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Introduction:
“Anyone who has seen me has seen the Father”

It is a noteworthy curiosity of modern thought that, however much it may be typified by its
famed “turn to the subject,” it has nevertheless been marked at nearly every crucial step by a quest,
not for subjectivity, but for objectivity. 1 It was for the sake of dispelling the illusions of intellectual
caprice so as to focus us resolutely on solid, practical reality that Bacon waived consideration of
formal and final causality in favor of the material and the efficient. 2 Similarly, it was to clear away
the crooked and irregular alleyways 3 of scholastic controversy that Descartes took up his
“wrecking-ball” of methodological doubt, 4 uncovering the self-knowing cogito as the foundation
of shared certainty. And it was to overcome Humean skepticism that Kant set upon a new course
for knowledge through his thematization of the transcendental subject. 5
Yet at each juncture, the result was a recession from, rather than a securing of, the object
of the mind’s quest. 6 A tragic dimension emerges here. The more the mind sought to grasp, the

1

“Objectivity” is loosely defined here as shared knowledge independent of incommunicable individual perspectives.
Naturally, the notion undergoes significant alterations through the course of the centuries. Kant, for instance, entertains
a quite different understanding than Aquinas would have had in his day. Hence a broad application of the term is
necessary here. As the two terms are correlative to one another, the same must go for “subjectivity” as goes for
“objectivity”: its application must be similarly broad. Initially we can define it as the incommunicable sphere (or
locus) of experience and action. As the paper proceeds, both concepts will attain to greater clarity.
2
See Francis Bacon, Cogitata et Visa. cf. id., The New Organon, Book II, aphorism 9.
3
cf. Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, Part II. “When one observes their indiscriminate juxtaposition…and the
consequent crookedness and irregularity of the streets…I thought that I could not do better than resolve at once to
sweep them wholly away.”
4
The expression is Hume’s, but it captures well the Cartesian approach. cf. Descartes, Mediations on the First
Philosophy, I: “The removal from below of the foundations necessarily entails the downfall of the whole edifice.”
5
See Immanuel Kant, Introduction to Critique of Pure Reason.
6
This cannot be regarded as purely innocent or accidental. From the outset, the modern project involved a certain
subordination of theory to the “relief of man’s estate” (see Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, Book I, v,
11), which cannot but also entail a subordination of the intellect to the will that inhibits the pursuit of truth.
Nevertheless, this is not the whole story. There is a sincerity in these figures’ quest that needs to be respected.
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less it possessed. Bacon, by effectively silencing its deepest questions, helped pave the way for a
positivism that could no longer discern being as an object for the mind, but only the “factual”
phenomena presented to the senses. Descartes, with his “new” foundation of knowledge, set the
table for all manner of skepticism, and generated a dualist occasionalism that could no longer
bridge the gap between the intellectual and material realms. The same pattern echoes down the
centuries. Husserl’s clarion call in his development of phenomenology was “back to the things
themselves,” 7 but this did not prevent his desire for scientific rigor from eventually forcing him
into solipsistic starting point. 8 And Heidegger, for all his moments of brilliance in recalling the
mind to an attentiveness to being-as-it-unveils-itself, ended by resolving philosophy back into a
poetic agnosticism. 9
Amid this rather desperate slide, Kant might briefly have appeared as a beacon of hope,
and would seem almost to have succeeded in his quest, if only his assertion of the universality of
the forms of transcendental understanding could be believed. But this dream was short-lived. With
the rise of cultural and historical consciousness in the nineteenth century, it soon dissolved into
the mists of Germanic folklore. For “cultural consciousness” amounted to the realization that men
of different places and tongues often think in strikingly different ways, ways not easily reducible
to so many erroneous deviations from the Prussian ideal. And to this realization, “historical
consciousness” provided the diachronic complement. For to be deep in history is, among other
things, to see that men of different ages also think in ways far different from men of one’s own:

7

Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol II.
i.e., in the development or shift from the more “realist” approach of the Investigations to the phenomenological
idealism detailed in Ideas. Husserl’s legacy remains ambiguous: while many positive fruits have emerged when his
methodology is paired with other complementary modes of analysis, many of his followers and intellectual descends
have only continued along the trajectory towards an ever-more isolated and incommunicable subjectivity. cf. Robert
Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 2000), 211-27.
9
cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar’s analysis in The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, Vol. V: The Realm of
Metaphysics in the Modern Age. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 429-50.
8
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working with different assumptions, asking different questions from different angles, even
estimating the value of logic in different ways. The upshot of all this is that the mind, far from
being a stable bedrock of universal knowledge, is something that moves and varies over time,
whose structures cannot be taken for granted from some pure a priori perspective that might claim
to provide us with a shared framework. Kant’s bold synthesis thus left us all the more confined in
the prisons of our modern minds. Yet again, each bold step forward served only to cement us
further in our banishment.
Granted, it was no coincidence that Kant’s project was derailed in this way. The
schematization of the structures of human subjectivity led naturally to a heightened sensitivity to
the variations which the mind might undergo in different times and places. When coupled with a
critical methodology that effectively sealed itself off from the “voice of being,” this newfound
awareness was left without a hermeneutic by which to discern a unity within the variety. 10 Hence,
as the “turn to the subject” progressed, the danger of total relativism loomed ever greater. 11 The
roots of this development predate the nineteenth century, of course, and all of the philosophers
mentioned here. The seeds of disintegrating historicism, positivism, and subjectivism can be seen
as early as the fourteenth century, 12 and acquire a special vigor in the Protestant Reformation. The

10
cf. Joseph Ratzinger, “Biblical Interpretation in Crisis: On the Question of the Foundations and Approaches of
Exegesis Today” in Biblical Interpretation in Crisis: the Ratzinger Conference on Bible and Church. (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1989), 15. Commenting on the shortcomings of historical-critical scholarship, he states: “The real
philosophic presupposition of the whole system seems to me to lie in the philosophic turning point proposed by
Immanuel Kant. According to him, the voice of being-in-itself cannot be heard by human beings. Man can hear it only
indirectly in the postulates of practical reason…small openings through which he can make contact with the real…For
the rest, as far as the context of his intellectual life is concerned, he must limit himself to the realm of the categories.
Thence comes the restriction to the positive, to the empirical, to the ‘exact’ science, which by definition excludes the
appearance of what is ‘wholly other.’”
11
The next attempt at unification came with Hegel and his all-embracing theory of history. This project too was bound
to fail. Knotted as it is by the often irrational decisions of human freedom, history is far too thorny a reality to squeeze
into elegant philosophical schemas.
12
cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, Vol V, 10-21.
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purpose here has not been not to lay out a strict chronology, but to point out the fruition of these
trends in late modernity and the challenge which they presented to the faith in that time.
Indeed, it is not difficult to see what a threat such a situation would pose to the life of faith.
From its inception, Christianity has been concerned with the bold proclamation of sure and certain
truths, truths on which men could stake their lives, and for which they have been willing to die.
Yet it was just this sort of thing that modern thought had difficulty embracing. Indeed, it seemed
preternaturally indisposed to such claims. No wonder, then, that attempts at a rapprochement
between faith and modernity were so often plagued by perils, and that the Church in turn grew so
readily suspicious of appeals to subjectivity and historical research. For these appeals, which
seemed necessary if faith was to retain its vitality in the modern age, tended toward the devaluation
of dogma in favor of a subjective experientialism that inevitably blunted the edge of the Church’s
kerygmatic proclamation. On the Protestant stage, this trend was initiated by Schleiermacher and
his definition of faith as the “feeling of absolute dependence.” 13 In the Catholic world, it was
advanced especially by Alfred Loisy, who reduced dogma to the symbolic expression of faith’s
experience, and finally relativized its value altogether. 14
In response to such distortions, Catholic orthodoxy countered with a firm insistence upon
the objectivity and stability of its confession. 15 This took the form of a presentation that placed a
heavy emphasis on faith’s doctrinal or propositional aspect and left very little room for notions of

13

See Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith. cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic
Theory. Vol III: Dramatis Personae. trans. Graham Harrison. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 60-2.
14
cf. Marvin R. O’Connell, Critics on Trial: An Introduction to the Catholic Modernist Crisis. (Washington, D.C.:
Catholic University of America, 1994), 1-9, 178-83, 194-7, 240-51, 312-14. cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love Alone
is Credible. tans. D.C. Schindler. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 40.
15
Once again, like the malady it sought to address, this response had its roots in earlier controversies, specifically in
the anti-Protestant polemics that sought to oppose the Reformation’s assertion of a rupture between scripture and
tradition. Nevertheless, it took on new shape and energy in the controversies of the nineteenth century. cf. O’Connell,
Critics on Trial, 22-39, 132-54, 333-54.
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historical development. 16 Again, the correlations here are no coincidence. The need to insist upon
faith’s objectivity led naturally to a focus on its conceptual content, since it is precisely by the
abstract concept that the human mind is able to transcend the particularities of its individual
experience and arrive at a shared knowledge that measures the mind. Lacking this transcendence,
we find ourselves still enmeshed in a subjectivism that is unable to enter into a communal
profession. Hence the felt need, in the contest against modernism, for theologians to insist upon
the distinct conceptual clarity of faith’s content, and the concomitant tendency to conceive of faith
as a list of propositions to be believed on the basis of verified authority. 17
This identification of the faith’s object with its propositional content was connected in turn
to an insistence upon a more or less absolute continuity of the faith’s articulation throughout
history. If the content of faith simply is its propositional articulation, then any serious variation in
this articulation would seem to undermine faith’s essence. Thus the only allowable form of
“development” within the tradition was that of the occasional deduction drawn from the
combination of various previously held propositions. 18 Aside from such logical exercises, no other
ambiguities were allowed. This naturally left little room for history in theology. Insofar as it was
admitted into the field at all, it took the form of the radical “successionist” 19 narratives typical of
anti-Protestant polemicists like Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, wherein every modern credenda had to

16

Cardinal Manning provides us with an example of this viewpoint when he described Vatican I’s Pastor Aeternus as
“the triumph of dogma over history.” See Kenneth L. Parker and C. Michael Shea, “The Roman Catholic Reception
of the Essay on Development,” in Receptions of Newman. (Oxford: University Press, 2015), 46.
17
i.e., not an authority dependent on subjective experience but on a combination of preambula fidei and supernatural
signs, all of which can be established by apodictic proof.
18
Such were the theories of the Baroque Scholastics: de Lugo, Suarez, Molina, Vazquez, et. al.
19
This term is used by Parker and Shea to refer to an “a-historical vision of the Christian past.” See Receptions of
Newman, 32.
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be explicitly traceable to the oral tradition of the Apostles. 20 But this practice more often resembled
proof-texting than it did rigorous historical study.
At this point, we can risk a summarizing thesis, drawing together the abovementioned
correlations: the more one exclusively emphasizes subjectivity in faith, the more likely one will be
to admit fluctuations in its doctrinal articulations; and the more one exclusively emphasizes
objectivity in faith, the more likely one will be to deny any such fluctuation. 21 If the first of these
tendencies finds its extreme instantiation in the modernism that eviscerates the ongoing
significance of past dogmatic commitments, we can discern the opposite extreme in some of the
reactions against modernism. With the rise of neoscholastic Thomism after the promulgation of
Aeterni Patris, the fight against heresy became identified with the construction of an ideal
conceptual system, built on the buttresses of a rigorous natural philosophy, whose crystalline
clarity and apodictic proofs left little room for appeal to subjective experience. The result was an
understanding of faith that can justly be called “ahistorical”: since truth was adequately secured
through appeal to dogmatic promulgation and rigorous metaphysical reasoning, historical study
became, strictly speaking, superfluous—nice window-dressing perhaps, but not essential to
theology. 22

20

Bossuet stands as the classic example of this style of quasi-historical argumentation. In his Continuity of Religion,
he sets forth the perfect uninterrupted continuity of the Church, in contrast to the deviations of the heretics, as the
principal sign of her divine provenance. “What continuity, what tradition, what wonderful concatenation!” JacquesBénigne Bossuet, The Continuity of Religion. (Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto Publications, 1930), 190-1, 201-6. See also
Owen Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman. (Cambridge: University Press, 1987).
21
Once again, subjectivity that is self-aware of its limitations is more prone to see the modulations of subjectivity
throughout history: as I exist in a particular historical moment (i.e., as my subjectivity is historically conditioned), so
too did the men who existed before me. The ancient tension between Heraclitus and Parmenides reemerges here in a
new light.
22
This statement paints in broad strokes, of course. It is not intended to typify all of neoscholastic thought, much less
all of Thomism. But it does describe significant tendency of the period that would eventually come to be seen as
problematic.
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This resurgence of Thomism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries played a
pivotal role in defending orthodoxy against the modernist incursions of its times. Nevertheless, it
did not take long before certain expressions of dissatisfaction began to be voiced from various
quarters in the Church regarding this mode of theologizing. The concerns centered on the question
of whether faith could really survive without reference to history and subjective experience.
Concerning history, ongoing research into the writings of the Church Fathers, continuing the line
of work begun in Tübingen and Oxford in the nineteenth century, was unearthing a wealth of
insights (especially in the areas of anthropology, ecclesiology and liturgy) that did not appear in
the neoscholastic manuals of the day, and which provided possible points of departure for a more
positive engagement with certain contemporary modes of thought, especially existentialism,
phenomenology and personalism. 23 Could theology afford to consign these profound thinkers of
past generations to the archives of history, assuming that all of their useful insights were already
synthesized within the Thomistic system? 24 Must it not rather continually return to revivify itself
in these ever-fruitful sources?
This question became more urgent when posed in relation to the Scriptures. For
neoscholastic theology very often gave the impression that it had adequately synthesized within
itself not only the insights of all previous theologians, but also the very contents of the Scriptures
themselves, such that theology had no real need to return even to these sources, but could occupy
itself mainly with teasing out the finer details of its system. Indeed, statements were sometimes
made to the effect that theology actually improved upon Scripture, insofar as it rendered its content

23

Ratzinger, in his memoirs, alludes to these philosophical trends when speaks of the desire shared by his generation
of seminarians to “listen to the voices of man today.” See Joseph Ratzinger, Milestones: Memoirs, 1927-1977. (San
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), 42-44.
24
Interestingly, insofar as the neoscholastic Thomism of the time approached this attitude, it came formally close to
Hegel, and his subordination of history to the synthetic dynamism of ideal spirit. This neglects the role played by
“forgetting” in tradition, and thus the need for fresh recollection. cf. Joseph Mueller, “Forgetting as a Principle of
Continuity in Tradition.” Theological Studies LXX:4 (2009), 751-81.
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more clearly, purifying it of its obscurities. 25 For all practical purposes, then, Scripture was reduced
to the role of handmaid to theology and dogma: hauled in when a proof-text was required, but
hardly functioning as a living source.
Here the question could not but be asked: had not a vital order been inverted in all this?
Had not theology, and with it the teaching office, placed itself in a position over and above the
Scriptures, rather than taking up the role of the servant from below? Is it revelation that is under
the Church, or rather the Church that is under revelation? 26 This question relates beyond itself to
that of whether revelation is best regarded simply a past event, whose content has been effectively
“mastered” and which we now merely hear about through authoritative witnesses, or whether it
retains an ongoing presence in and hence a present lordship over the life of the Church. If the latter,
then it would seem that theology has a duty to constantly return to the living fonts of revelation in
order to be continually renewed therein, fonts whose content can never be synthetically mastered.
This line of questioning presses to a deeper level still. For is Jesus himself merely a figure
from the past whom believers only hear about, or is he someone whom they can personally know
as the revelation of the Father? (Jn 14:9) If the latter, then must not theology also continually return

25

A late example of this tendency can be detected in Yves Simon, “The Rationality of Christian Faith.” Thought
XXXI:4 (1956): 495-508. “Prior to theological work, revealed truths are expressed in the confused concepts of common
sense and of Christian sense; it is up to theology to express the same truths with a greater degree of appropriateness
and precision. The transition from the more confused to the more distinct, independently of any fresh discovery of
truth, is a progress in quality and intensity; it is, in the most proper sense, a progress in intelligence.” (504) Ratzinger
sees traces of the same attitude in Humani Generis 21, which laments “how false is a procedure which would attempt
to explain what is clear by means of what is obscure,” and defines the task of theology as that of showing “how a
doctrine defined by the Church is contained in the sources of revelation.” Ratzinger comments: “One can hardly deny
that the point of view which sees only Scripture as what is unclear, but the teaching office as what is clear, is a very
limited one…” Joseph Ratzinger, Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II. Vol III. ed. Herbert Vorgrimler. (New
York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 197. The point here is not to imply that there is no sense in which the import of
revelation is clarified by its progressive propositional articulation; it is simply to observe that there is always another
sense in which scripture remains more clear and more “appropriate” than any theological gloss, such that it always
behooves theology to return to scripture to be judged by it. Failure to appreciate this is an indicator of rationalism,
which can conceive of no other clarity than that of the concept.
26
See Ratzinger, Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, 197: “to reduce the task of theology to the proof of the
presence of the statements of the teaching office in the sources is to threaten the primacy of the sources which, (were
one to continue logically in this direction) would ultimately destroy the serving character of the teaching office…its
primary service is to listen.”
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above all to the Source of all sources, Jesus Christ, and can this be done without admitting vital
spaces for subjective experience within the structure of faith? 27 The New Testament certainly does
speak of intellectual commitments as constitutive elements of faith, but it is also inclusive of
elements of experience, encounter, relationship and discipleship, all of which involve more
personal modes of “knowing.” 28 Is it possible to isolate the content of such a faith from the
transformation undergone by the human subject, as though it were accessible on some neutral
ground? 29 To some it seemed that neoscholasticism, with its hyper-objectivity, had conceded too
much ground to the spirit of modern positivism, adopting “positivistic criteria” to measure the
certitude of faith, and reducing its “sources” to the level of positive “historical sources,” 30 thereby

27

See Joseph Ratzinger, “The Ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council,” trans. Stephen Wentworth Arndt, in
Joseph Ratzinger in Communio. Vol I: The Unity of the Church. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 2010), 63-66.
28
cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar’s treatment in The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, Vol. I: Seeing the Form.
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 127-32.
29
This is the principal objection of Karl Barth to what he considers an inherent tendency of Catholic theology. See
Avery Cardinal Dulles, Models of Revelation. (New York: Orbis Books, 1992), 89-90: “Barth ridicules the apologist,
who has to go forth from theology carrying a white flag and seeking the parley with unbelief on neutral ground.”
30
See Ratzinger, Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, 178, where he accuses neoscholasticism of attempting
to “make the certainty of faith measurable by positivist criteria so that it may compete with the positivism which
dominates all contemporary thinking.” cf. ibid., 191: “In a typically modern spirit of positivism, it identified revelation
with its historical presentation and thus falsified the original idea of ‘sources’ in the theological sense in favor of an
historical idea of ‘source.’”
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effectively excising any personal dimension from faith. Theology could no longer address the
heart. 31 Even the life of prayer and mysticism had been formalized into conceptual systems. 32
Thus the critique of a growing consortium of theological writers in the twentieth century
can be summed up as follows: theology cannot leave its sources behind, or cease returning to them
as though this were some already accomplished project. 33 Faith and dogmatic theology cannot be
one thing, and the knowing and following of Jesus another. My subjective-historical experience of
knowing Christ in word and sacrament cannot simply be one thing, and revelation another. The
mystical life of grace cannot be one thing, and discipleship another. The authority of the Christian
conscience cannot be one thing, and that of the Church another. 34 In other words there was a felt
need for a renewed integration to take place in theology, wherein the collective wisdom of the

31

However much this deficiency may have been counteracted by the robust devotional life of the times, the mutual
isolation of the two realms was clearly problematic. For theology risks becoming wonder-less and cavalier when
isolated from devotion, and devotion risks growing shallow and prone to deviations when cut off from theology. This
problematic is a crucial element of Henri de Lubac’s critique of natura pura schemas: forced by the conditions of their
dialectic to deny any direct correlation between grace and natural human desire, they effectively sealed off any avenue
by which theological truth might appeal to the heart. John Henry Newman, in his preface to the third edition of The
Via Media, accounts for the possibility of such disjunctions in the life of the Church by the noting the necessary
complexity of her threefold mission (priestly, prophetic and kingly): the demands of truth, of worship and of political
prudence do not always perfectly align in this world, though they will never contradict each other absolutely. Thus
certain disjunctions can and do arise in the history of the Church without prejudice to her supernatural and divine
character. Nevertheless, such disjunctions cannot be ultimate. Hence there is need for the three offices to remain in
close connection with each other, moderating and enlightening one another. As devotion must at times be corrected
by theology and pastoral authority, so theology must at times be tempered and measured in her conclusions by the
prerogatives of charity and devotion. He gives many examples of such corrections in history. De Lubac’s may
represent another. See John Henry Newman, “Preface to the Third Edition” in The Via Media of the Anglican Church.
(London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1888), xxxvi-xciv.
32
The ascetical manuals that proliferated throughout the modern period, while they collected much of the authentic
wisdom of the saints and so retain a perennial value as places of reference, must nevertheless be regarded as highly
questionable in terms of their spiritual fruits, insofar as they attempted to reduce the ways of God’s Spirit in people’s
lives to a rigid and rational system, neglecting the freedom that “blows where it wills.” God always retains the rights
the break the rules we might set for him, insofar as these are distinct from the rules which he sets for himself.
33
Ratzinger notes that renewal in the Church generally comes by way of someone returning directly to the scriptural
word and discovering its demands anew. See Joseph Ratzinger, “Conscience in Time,” trans. W.J. O’Hara, in Joseph
Ratzinger in Communio, Vol II: Anthropology and Culture. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), 25: “something
happened which we find more than once in the story of the saint. He suddenly realized that a particular passage in
Scripture, which he happened to come across, is meant quite literally and that he must take it literally.”
34
Distinctions in ratio do not necessarily amount to distinctions in re.
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Church could be tied back more directly to its personal Source, so that the Whole could once again
shine out more clearly in the parts. 35
Naturally, the “movement” being referred to here—which is generally associated with term
“ressourcement”—was nowhere near so uniform or explicitly articulated as this presentation
would seem to indicate. Here we are seeking simply to distill a widespread agitation for reform,
never entirely self-consistent and often only partially stated, 36 and hence not easily categorized by
a single label, 37 and yet which came to be recognized as a legitimate voice of protest against the
over-identification of theology with its objective and ahistorical pole: modernism cannot be
defeated simply by a thrust in the opposite direction, for here modernity’s tragic breach would
remain unhealed. Initially, in the anti-modernist air of the early twentieth century, this call was
met with considerable suspicion and even ecclesial reprobation. 38 Nevertheless, it would go on to
enjoy considerable influence in the Church, especially in shaping the documents of the Second
Vatican Council, after which it attained an unquestioned dominance over the theological scene in
the second half of the twentieth century. 39

35

i.e., the personal Whole, who can be known only by persons, and who might fail to appear if the forest is lost for
the trees.
36
The critique was generally prosecuted simply by highlighting counter-examples of theological method within
patristic sources, rather than outright criticism of the regnant Thomism. It was only after certain Thomists sniffed out
the implicit challenge in this project that the parties entered into direct controversy. In 1946, the Dominican Thomist
Père Marie-Michel Labourdette published a pair of essays in the Revue Thomiste which aimed sharp criticism at the
new movement. This provoked a response, and forced ressourcement thinkers to more clearly articulate their criticism.
See Aidan Nichols, “Thomism and the Nouvelle Theologie.” The Thomist 64 (2000), 3-4.
37
Such titles as “liturgical movement,” “biblical movement,” nouvelle theologie, and ressourcement achieve only
partial success in naming the dynamic we are referring to, as it can be detected in all of these, and yet cannot be limited
to any one such group of thinkers. With this said, ressourcement is probably the best term to capture the whole, as the
desire to “return to the sources” is a common thread throughout.
38
Namely, in Humani Generis and the subsequent silencing of such luminaries as Henri de Lubac and Yves Congar,
though it should be noted that the document takes care not to specify any particular theologians as subject to its rebuke,
and with every forceful denunciation also cracks the window open just enough so as to leave space for future
developments. Ratzinger speaks of an “anti-modernist neurosis” that “crippled the Church” in the era preceding the
Council. See Joseph Ratzinger, Theological Highlights of Vatican II. (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2009), 27.
39
Together with this post-conciliar ascendency, though, the divisions within the movement also became much more
evident, especially as many post-conciliar theologians gravitated toward outright infidelity to magisterial authority.
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Recent decades, however, have witnessed renewed criticism of ressourcement 40 theology
and its descendents, calling into question whether its own critiques of neoscholastic Thomism were
justified, and whether it did not in fact simply return the Church to a modernist crisis that
dramatically undermined the stability of the faith after the Council. 41 To name but a few among
many possible examples, Steven A. Long, in accordance with his reassertion of the baroque
scholastic tradition regarding nature and grace, has argued against the centrality of history in
theology, and for a return to “pure” philosophy as the only adequate foundation for a theology
capable of arriving at truth amidst a sea of relativism. 42 More recently, Mats Wahlberg has urged,
against the manifestational models common in much of ressourcement theology, 43 the necessity
of a stand-alone propositional revelation as a condition of faith’s intelligibility. 44 In these two
cases, which represent a broad set of recent literature, the ultimate validity of history and
subjectivity as reference points in theology is being called into question.
These arguments, and other associated with them, hearken back with greater or lesser
nuance to those of the principal opponent of the ressourcement in the 1940’s: Père Réginald
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Garrigou-Lagrange. First in a brief article and then in a more extensive essay, 45 Rome’s leading
Dominican dogmatic theologian alerted the Church against what he took to be a renewed incursion
of modernist thought within the life of the Church. His principal objection focused on the claim,
advanced by some within the movement, 46 that dogmatic content could be preserved amid
changing conceptual forms. This claim, he argued, was rooted in Maurice Blondel’s dubious
(re)definition of truth as the conformity of mind with life (rather than with reality), and culminated
in the eventual evacuation of all objective content from faith. For without stability in its concepts,
the mind can have no hope of securing a grasp of extra-mental reality:
How could, in these conciliar definitions, the word to be [i.e., the copula]…make an immutable
proposition, whose two terms are continually mutable? It would mean that an iron hook can
stay immovably united to the waves of the sea. How can a judgment have an immutable value
if there is not immutability in the first apprehension, in the notions themselves that this
judgment reunites? 47

In such a case, Garrigou-Lagrange argues, faith can only reduce to one thing: spiritual experience;
all dogmatic statements become relative to this measure. “Thereby,” he writes, “behold our return
to Modernism.” 48 When the mind neglects its potency to the to the actuality of external reality, it
finds itself locked in an inescapable prison. With this order inverted, it can no longer come to
certitude about anything outside of itself, whether it be the existence of God, the miraculous signs
that might spur it to faith, or the conceptual content to which it is to assent. 49 Thus faith is
undermined. Thomism, by contrast, is nothing other than the full schematization of the

45
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13

philosophical priority of act over potency, reality over mind, God over creature: the sole antidote
to the modern ailment. 50 To neglect it is necessarily to slide back into the pit. Hence the perils of
the “new theology.” 51
The experience of post-conciliar chaos in the life of the Church has led many to return to
these arguments of Garrigou-Lagrange with renewed attention and sympathy. Hence, in many
quarters, a new shadow of suspicion has fallen over the figures of the ressourcement and their
projects. All of this is mentioned here not to render an immediate judgment on the controversy,
but simply to show that the tensions involved in the Church’s engagement with the modern world
are far from resolved. The questions remain urgent. Can a purely “objective” theology be adequate
to its task? Can theology survive without rigorous appeal to subjective experience and to history?
Can such an appeal take its place in the heart of theology without ushering it to a destructive
relativism? The ongoing vitality and integrity of faith in the modern world will depend, in part,52
on how we answer these questions.

*

*

*

This brief historical survey was necessary to set the stage for the topic of this paper, which
will investigate how two important modern theologians, John Henry Newman and Joseph
Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI), have sought to correlate the objective and subjective elements of
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faith in fruitful and creative ways. In this pursuit we will try to avoid both saying too little and too
much. We will not limit ourselves, for instance, to the simple claim that Newman’s theological
vision had significant influence on the thought of Ratzinger-Benedict. This much is clear from the
fact that Ratzinger was a German theologian coming of age in the mid-twentieth century, 53 as from
the numerous places in his writings where he speaks explicitly to such an influence. 54 Two of
Ratzinger’s most beloved seminary professors were devoted students of Newman’s thought, 55 and
the latter’s themes crop up repeatedly throughout the Ratzingerian corpus. Most of all, Newman’s
impact on Ratzinger is clear in the words by which Pope Benedict XVI praised the great convert
at his beatification ceremony: “He has long been an important influence on my life and
thought…[an] enduring witness to [God’s] truth.” 56 That Ratzinger revered Newman’s thought,
and saw him as principal shaper of his own mind: this much can be taken for granted. On the other
hand, we will not go so far as to try to trace any direct lines of dependence between the two
thinkers. Ratzinger’s thought is far too rich to admit of reduction to any single influence. That his
reading of the English cardinal was shaped and colored by an array of alternative influences: this
too can be taken for granted. It would be incomplete simply to characterize Ratzinger as a
Newmanian.
Rather this paper will aim to unveil a common shape that appears in the thought of both
figures, one which comes to light especially as the two are read together and allowed to mutually
illumine and support one another. As this mutual illumination unfolds, we will find that the
common shape that emerges can provide us with a powerful resource by which to approach the
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theological difficulties of our age. For both of these men, whose projects parallel each other in
significant respects, present us with a seeming paradox that challenges our modern dichotomies:
both fought against theological liberalism and its attendant relativism, not by eschewing
subjectivity and history, but rather precisely by embracing of them. To put it briefly, we can say
that Newman defended the objectivity of dogma through an appeal to subjective imagination that
allowed him to mediate between stability and development in Christian history. Ratzinger, in his
turn, defended the continuity of tradition through an appeal to historical development that
depended on an intimate correlation between faith’s objective and subjective (i.e., experiential)
aspects. The specific contours of these patterns and their interrelationship will come into greater
clarity as the paper progresses.
The investigation will proceed as follows: first, in a section focusing largely on Newman’s
thought and only secondarily on Ratzinger’s, we will investigate the interrelationship between the
subjective and the objective in its various aspects. This will lay the groundwork for an appreciation
of how his theory of development depends upon his unique approach to epistemology. Second, in
a section that will gradually shift its focus to Ratzinger’s thought, we will turn to the question of
history, and how the poles of stability and dynamism can be correlated within a theological vision,
noting especially the ways in which Ratzinger’s developments help to counter certain objections
to Newman’s articulation, while carrying forward its latent possibilities; it is here that we will
encounter the central idea enabling a culminating synthesis. Finally, in a concluding section, we
will look to apply the insights garnered from our investigation to the contemporary life of the
Church, showing how they can help us to resolve the deep tensions that continue to affect her
communion and her ability to engage in the mission entrusted to her. We hope to show that these
two thinkers, especially when taken together, can provide us with a model of how the light of
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revelation can enable us to overcome the modern dilemma precisely from within, both for its
resolution and for the faith’s advancement in the world today.

Part I: Objectivity and Subjectivity
A. Faith’s Objectivity
No honest treatment of the subjective and historical aspects of Newman’s and Ratzinger’s
thought could justly begin without stating clearly from the outset that the primary concern of both
men lay in the affirmation of faith’s objectivity and constancy. This is especially true of Newman,
and it was the principal fault of many of his late-nineteenth-century readers that they passed over
this sine qua non of his thought in order to isolate those elements that best suited their
subjectivism. 57 Ratzinger, however, in a semi-autobiographical speech on the occasion of the
centenary of Newman’s death, makes clear that the latter’s project had nothing to do with such
modernism: “His life’s work [was] a struggle against the growing tendency to view religion as a
purely private and subjective matter, a question of personal opinion,” asserting instead that it
involved an “objective reality.” 58 We hear the same affirmation from Newman’s own lips on the
occasion of his creation as a cardinal: “I rejoice to say, to one great mischief I have from the first
opposed myself. For thirty, forty, fifty years I have resisted to the best of my powers the spirit of
liberalism in religion.” 59 His principal foe then, against which he focused his intellectual energies
and in relation to which he framed his mission, was liberalism, which he elsewhere called the “anti-
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dogmatic” principle. 60 We cannot properly understand his achievement unless we grasp this
fundamental thrust.
Faith, for Newman, is essentially dogmatic, and cannot be conceived apart from its
submission to an authoritatively proclaimed truth. This conviction stemmed in part from the
powerful conversion experience that shaped him as a young man, wherein, he recounts, “I received
into my intellect the impressions of dogma.” 61 Thus “from the age of fifteen, dogma has been the
fundamental principle of my religion; I know no other sort of religion; religion, as mere sentiment,
is to me a dream and a mockery.” 62 Such “religion” is a dream and a mockery because it lacks any
definite content by which to lift man out of his own pathetic measure and into the measure of God,
which alone can account for true conversion of life. Genuine dogmatic faith, on the other hand,
involves the necessary transcending of the narrow confines of the individual subject, of one’s own
opinion, experience and private judgment, unto a horizon of truth that stands outside of and above
oneself, in submission to an authority that comes to meet one with a definite message of salvation.
Such was the message entrusted to the apostles, confessed by the martyrs, proclaimed through the
centuries, set forth by councils and popes—“they had a message to deliver to the world…a definite
message to high and low, from the world's Maker”— and the authority with which it is proclaimed
belongs to its essence. 63 That faith has such a definite content, then, that it demands the submission
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of our minds and can accordingly be set “irrevocably” into human language by a legitimated
authority: this lies at the heart of Newman’s concern. 64
Liberalism, by contrast, eviscerates faith’s authoritative power by submitting it to a human
standard and to the dominance of finite reason. Newman describes it as “false liberty of
thought…the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their
nature beyond and independent of it.” 65 Following the lead set forth by John Locke, many wellintentioned apologists in the Anglican world had attempted to defend Christian doctrine by appeal
to rational proofs, whereby they hoped to show faith to be in accordance with reason. Locke, in
his Essay concerning Human Understanding defined the love of truth for truth’s sake as “the not
entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon will warrant.” 66
This is what it meant to be rational: not to affirm anything beyond that which can be explicitly
demonstrated. Thus, if faith is to concur with the canons of intellectual honesty, its assents must
be warranted at each step by sufficient proofs. In this conception, reason precedes faith and secures
its foundations. Faith’s assent enters in only after the proposed truth has been rationally
demonstrated. 67 It is not difficult to see how this apologetic tack unwittingly paves the way for a
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reduction of faith to mere changing human philosophy: 68 dogma’s authority is replaced by that of
the human mind, 69 and, as each “proof” is called into question, the body of Christian truth shrinks
down to the point where it no longer has any content left but that of mere “feeling.” 70 Thus it
conduces ultimately to a doctrine of “justification by faith independently of beliefs.” 71
Against this reductive conception, Newman—in an objection not dissimilar to Karl Barth’s
later protests against the apologetics of German Protestantism—counters: faith does not depend
on human reason but on the testimony of God. It does not rely upon “intrinsic grounds” of the
mind but on “the external authority of the Divine Word.” 72 It is not a conclusion drawn from
experience or logical premises, but the childlike acceptance of testimony, a “spontaneous
movement,” 73 “complete in itself,” 74 responding at once to the trustworthiness of the messenger
and to the “intrinsic excellence” of the message. 75 As such, it is capable of taking the mind beyond
that which it is able to grasp by its own machinations, and to this extent assumes the form of a
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positive law over the mind. 76 Newman does not hesitate to strike a seemingly stoic note here: as
the truth revealed is supernatural, 77 “vouchsafed to us from above” with “divine sanction,” it
demands the strictest obedience from man: 78 a “submission” 79 wherein the “Catholic sacrifices his
opinion,” 80 along with his feelings and private imagination, 81 to the Word of God. In a passage
reminiscent of St. John of the Cross, Newman even speaks of a darkening of the intellect that must
precede faith’s illumination:
If the Gospel be a message, as it is, it ever must be more or less what the multitude of self-wise
reasoners declare it shall not be,—a law; it must be of the nature of what they call a form, and
a bondage; it must, in its degree, bring darkness, instead of flattering them with the promise of
immediate illumination; and must enlighten them only in proportion as they first submit to be
darkened. 82

In this way does faith counteract that liberalism which is the “exaltation of man without submission
to God.” 83 For it reminds the rationalist who “makes himself his own center,” 84 and all those who
“walk by their own light…because self is their supreme teacher,” 85 that “the mind is below truth,
not above it.” 86 Humble submission to God is the only path to wisdom.
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Thus, while faith gravitates naturally toward wisdom, it remains distinct from and prior to
it. Certainly, the purpose of faith’s many doctrines is to impress a simplicity upon us,87 and hence
it belongs to faith to seek that wisdom which sees one thing flowing from another, and ties the
parts together into a unified whole. This is the province of theology, and why the latter retains a
pivotal role in the life of the Church. Nevertheless, faith comes before such comprehension and
does not depend on it. First the mind assents; only afterward does it reason: 88
Faith from the first makes men willing, with the Apostle, to be fools for Christ's sake. Faith
sets out with putting reasoning aside as out of place, and proposes instead simple obedience to
a revealed command. 89

This is what distinguishes gospel faith from any “mere philosophy thrown upon the world,” subject
to the changing thoughts of men. 90 It is not a product of human inference, which can at most attain
to a “divine principle,” but a response to the “Divine Agent” 91 that is capable of knowing Him as
a Person and hence of recognizing His authority. 92 Faith proceeds from personal authority, and not
from personal reflection. 93 It is no “private imagination,” 94 much less a “private judgment.” 95 It
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does not develop from below, but rather descends “from above” as a “substantive
message…guarded and preserved in a visible polity.” 96
It is this “visible polity” that preserves the faith in its objective character as something prior
to human reflection, “public, fixed and permanent,” and it was so that the Gospel might be
“acknowledged and authenticated” as such that God “framed a Society of men to be its home, its
instrument, and its guarantee.” 97 For revelation cannot be recognized except as infallible, and no
infallible revelation could be given were there not an infallible authority to secure it. 98 Thus does
Newman call the Church a “divine creation,” an “Oracle of Truth,” a “teacher sent you from
God,” 99 with “a claim on [men’s] love and obedience.” 100 Submission to her is part and parcel of
the believer’s submission to God and His revelation, and must necessarily extend to a reverent
adherence to the linguistic formulations of her dogmatic definitions. For, crucially, “the right
exercise of words is involved in the right exercise of thought.” 101 Hence the dogmatic principle:
any doctrinal relativism is abhorrent to Newman’s spirit.
If all this sounds rather austere, it should be noted here above all that Newman’s principal
objection to liberalism was its failure to produce a religion of the heart. Here we begin to see
something of Newman’s paradoxical approach. The real flaw of liberalism, he says, is that it
imagines “that belief belongs to the mere intellect, and not to the heart also.” 102 In one sense, then,
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the problem is not that liberalism is “too subjective,” but rather that it is not nearly “subjective”
enough. It does not strike deeply enough. Rather it flits about the surface, imagining itself detached
and indifferent to the matters it ponders, holding itself as “a critic and a judge, not an inquirer...he
negotiates and bargains…[and] will not throw himself upon and into the evidence.” 103 But this is
precisely what distinguishes mere philosophy from faith: “one is held as a matter of indifference,
the other as a matter of life and death; one is held by the intellect only, the other also by the
heart.” 104 Faith is held by the heart as by the conscience, which by “secret instinct” 105 prompts
men to embrace the revealed word. 106 Thus it avoids the “fatal error of secular reason” 107 which
imagines truth can be judged without “preparation of heart” and “approached without homage.”108
Rather, remembering that man does not set the conditions for God, 109 it earnestly seeks and humbly
embraces the revealed word once it is discovered.
Only in this way, only if revelation comes down from above to address the depths of man’s
conscience with divine authority, can religion truly be a matter of life and death. Only this can
account for that “spirit that made the martyrs.” 110 A religion of private judgment would lack the
mettle to inspire such sacrifice, just as any human authority would lack the leverage to request it.
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Only divine authority could inspire and call forth such an otherwise disproportionate act of love.
In other words, dogma is the only proportionate condition for martyrdom. Only if I first stake my
life on my profession am later I willing to die for it. This is central to Newman’s appreciation of
dogma: “Dogmatism was in teaching, what confession was in act.” 111 This tells us something,
perhaps, about the experience that marked him as a youth: the “impression of dogma” he received
there struck him with such force that only a transcendent source, a truth larger than the mind, could
account for it. It also tells us something about the deepest reasons for Newman’s insistence that
faith must involve a transcendence of the finite subject in submission to an authority outside and
above oneself: faith has to be dogmatic precisely in order to strike man to the heart. Cor ad cor
loquitur. 112
B. The Subjective Aspect

From the conclusion of the preceding section it should now be clear that Newman’s
insistence upon the objectivity of faith in no way entailed a denigration of human subjectivity.
Indeed, it is his appreciation of human subjectivity that most impresses one upon examining
Newman’s writings, and this appreciation which captivated the French modernists who read him
so ravenously in the late nineteenth century. 113 While the failure of these men to appreciate also
Newman’s dogmatic principle led them to gravely miscarry the import of his writings, the later
neoscholastic attempt to read Newman into their own objective formalism was no less detrimental
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to an adequate reception of his thought. 114 No neoscholastic manual could ever produce one of
those numerous passages in Newman’s corpus that evidence such a finely nuanced grasp of the
inner workings of the human mind:
The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward with a quickness which has
become a proverb, and a subtlety and versatility which baffle investigation. It passes on from
point to point, gaining one by some indication; another on a probability; then availing itself of
an association; then falling back on some received law; next seizing on testimony; then
committing itself to some popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure
memory; and thus it makes progress not unlike a clamberer on a steep cliff, who, by quick eye,
prompt hand, and firm foot, ascends how he knows not himself; by personal endowments and
by practice, rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him, and unable to teach another. It is
not too much to say that the stepping by which great geniuses scale the mountains of truth is
as unsafe and precarious to men in general, as the ascent of a skilful mountaineer up a literal
crag. It is a way which they alone can take; and its justification lies in their success. And such
mainly is the way in which all men, gifted or not gifted, commonly reason,—not by rule, but
by an inward faculty. 115

The reader of Newman becomes accustomed to this experience, oftentimes breathtaking, of having
his mind set before him and explained as if for the first time, words being given to experiences he
had previously only half-sensed and guessed at, which he had perhaps always suspected but could
never bring out into a fully explicit articulation. Such creative perception, such profound
phenomenological insight, 116 such delicate sensitivity, could only be the product of a modern mind,
one who appreciated the modern predicament and did not seek simply to extract himself from it.
Newman was indeed a lover of the human mind and heart, and could imagine no final
opposition between objective “dogmatic correctness” and a “so-called religion of the heart.” 117 As
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we have seen, a principal fault of liberalism for Newman was its supposition “that belief is a matter
of the intellect only and not also of the heart.” 118 The heart, then, in its orientation to the truth, is
a fundamental category for Newman, and it plays a crucial role in his theology and anthropology.
His dogmatism cannot be properly appreciated in isolation from this complementary principle. His
deep respect for human subjectivity, and especially for Christian subjectivity and conscience,
constitutes one of the principal shaping forces of his mind.
This respect is evident in Newman’s hesitancy to impose too much upon the minds of the
faithful, and his ultimate discomfort with a model of faith that would leave no breathing space for
reason and personal conscience. Dogma is not meant simply to steamroll the human mind,
reducing it to a purely passive submission, but rather to become an internal enlivening force. 119
This is why the Church, according to Newman, must exercise her dogmatic authority with great
moderation so as not to overburden the faithful, not imposing judgments as a “luxury of devotion”
but solely as a “stern painful necessity.” 120 Hence, he says, “she has ever shown the utmost care
to contract, as far as possible, the range of truths and the sense of propositions, of which she
demands this absolute reception.” 121 Hence “she only speaks when it is necessary” 122 and imposes
only the “strict interpretation” of her pronouncements, which extends only to the conclusions
themselves and not to reasons by which they are adduced. 123 By the same measure, Newman
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expresses his “repugnance to impose upon the faith of others more than what the Church distinctly
claims of them.” 124 Such an attitude, far from the charge of minimalism hurled at it by certain
“tyrannous ipse-dixits” 125 of Newman’s day, is simply the respectful reverence with which the
generous piety of the faithful deserves to be met. 126
This same reverence is reflected in Newman’s ecclesiology, wherein he is always careful
to leave space for the prophetic current alongside the episcopal, even as he is equally careful to
avoid any merely democratic interpretations. 127 Episcopal authority is of course beyond question
for Newman, but he shuns any one-sided portrayal that would construe its teachings solely as
external imposition, failing to take into account the Spirit that stirs from within.128 Rather, he
prefers to speak in terms of a shared breath that moves between the magisterium and the faithful,
a “conspiratio,” the two partakers of which ought always to be taken “together, as one twofold
testimony, illustrating each other, and never to be divided.” 129 As both share the same truth, there
can be no dichotomy between the teacher and the taught. Certainly, the correspondence between
inspired obedience and inspired teaching is a crucial aspect of this mutuality, but the same Spirit
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that inspires obedience also endows the faithful with a certain ‘sensus’ for faith’s mysteries, 130 “a
sort of instinct, or φρόνημα” planted “deep in the bosom of the mystical body.” 131 This “sense” or
“feeling,” especially when it expands to become the con-sensus of the whole, can and, Newman
insists, should become an important locus of magisterial discernment, wherein the shepherds can
encounter a “faithful reflection” of their teaching as in a mirror. 132
Thus it behooves the shepherds to respect and even to consult the consensus of the faithful
in the exercise of their office; not because authority as such comes from below, but because such
a consensus can serve as a witness to the apostolic faith, much as a barometer testifies to the state
of the atmosphere. 133 Newman delights to point out those rare examples in Church history wherein
it is the faithful (and decidedly not the bishops) who are responsible for doctrinal preservation and
development. 134 Such examples show that faith also murmurs from within even as it is spoken
from without. This inner voice, this resonance of the faith from within, which can be called an
ecclesial conscience, 135 deserves its proper respect. Newman even suggests that a holy fear is
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appropriate before this supernaturally implanted genius. 136 While the magisterium does not strictly
depend upon its affirmations, she is at her best when she pays it heed and nurtures it:
The Ecclesia docens is more happy when she has such enthusiastic partisans about her…than
when she cuts off the faithful from the study of her divine doctrines and the sympathy of her
divine contemplations, and requires from them fides implicita in her word, which in the
educated classes will terminate in indifference, and in the poorer in superstition. 137

Apropos here is Newman’s conviction that Christianity must be internal, and can never be
relegated to mere external religiosity. 138 He laments that “the great mass of men” eschew “all
religion that is inward,” preferring a “mere pharisaical excellence” or the formality of “mere duty”
to the spontaneity of devotion that follows on the “apprehension of Almighty God.” 139 These, he
argues, miss the essence of Christianity, which is no “assault from without,” but an “inward
influence,” an “intimate visitation” capable of taking an “inward hold upon us,” and enabling us
to grasp its language and logic from within: “catching and mastering it, almost before the words
were spoken.” 140 The forms and subscriptions with which dogma confronts us, therefore, ought
not to be mistaken for the sum total of faith. They exist at the service of an inner principle of life,
to nurture and protect it, and their importance (qua external safeguards) diminishes in proportion
as its life grows strong. 141
If the structure of justification can be taken as an analogous guide here, we can say that the
truth which transcendently exceeds and precedes the mind also becomes something of an
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immanent principle within the mind as the latter is taken up by it. 142 Thus, just as the Gospel law
is no “outward yoke” but an “inward principle” of liberation, 143 so also is dogmatic faith not an
“external shackle” but a “living source,” 144 “springing up out of the immortal seed of love.”145
Newman speaks of faith as flowing out of that justification which acts as an “indwelling power”
within us, in us but not of us, 146 uniting itself to our intellects and wills: 147 “the secret power of
God acting directly without observation upon the hearts of men.” 148 As such, faith cannot be
equated with a purely passive submission, but must involve an active internal impulse, which
necessarily unfolds out onto an experiential apprehension of the truth, even if it does not strictly
depend upon this experience at the outset. 149
The mind is active and not passive: in faith, as in all vital apprehensions that carry practical
import for man’s life, it must “throw itself in upon the evidence” if it is to come to truth. This is a
crucial principle for Newman. According to it, and in opposition to modernity’s most basic
assumptions, he rejects mathematics and formal logic as paradigms for human knowledge. 150
Useful and important as these disciplines may be in abstract affairs, 151 they collapse before
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concrete reality, which always calls for something more than a disinterested neutrality if it is to be
truly apprehended in all of its complex richness. 152 In matters of religious faith above all, space
must be left for those antecedent presumptions and anticipations which, as the “creation of the
mind itself,” drive the mind beyond what any mere “evidence” or “proof” could deliver to it from
without. 153 Theologians err, therefore, when they seek to settle all difficulties by appeal to the pure
objectivity of syllogisms or hyper-formalized conceptual systems of perfect logical consistency. 154
These, Newman fears, too often present faith as a kind of logical certainty before which the mind
can assume a merely passive stance, a stance that naturally coincides with that cold externalism
that knows nothing of Scripture’s pathos. 155 Unbiased neutrality is not an adequate standpoint from
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which to perceive faith’s convicting power. The grounds of belief are not only external but also
internal; its origins are not reducible to “apodictic” proofs: “They believe on grounds within
themselves, not merely or mainly on the external testimony on which Religion comes to them.”156
Accordingly, faith demands a thoroughgoing account of that Christian subjectivity which
not only stands at the origins of belief but also perdures as a shaping force throughout the course
of its preservation. Just as it is the upright conscience that—with that aid of illuminating grace—
gives rise to those “spontaneous presentiments and desires” that condition faith’s assent, 157 so
Newman also says it is love that provides the inner sense of balance by which faith is prevented
from sliding into the distortions of superstition and bigotry. A sort of hermeneutic circle emerges
here:
Right Faith is the faith of a right mind. Faith is an intellectual act; right Faith is an intellectual
act, done in a certain moral disposition. Faith is an act of Reason, viz. a reasoning upon
presumptions; right Faith is a reasoning upon holy, devout, and enlightened presumptions…as
far as, and wherever Love is wanting, so far, and there, Faith runs into excess or is perverted.158

Conspiratio: the heart is measured by faith, and the heart becomes faith’s “measure.” 159 Newman
refers to love as a spontaneous instinct which, continuing and perfecting the work of the pious
instincts in which faith originated, provides faith with an internal measure that prevents it from
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overstepping its bounds. 160 Thus is faith a “test of man’s heart…what he thinks likely to be…his
convictions, tastes, and wishes.” 161 Christian faith lives only when the believing heart is attuned
to its mysteries. It is not enough for the latter to submit to an extrinsic message that is “utterly
alien” to its knowledge. 162 It must nourish a taste of that message from within its inner
experience. 163 This is why Newman pays such close heed to the mystery of the human heart, and
why he refuses to neglect it in his presentation of dogmatic faith. In what follows we will seek to
further unfold the various aspects of this theme in his work.
i. The Individuality of the Human Person: Newman’s Personal Liberalism
Closely tied to Newman’s attentiveness to subjectivity is his appreciation of human
individuality. He is remarkable for his regard for the uniqueness of each human person and each
human mind. Indeed, the words he applies to Saint Paul could well be applied to him: he was a
“special friend and intimate of human nature” with a unique capacity for sympathy with mankind
and “the tenderest interest in the souls of individuals.” 164 It was this “personal attachment” and
“keen affection” that caused him to “prefer ‘the cords of Adam’ and the voice of persuasion” to
the imposition of authority, 165 and the same that engendered his fond esteem for the concrete
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reasonings of individual men: the “thousand various shapes” and the “infinite hues and tints and
shades of colour” that each mind will develop in the consideration of any single idea. 166
Newman was no friend, then, of those rationalisms that sought to provide a uniform
straightjacket by which to measure all minds in terms of an a priori idealism. 167 Rather than
uniformity, he delighted in the “diversity with which men reason” 168 and in the diverse modes by
which they hold ideas as true. Doctrines or ideas, according to Newman, are “percolated…through
different minds;” 169 they “expand variously according to the minds…into which they are received;
and the particularities of the recipient are the regulating power…or, as it may be called, the form
of the development.” 170 Herein lies the limitation of purely abstract analyses: for the same idea,
abstractly considered, can take on radically different shapes depending on how it is held by
different persons: “as distinct from itself as are their faces.” 171 Thus, even an abstractly true opinion
can be rendered false by a false mode of holding it:
We must never say that an individual is right, merely on the ground of his holding an opinion
which happens to be true, unless he holds it in a particular manner…with that particular
association of thought and feeling, which in fact is the interpretation of it. 172

Accordingly, someone in formal error may be closer to the truth than someone holding a
technically correct opinion in a fallacious manner. 173 Formal analyses of truth and falsity, then, are
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incomplete until the personal condition of the knower—his desires, feelings and presumptions—
is taken into account. 174
The same insight applies to the ways in which different men argue and respond to
arguments. Formal logic is inadequate to give us the real grounds by which men estimate the value
of proofs and evidences, which “recondite reasons”—it is the burden of the Grammar of Assent to
show—are far too profound to admit of any simple measurement. 175 The same argument can be
the more or less convincing to different minds depending on their condition, and even the same
mind can respond to the same argument in different ways at different times. 176 While most modern
thinkers would attribute such diversities to so many departures from the rational ideal by men of
insufficient intellectual rigor, Newman, quite strikingly, prefers to honor them as flowing from
legitimately rational judgments, more rational even than the syllogisms of “paper logic.” Indeed,
he accuses those who would dismiss this popular mode of rationality of intellectual shallowness:
Nor can it fairly be said that such varieties do arise from deficiency in the power of reasoning
in the multitude; and that Faith, such as I have described it, is but proved thereby to be a
specimen of such deficiency…Clear, strong, steady intellects, if they are not deep, will look on
these differences in deduction chiefly as failures in the reasoning faculty, and will despise them
or excuse them accordingly…men of exact or acute but shallow minds, who consider all men
wrong but themselves…who regard the pursuit of truth only as a syllogistic process, and failure
in attaining it as arising merely from a want of mental conformity with the laws on which just
reasoning is conducted. 177
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We come into contact here with what Edward Sillem calls Newman’s “Personal Liberalism,”
which he distinguishes sharply from that “spirit of liberalism in religion” against which Newman
battled throughout his life. 178 The latter liberalism, as we have seen, sought to establish an
autonomy of reason by setting up strict standards according to which men could be justified in
accepting propositions as true and so live in keeping with their rational dignity. This was the liberty
that it called for: the freedom of reason to apply its universal standard. Anything less, it claimed,
would reduce man to intellectual slavery. In establishing this universal norm, however, liberalism
absolutized the explicit measures according to which man assesses his own thought (e.g., logic,
empirical evidence, mathematical necessity), and neglected the possibility that human thought is
too deep a thing to be able to comprehend itself. Thus, by imposing a universal form upon all
thinkers as the only legitimate measure of validity, it dramatically constricted the range of human
thought. Faith, as the most pertinent example, becomes positively irrational because its judgment
does not admit of reduction to syllogistic form.
Newman does not allow himself to be determined by this problematic. He does not oppose
liberalism, for instance, by denying that human reason has a legitimate autonomy, or by denying
that freedom is a condition of man’s rational dignity. Rather, by his “personal liberalism,” we can
say with Sillem, Newman argued that “liberalism” was not nearly liberal enough. Reason, for him,
was a far broader and richer reality than anything man could comprehend by his explicit
formulations. No one grasps the Logos by his system. “How a man reasons is as much a mystery
as how he remembers:” 179
Who shall analyze the assemblage of opinions in this or that mind...the recondite reasons which
lead each person to take or decline?...[but these] are just the most important portion of the
considerations on which his conviction depends. 180
178
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If this is true, if Newman is correct in his claim that “the human mind…is unequal to its own
powers of apprehension” and that “it embraces more than it can master,” 181 that it might not even
be aware of the views it holds and by which it is nourished, 182 if it is thus a mystery to itself that
cannot be fully comprehended, then liberal-rationalist philosophers are out of place in their
demand that every human judgment conform to the strictures of formal logic, and Newman is
justified in allowing vital space for a truly personal (i.e., irreducible) mode of judgment in his
theory of knowledge. 183 This is the freedom he calls for: the freedom of actual minds to think
according to their actual methods. As we read in the Grammar of Assent, “it is the mind that
reasons, and that controls its own reasonings, not any technical apparatus of words and
propositions.” 184 Indeed, the most important human judgments are of this personal nature. They
are not reducible to formulaic rules because they strike at the heart of human existence and call
upon man’s moral sense. Science may be public and hence assessable by universal grounds
“common to all,” 185 but this corresponds to the tangential manner in which its claims affect the
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human heart. 186 Faith, as an existential matter, on the other hand, is of a personal nature, and the
grounds by which its claims are adjudicated are hidden in those secret judgments of the heart that
decide what is probable and what is improbable, what is good and what is bad, what is desirable
and what is undesirable. Syllogisms, accordingly, take a back seat for Newman in the realm of
religion, for these seek to make public what is ultimately personal, and to compel by logic what
can only be arrived at by a free personal judgment. Logic has an important role to play in human
thought, but it is not that by which man is most decisively shaped. 187
Newman is thus keen to arouse a sense of personal responsibility in man, a sense that is
numbed by the passive stance that liberal rationalism assumes before questions of truth.188 This
stance allows man to hide behind universal forms. But Newman wants each man to feel as though
“individually addressed” by the claims of revelation; 189 addressed in that inner sanctum where the
“original element within us” is “fixed in each individual,” where the “moral perception” or “ethical
sense” abides in the disciplined heart. 190 It is here where the “right or renewed heart” ventures
forth in the embrace of faith; 191 here that we make the judgments that determine us before our
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Judge. 192 This place, the place of conscience, which is irreducible, irreplaceable and hence of
eternal value, 193 is where Newman says we “realize our individuality.” 194
This is where Newman’s personalism 195 comes to the fore. External evidences, sensible
miracles, and deductive arguments are all things that are by nature universally accessible and that
present themselves equally to all men regardless of moral standing: their undeniability corresponds
to their lack of moral import. They do not address the heart but the “intellect only.” But while man
is not ethically responsible for his embrace of such certainties, “man is responsible for his faith,
because he is responsible for his likings and dislikings, his hopes and his opinions…;” 196 “though
a given evidence does not vary in force, the antecedent probably attending it does vary without
limit, according to the temper of the mind surveying it.” 197 The claims of Revelation therefore
admit of being “estimated variously according to the desire of it existing in each breast…Those
who had love...were inclined to believe.” 198 Before God, man must realize his individuality. This
is the conviction that lies at the heart of Newman’s personalism, and its appreciation is essential if
we are grasp the thrust of his opposition to modern liberalism.
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ii. Implicit - Explicit
The foregoing presentation of Newman’s personalism has opened up an entrée for us onto
one of the most crucial facets of Newman’s thought: namely, his distinction between the explicit
and the implicit modes of human cognition. For his rejection of the liberal reduction of reason “to
strictly precisionist and formal forms of argument” 199—wherein what is distinctive of the
individual person is subordinated to universal forms—implies that there is another mode of
reasoning, one more “subtle” 200 and “spontaneous” 201 than any formal mechanism, which can
account for the diversities of human thought. 202 This is what Newman calls “implicit” reason: a
notion fundamental to his theological and philosophical vision. By the term “implicit” Newman
refers to a mode of cognition that is both prior to and more fundamental than those expressions of
thought that have been brought out into full reflexive consciousness (i.e., explicit expression)
through the measures of language and formal analysis. These latter are the thoughts of which we
are fully conscious, and which we often mistake for the sum of our intellectual life. Newman
argues, however, that they are in fact rooted in a deeper level of judgment, one of which we are
not fully aware. By this assertion he seeks to relativize the normativity of formal logic for human
thought, without jettisoning altogether its proper utility.
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At the root of this contention is Newman’s conviction that the human mind remains a
mystery to itself, and “takes no external survey” 203 of its own activities. In a manner corresponding
to the irreducible fullness of the concrete realities which it apprehends, it defies any fully explicit
articulation. Again: “the human mind in its present state is unequal to its own powers of
apprehension; it embraces more than it can master.” 204 This assertion may sound paradoxical—for
how can the mind know without being aware of its knowing—but Newman is armed with a host
of examples that illustrate its validity. He notes, for instance, how peasants and uneducated men
often make sound judgments even when they lack the sound rationale by which to explain them—
though their explanations be fallacious, their conclusions are often accurate; 205 or how men of
great genius are similarly unable to trace out for others the paths by which they arrive at their
insights, their logic being impenetrable to the masses who must take them on trust for the evident
fruitfulness of their discoveries; 206 or how a person can hold a position without knowing it, 207 or
be affected an entire day by some thought or other before being able to accurately name it; 208 or
how certain men can spend their whole lives burdened by a single idea which they might struggle
for decades to put adequately into words. 209 All of this, he says, points to the reality that the mind
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does not fully master itself, 210 and that it admits simultaneously of both conscious (i.e., explicit)
and “unconscious” 211 (i.e., implicit) modes of intellection.
Newman explains this distinction as that between the mind’s original act of judgment or
apprehension and its subsequent reflection upon itself. First, there is a simple and spontaneous
movement by which the mind embraces the reality set before it, and then a reflexive self-measuring
by which it contemplates its own act:
This may be taken as an illustration of the difference between the more simple faculties and
operations of the mind, and that process of analyzing and describing them, which takes place
upon reflection. We not only feel, and think, and reason, but we know that we feel, and think,
and reason; not only know, but can inspect and ascertain our thoughts, feelings, and reasonings:
not only ascertain, but describe… 212

It is only in the second step, where men “reason upon their reasonings,” 213 that the mind becomes
“explicitly” aware of itself. For Newman, however, this self-awareness remains always incomplete
and imperfect. Hence it can be no exhaustive measure of the mind’s activities. The many “aspects”
which the mind generates in its attempt to articulate the object of its apprehension never fully
correspond to that object’s integral “idea” or “impression.” 214 This is what accounts for that
“unconscious” possession of ideas that Newman speaks of, 215 as well as for the “implicit
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reasoning”—most fully manifested in the operations of the “illative sense” 216—by which the mind
is capable of making sound judgments independently of the explicit formal inferences whereby the
conclusions would follow with logical necessity from formulated premises. Thus:
In spite of the inaccuracy in expression, or (if we will) in thought, which prevails in the world,
men on the whole do not reason incorrectly…They may argue badly, but they reason well; that
is, their professed grounds are no sufficient measures of their real ones…men advance forward
on grounds which they do not, or cannot produce, or if they could, yet could not prove to be
true, on latent or antecedent grounds which they take for granted. 217

“All men have a reason” even though “not all men can give a reason,” 218 just as they can “be
possessed, ruled, [and] guided by an unconscious idea.” 219 Such seeming paradoxes, coming from
a man who professed such a healthy suspicion of them, 220 and who insisted on the importance of
method and system in the cultivation of a sound intellect, 221 are no sign of intellectual lightness on
the part of their author. 222 Rather, as we have seen, they flow from the resolute seriousness with
which he observed the human mind in its concrete existence, which reality forced upon him a
reconsideration of the role of formal logic in assessing human thought.
That logic and explicit reasoning do have an important role to play is beyond question for
Newman; he wishes only to point out their limitations. As a philosopher, he profoundly appreciates
the need for man to reflect upon and seek to order his thought. This is one of the ways in which he
defines philosophy: the mind’s attempt, primarily through the tools of logic, to analyze, clarify,
and order its operations for the sake of purifying its judgments and bringing them into conscious
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and communicable expression. 223 While the mind does not depend on these processes in its initial
apprehensions, they are nevertheless necessary if it is to arrive at that certitude and wisdom toward
which it is ordered. Thus “it is the object of science to analyze, verify, methodize, and exhibit” the
impressions made upon the mind on the implicit level. 224 The explicit level of human rationality
retains an important office. “The right exercise of words is involved in the right exercise of
thought." 225
Nevertheless, in discharge of this commission, it is vital that “explicit reason” also retain a
keen awareness of its limits, and that it not mistake itself for a comprehensive survey. “Words,”
Newman says, “are incomplete exponents of ideas,” 226 and this poverty of language to measure
thought necessitates a humility in reflective reason’s judgments. While explicit reason can
determine whether or not a given articulation is logically sound, and so can force the mind to
reassess its grounds if necessary, it cannot rule out the possibility that the mind remains correct in
its judgment on some other unnamed grounds. For this would be to assume that what is articulated
exhausts the mind’s apprehension. And this Newman denies:
Clearness in argument certainly is not indispensable to reasoning well. Accuracy in stating
doctrines or principles is not essential to feeling and acting upon them. The exercise of analysis
is not necessary to the integrity of the process analyzed. The process of reasoning is complete
in itself and independent. The analysis is but an account of it. 227

…an account which is imperfect. This is not to say that the mind’s judgments cannot be called into
question or revised in the case of error; only that such revision, when it occurs, will not be
necessitated by any single logical analysis. It will flow rather from an accumulation of contrary
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impressions that force a new apprehension on the implicit level. 228 Logic can play an auxiliary role
in this process, spurring a critique leading either to a rejection or to a refined and more fully
conscious assent, but the mind is not moved by logic alone. 229 Discursive thought vitally extends
its range and purifies its insights, but the deep, central and conservative apprehensions that govern
its life abide at a deeper level. 230 Newman’s claim, then, is that formal logic should recall its zone
of competence and limit its claims accordingly. If this is forgotten, then “current language becomes
the measure of thought” and “the multiform and intricate assemblage of considerations, which
really lead to judgment and action, must be attenuated or mutilated into a major and a minor
premise.” 231 In such a situation, the mind inevitably grows stultified in its capacity to acquire fresh
knowledge, for such formal argumentation, which is “mainly a test of reasoning,” is a critical and
not a creative faculty. It checks against undisciplined growth, but provides no impetus of its own.
It pulls down, but “will not be able to build up.” 232
Creative apprehensions require a deeper movement, one that defies explicit articulation,
being irreducible to formula or mathematical measurement. 233 If reason is strictly defined as the
“faculty of proceeding from things that are perceived to things which are not,” 234 of “gaining
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knowledge upon grounds given…asserting one thing, because of some other thing,” 235 then
explicit reasoning is that progression which is mappable according to universal forms, and implicit
reasoning is that which escapes by its subtlety any such analysis. And it is Newman’s contention
that the bulk of the mind’s work is performed on this implicit level, the explicit level being limited
to abstract, non-existential matters, at least insofar as it lives in isolation from the implicit
ground. 236 The reason why this implicit level escapes analysis, for Newman, is that it is inseparable
in its concrete act from what he calls man’s “moral sense” or “moral perception.” In all concreteexistential matters, man does not decide on evidence or formal inference alone, but always in the
light of certain moral factors: on the basis of the presumptions that lay hidden in his breast, his
secret antecedent judgments about what is probable, his sympathies, his innermost desires and
hopes, all of which elude easy detection, 237 and yet which “practically colour[s] the evidence…and
interpret[s] it for him,” 238 converging together with accompanying impressions and the impulse of
conscience to finally move man to action through an “illative” judgment. 239 Newman laments that
these two aspects of man’s inner life, the intellectual and the moral, are so frequently separated in
the world, and he faults this unreal separation for most of the world’s intellectual maladies. 240
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Everything becomes abstract and unreal when reality is assessed by the “intellect only;” supposed
clarity is purchased at the price of consequence. In fact, Newman says, the intellect and heart must
be seen as deeply interwoven. Only this can account for the way in which men actually think.
Purely intellectual measurements, which can take no account of moral insight, must fail to the
grasp the whole of human thought, and reduce the knower to a mere critic. 241
At the forefront of Newman’s mind in all of these considerations is the question of faith.
For he is keen to show that while faith is distinct from reason as popularly conceived, it is
nevertheless fully rational and can be called an act of reason strictly speaking: 242 it is “the
reasoning of the religious mind,” 243 albeit not that of any so-called “pure reason.” It is the
acceptance of truth on the basis of testimony, which testimony is received by the judgment of a
heart shaped by religious presumptions. 244 These include especially those dictates of the upright
conscience that resonates with the message and recognizes the nobility of the messenger. 245 In this
way, by an implicit judgment of the heart that coincides with the illative apprehension of
converging evidences, that impression is created in the mind which constitutes faith’s fundamental
content. Only in a “second” step, 246 wherein faith reflects on itself, does this impression proceed
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to the explicit articulation of dogma and system. 247 Thus, while dogma is essential to faith, it is
not faith’s most basic aspect. First comes the impression of the object, then the natural progression,
through reflection, to explicit judgment and expression. 248 It is true that this progression belongs
internally to faith’s dynamic, which cannot but seek wisdom, but this reflection should not be
mistaken for the whole. It is the province of theology to “analyze, verify, methodize, and exhibit”
faith’s impressions so as to bring them out into explicit form and order them systematically
according to their internal rationale. But this work depends on something prior to it, from which it
must never be isolated.
If faith’s explicit reasoning becomes detached from its implicit grounds, then there is the
danger that dogma and system will lose all sense of faith’s inner proportions, yielding results that
are foreign to the believing heart. 249 Newman offers the analogy of a blind man professing to
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priority of impression over articulation, even while at the same time affirming a strict unity obtaining between the
two, such that the impression cannot stand without dogmatic articulation (and submission to it) as a co-constitutive
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lecture on the subject of light and color. Such a man, he says, might well begin to articulate a clear
and impressive system on the basis of the abstract notions he has grasped, but inevitably his lack
of familiarity would show itself:
…at length on a sudden, he would lose himself in some inexpressibly great mistake, betrayed
in the midst of his career by some treacherous word, which he incautiously explained too fully
or dwelt too much upon; and we should find that he had been using words without
corresponding ideas. 250

Inquiry requires a “personal familiarity” with its subject matter. 251 Similarly, faith’s explicit
reasoning and articulation depend on the prior reasoning of the heart. Recognizing this is what
prevents that slide into rationalism wherein explicit reason confuses its own grounds for the true
grounds of faith.
“The heart has its reasons which reason itself does not know.” 252 Newman’s account of
implicit reasoning in its differentiation from the explicit can be read as a development of Pascal’s
distinction between l’esprit de géométrie and l’esprit de finesse, and as a distinctly non-fideist
reading of the latter’s “reasons of the heart.” 253 It is certain that Newman read Pascal, and the
spiritual affinity between the two thinkers is beyond doubt. 254 This is manifest not only in the space
that each of them afford to more intuitive modes of apprehension—a feature that can also be related
beyond them back to the intellectus of Thomas Aquinas 255—but also in their insistence upon the
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ethical aspect of man’s quest for truth. 256 As Newman says, “Truth there is, and attainable it is,
but…its rays stream in upon us through the medium of our moral as well as our intellectual
being.” 257 Thus it is that, in both thinkers, our speculative considerations cannot be separated from
the demands of action, and the embrace of truth must ultimately coincide with a “wager” or
“venture” on man’s part. Man’s deepest reasoning, therefore, cannot involve the “intellect only”
but must be a reasoning of the heart, the account of which will only be complete when the role of
conscience is acknowledged. 258
iii. The Imagination
Our account of Newman’s doctrine of implicit reasoning would be incomplete if we did
not proceed to unfold another crucial facet in his account of human subjectivity. For, granting that
there are such things as implicit “apprehensions” or “impressions,” the question naturally arises as
to where or by what power of mind such intuitions are received. The answer comes with Newman’s
theory of “imagination,” which he regards not simply as the sub-rational fabricator of sensible
phantasms—something we would share with the animals 259—but as a properly human and truly
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intellectual faculty whereby the mind is able to grasp wholes and to envision concrete unities
through its encounter with external reality. These are the deep impressions of which Newman so
often speaks—the “personal” 260 and “direct” apprehensions of truth that differentiate what is
“energetic” 261 and “real” from the merely passive and “notional” 262—which coalesce to form a
“master vision” 263 that practically governs the mind in its implicit and explicit judgments.
To better understand this doctrine of Newman’s, it will be helpful to have recourse to some
features of English romanticism that significantly parallel Newman’s vision, and indirectly helped
to shape it. While the relationship is more one of common sources than of direct dependence, the
comparison can help to illumine for us the drift of Newman’s mind. He himself admits a certain
resonance here, 264 writing of his appreciation for such romantic figures as Coleridge, Wordsworth
and Byron, 265 and acknowledging the significant service rendered to his intellect by that poetic
vision—the “sacramental system” as he called it—which he first discovered in the writings of
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Bishop Butler, and which helped him to overcome his youthful skepticism. 266 He describes this
sacramental vision of reality as “the doctrine that material phenomena are both the types and the
instruments of real things unseen,” 267 an insight which he sees flowing from the doctrine of
creation, insofar as “the very idea of an analogy between the separate works of God leads to the
conclusion that the system which is of less importance is economically or sacramentally connected
with the more momentous.” 268 Thus the unity of all God’s works can be detected in each part, each
individual phenomenon representing more than itself, and pointing beyond itself to something
higher. We can discern here that talent for “seeing together”—what Newman calls
“contuition” 269—that typifies the romantic reaction against the cold divisions of rationalism.
John Coulson, in his work relating the Grammar of Assent to this romantic background,
takes Coleridge as representative of this tendency. Coleridge attacks modern conceptualism by
asserting, against its standard assumptions, that poetry and metaphor constitute the “first order” of
human language, and that literal prose expressions are secondary derivatives from these primary
forms. 270 The mind is originally creative in its apprehension of reality, active rather than passive, 271
employing its imagination to discern those subtle unities and interrelations of existence that escape
merely conceptual analyses, tending as these do to isolate rather than to unite. This is what any
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good poetic metaphor achieves: by transferring to one object that which is proper to another, 272 it
helps us to see reality anew by allowing us to appreciate at a deeper level the analogies that tie all
things together in a vision of sacramental unity. In executing this function, the poem or metaphor
does not depend on a prior conceptualization of its content, as moderns tend to assume. If anything,
the order of dependency is the inverse: explicit reason presupposes a unity that it cannot procure
for itself, but can only receive from the imagination. It is the poem that gives rise to its
explanation—its secondary analysis—not the explanation that gives rise to the poem. 273
When this order is reversed, the poetic imagination suffers, just as religion suffers when
the order between explicit reason and belief is upended. As religion becomes dry and formulaic
when reason is made the foundation for faith, so too does poetry grow staid and artificial when
abstract theory is made the foundation for its expression. 274 And sooner or later, just as religion
dissolves into philosophy in the former case, so too does the pretext of poetic form give way to the
paraphrase in the latter. 275 But real poetry does not admit of paraphrase any more than genuine
faith admits of reduction to formal inference. Such is the parallel danger to faith and imagination
in the modern age. They are intertwined, and the projects of Newman and Coleridge accordingly
mirror each other in their efforts to set things back in their proper order.
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In fact, according to these men, the “real ideas” that drive the mind in its work are not
abstract concepts but the concrete unities apprehended at the level of the imagination. 276 In this
insight they are undoubtedly influenced by the thought of eighteenth century philosopher Abraham
Tucker, whose works Newman possessed, and who first posited the imagination as the faculty by
which the mind is able to know individuals qua individual through a process he called “associative
coalescence.” 277 By this he meant the instinctive genius by which the mind sees “the distinction of
parts within an antecedent unity” 278 and so is enabled to grasp wholes as such. This, in turn, is
what Newman and Coleridge intend by the term idea: it refers to our imaginative “grasp of
something as a whole” 279 in response to a “living unity” 280 encountered in reality, “an intuition not
sensuous” 281 which draws parts together into harmony in such a way as to serve as a kind of poetic
symbol 282 or “living educt of the imagination.” 283 Such ideas, in turn, accumulate together,
mutually refining and reinforcing one another, to give rise to an insight into the unity of all
reality: 284 a total “vision, analogous to eye-sight” of the “integral wholeness of the visible world
in its analogical relation to the invisible world.” 285 This overall view, derived from the sum total
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of the impressions (actively) received by the creative imagination, 286 constitutes the framework by
which the mind arrives at its sense of what is probable and improbable, setting the conditions both
for the convergence of probabilities that triggers the illative “ecstasy of assent,” 287 and for the
ultimate derivation of explicit beliefs from implicit apprehensions. 288 Only the imagination can
account for such “leaps;” the explicit-conceptual order is subordinate to it.
In other words, on both the implicit and the explicit levels, I arrive at my judgments about
the reality of things according as they are made credible and real to my imagination, and fit within
my overall view of things. 289 Naturally, there is a two-way dialectic at play here, as my “overall
view” is also subject to adjustment from its confrontation with stubborn new realities: every
instance is viewed in relation to the whole, and the whole in relation to all instances. But the
discovery of new truth is, insofar as this discovery is “real” or “imaginative,” 290 always occasioned
by a coalescence between the individual instance and the “interrelated symbolism” of my
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“worldview” as a whole. 291 Crucially, as we have repeatedly insisted, such judgments will always
be simultaneously intellectual and moral. For conscience, as the vivid apprehension of the
commanding God, is also an integral element within man’s imaginative world. 292 Accordingly,
duty enters into the equation of assent as a vital conditioning force. Indeed, such judgments cannot
but be profoundly moral, since imagination is constructive of personality: the unity it apprehends
is correlative to the unity that lies at the heart of the person. 293
In this sense, significant imaginative judgments about reality will always carry something
of the structure of conversion. As impressions give rise to judgments about probabilities, and
probabilities begin to converge stereoscopically toward a new center, such that I am forced for the
sake of consistency and an imaginable “world” to abandon my present standpoint and “leap” into
a new perspective, I am confronted with a moral challenge addressed to the depths of my
conscience. For even as such “leaps” are conditioned by accumulating probabilities and can be
regarded as thoroughly rational, they nevertheless leave space to man’s freedom and call forth a
decision from him that can feel very much like a dying. 294 One’s integrity is thus challenged.
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Thus capacity to see the unity of things is rooted in a basic “sympathy” between the self and reality. See Tillman,
“Introduction” to Oxford University Sermons, xxxiv-xxxv: “insight into this reality [the ordered unity of creation],
Newman says, is like a ‘vision, analogous to eye-sight, which my intellectual nature has of things as they are, arising
from the original, elementary sympathy or harmony between myself and what is external to myself, I and it being
portions of one whole, and, in a certain sense, existing for each other.’”
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“Leap” is not Newman’s term, of course, but rather “venture.” In fact, he assiduously avoided the former term in
order to distance himself from Kierkegaard’s Protestant fideism. Nevertheless, Coulson defends its use as a valid
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made to clarify that it indicates a fully rational act made in the light of converging evidences and testimonies. In such
cases, it is fully reasonable to stake my life on something even prior to possessing demonstrative proof that might
walk me all the way to the goal: I must move spontaneously beyond what evidence can attain in its finite increments.
In this sense there is an analogy to be drawn between the “venture” and the “leap.” cf. John Coulson, Religion and
Imagination, 70-1: “the decision to abandon one’s own subjectivity and accept as true positions held by other
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Naturally, the more radical the “conversion” called for in such a situation, the more powerful and
compelling the new center of unity must be in order to justify the illative venture. If the conversion
is to be total, it will require an impression that is comprehensive in its integrative power.
Ultimately, of course, Newman’s doctrine of imagination derives not so much from his
Romantic contemporaries as from his reading of the Church Fathers, 295 wherein he recognized a
common fascination amid varying articulations with a single comprehensive idea, a distinct
integrating impression that could alone account for that eager longing and intimate attention that
ties the saints together across the centuries. 296 He discerned in their writings a central image, one
capable of collecting all “the scattered rays of light,” and of drawing apparently divergent truths
around a common center and logos, 297 allowing the Fathers to delight in the higher symmetries of
faith’s paradoxes. We witness this same delight at play in many of Newman’s sermons, where he
frequently employs the method of the Fathers in developing divine attributes only to bring home
to the imagination the startling paradox of the incarnation: for instance, that God’s omnipotence
should find its supreme expression in the swaddled babe, in the impotence of imprisonment and

people…is to acquire a personal depth…we find ourselves by being in equilibrium with others now and in the past;
the polygon of oneself expands into the circle of a world unseen”… “in one respect we leap, but in retrospective we
experience that leap as precipitated by an accumulation of probabilities.” cf. John Henry Newman, Loss and Gain.
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012), 316-7: “Certainty, in its highest sense, is the reward of those who, by an act of
the will, and at the dictate of reason and prudence, embrace the truth, when nature, like a coward, shrinks. You must
make a venture; faith is a venture before a man is a Catholic; it is a gift after it.” cf. John Henry Newman, “Ventures
of Faith” in Parochial and Plain Sermons, IV:20. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 992-9.
295
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divines and their reading of the Fathers. See Coulson, “Newman on the Church,” in The Rediscovery of Newman, 1256. Coulson mentions the Fathers’ Platonism, in particular, as a crucial factor, insofar as the platonic appeal to
illumination or memoria, like the appeal to imagination, admits of operations of the intellect that are irreducible to
piecemeal reconstructions: the unity precedes the parts.
296
See Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 36-46, where Newman compares the saints’ “continuous
watching and waiting for Christ,” their “personal attachment” to and “intimate, immediate dependence on Emmanuel,”
to the “subtle instincts” of animals, whereby we can be certain that the objects they correspond to are real and present,
reasoning thereby that we can be sure also that the object of the saints’ devotion is also real and present, i.e., in the
Eucharist.
297
See Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 27: “Revelation meets us with simple and distinct facts and actions, not
with painful inductions from existing phenomena, not with generalized laws or metaphysical conjectures, but with
Jesus and the Resurrection…the life of Christ…collects the scattered rays of light.”
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death, and in humble signs of bread and wine. 298 Yet such paradox, such awful mystery, which
might seem an impediment to faith, is offered precisely as a motive for faith, insofar as its tensions
ultimately manifest a “consistency and symmetry” so profound that its author could only be divine:
“I believe the infinite condescension of the Highest to be true, because it has been imagined.”299
This symmetry must be sought in order to be perceived, but once “seen” and impressed upon the
imagination, it carries its own authority. 300
Such is the power of the “image of Christ,” 301 so transcendently comprehensive in its
integrative capacity that it inspires men to leave their old “worlds” behind and step into the new
the imaginative world of faith. This idea, this image or impression lodged deeply in the Christian
imagination, is the center and essence of Christianity for Newman, prior to all articulated
expressions in dogma or theological system:
As God is One, so the impression which He gives us of Himself is one; it is not a thing of parts;
it is not a system…It is the vision of an object. When we pray, we pray, not to an assemblage
of notions, or to a creed, but to One Individual Being; and when we speak of Him we speak of
a Person, not of a Law or a Manifestation. This being the case, all our attempts to delineate our
impression of Him go to bring out one idea…an individual idea in its separate aspects. 302

Just as sensual “impressions” correspond to their objects by their wholeness and indivisibility, and
impress upon us a “persuasion of their reality” from the “spontaneous congruity and coincidence”
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See Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 75-90.
Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 88. cf. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger’s address to the Communion
and Liberation movement at Rimini in August 2002. Ratzinger speaks of the knowledge of beauty that “pierces man”
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for it, yet, to be seen in its consistency and symmetry, has to be looked for.” cf. Mark McInroy, “Roman Catholic
Receptions of the Grammar of Assent” in Receptions of Newman, 85-7, which compares Newman’s vision to that of
Pierre Rousselot, who in The Eyes of Faith argues that in faith “perception of credibility and belief in truth are
identically the same act.” The perception of symmetry is at once intellectual and moral for Newman, as he goes on in
the above passage to observe that the mystery also perfectly corresponds to the reversal of sinful pride and the healing
of conscience.
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See Coulson, Religion and Imagination, 53.
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Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 330.
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by which they unite diverse aspects, so also does the “impression” of the Gospel, by its profound
inner harmony and consistency, and by its perfect correspondence to the impressions and
anticipations of conscience, 303 inspire us to give our full assent to it as an “idea or vision” that is
whole and indivisible in itself: “not as the subject of a number of propositions, but as one, and
individual, and independent of words.” 304 The knowledge which revelation aims at, then, is not so
much concerned with concepts as with this “intimate kind” of impression upon the soul; 305 it
“addresses itself to our senses and imagination” so that we respond to it as something we have
“looked upon,” seen, heard, and touched. 306 Faith’s knowledge, for Newman, is rooted in the
“imagination” as in an intellectual faculty.
Accordingly, “particular propositions,” which are necessary for faith’s expression and
preservation as aspects of the one idea, 307 “can never really be confused with the idea itself,” 308 in
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cf. Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 119: “no mere promise was sufficient to undo the impression left on the
imagination by the facts of Natural Religion; but in the death of His Son we have His deed.” cf. Ratzinger, Biblical
Interpretation in Crisis, 19-20: “For the mainstream of the modern exegesis, the event is the irrational element. It lies
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far as we know, for realizing the Objects of Faith.” Therefore we are dependent upon “secondary and intelligible
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by ‘knowledge.’ ‘This is life eternal,’ says our Saviour, ‘that they might know Thee the only True God, and Jesus
Christ whom Thou hast sent.’”
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See Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 121-2 with reference to 1 Jn 1:1. cf. ibid., 332: “Knowledge is the
possession of those living ideas of sacred things, from which alone change of heart or conduct can proceed. This awful
vision…” cf. ibid., 176: “To them Christ was manifested as He is to us, and in the same way; not to the eyes of the
flesh, but to the illuminated mind, to their Faith.” cf. Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine: 336: “[Aquinas
says]: 'The light of Faith makes things seen that are believed.' He says moreover, 'Believers have knowledge of the
things of Faith, not in a demonstrative way, but so as by the light of Faith it appears to them that they ought to be
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which they live and which they can never fully exhaust. 309 Indeed, such doctrinal statements must
never be isolated from the impression which they express:
Though the Christian mind reasons out a series of dogmatic statements, one from another, this
it has ever done, and always must do, not from those statements taken in themselves, as logical
propositions, but as being itself enlightened and (as if) inhabited by that sacred impression
which is prior to them, which acts as a regulating principle, ever present, upon the reasoning,
and without which no one has any warrant to reason at all…though the development of an idea
is a deduction of proposition from proposition, these propositions are ever formed in and round
the idea itself (so to speak), and are in fact one and all only aspects of it. 310

The Christian imagination thus governs Christian thought, as the “image,” “idea” or “impression”
it grasps is prior to all explicit articulations. It provides the “atmosphere” through which the textual
prose of doctrine gains its “illuminative power.” 311
With all of this said, it needs to be noted in the same breath that this “imaginative
apprehension”—which Newman will eventually come to call a “real apprehension” 312—bears
within itself an innate dynamism toward articulated expression in the form of dogma and system,
and can be said to contain them implicitly within itself. 313 This is because it is internal to the
original impression that its sublime harmony coincide with the divine authority with which it
confronts the mind. Thus the impression begs to be brought out into explicit articulation in
authoritative statements and theological discourse; this indeed is a primary means by which the
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impression is preserved and communicated. 314 This is why Peter, at the very dawn of gospel faith,
is spontaneously impelled to cry out “Thou are the Christ, the Son of the Living God,” giving birth
thereby to the whole dogmatic system, and spurring a tradition of reflection that up to the present
day has not ceased to draw out the implications and inner necessities flowing from this
foundational statement. 315 It is why theology never ceases to be essential to faith’s inner vitality:
for the symmetries of the first impression demand that faith’s explicit knowledge also gravitate
toward a “moral center,” 316 giving birth to a Wisdom in the mind by which faith’s harmonies are
more perfectly known (i.e., with reflexive appreciation), and its inner authority more powerfully
experienced. It is why, in short, faith continually gives rise to the process of development, “till
what was at first an impression on the Imagination has become a system or creed in the Reason.”317
In this sense, dogma and theology are never simply ancillary aspects of faith, but are rather
contained within it in nuce from the very beginning, and help to constitute its essence. Our
understanding of revelation’s “impression” would be profoundly impoverished if it were thought
to exclude these vital conceptual elements. Nevertheless they live only within the “imaginative”
apprehension of the Christian “idea.” Newman thus envisions the implicit and explicit aspects of
faith within a dynamic interplay of mutual reinforcement and clarification that excludes any
isolation of one from the other. Faith cannot exist apart from a profoundly personal apprehension,
and this apprehension cannot exist apart from its own inner transcendence toward a universal
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authority, together with its demand for a publicly expressible form. Dogma and “impression” thus
interpenetrate and need one other; faith responds to revelation’s impression as to God’s definite
word. 318 Newman’s unique response to modernity here begins to take shape: in the realm of faith,
subjectivity and authority are internal to one another. In other words, revelation is addressed to the
human conscience.
iv. Conscience
We arrive now at the linchpin. For prior to the assertions of the preceding paragraphs it
might have seemed that our foray into Newman’s account of subjectivity had taken us far afield
from the initial claims regarding dogma and objectivity. How, we might ask, can faith begin as
submission to unexperienced truths authoritatively proclaimed if it is based in an imaginative
apprehension? Or how can it be essentially dogmatic if its essential content escapes full verbal
articulation? It is Newman’s doctrine of conscience that overcomes this tension and ties the
apparently discordant strands together. For conscience “throws us out of ourselves, and beyond
ourselves” 319 and makes us willing to give our lives for goodness and truth, and the integral role it
plays within man’s intellectual and imaginative life refers what is eminently personal outward
toward an objective measure that transcends any individualistically conceived subjective confines.
The grounds of this transcendence, however, remain rooted in the inner depths that are constitutive
of the mind itself. There is, therefore, no question of heteronomy, any more than there is of
subjectivism. In this way, Newman heals the breach, so keenly felt in the modern age, between the
authority of truth and the freedom rightfully claimed by the rational subject. 320 At the same time,
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he calls into question the assumption that rational certainty must be arrived at by grounds that are
common to all.
We have already seen how, for Newman, the “intellectual” and the “ethical” aspects of the
human mind must never be isolated from each other in “existential” 321 matters, but must ever be
intertwined, acting in concert. The reason for this is that, in all considerations that are not purely
abstract, the “intellectual” and the “ethical” bear implications for one another. If a question touches
my lived reality, then my answer to it will carry ramifications for my duties in relation towards it.
And, vice versa, if I am convinced in conscience regarding certain duties, or if I am lax regarding
them, this will inevitably factor into my judgments regarding realities to which those duties might
relate. Try as we might to isolate the two sides, they are inseparably bound, and it is to our benefit
to recognize this fact. 322 This is why questions of faith or doctrine that might at first seem purely
speculative have a moral relevance, 323 and why certain philosophies can rightly be described as
base.
These considerations come to the fore most prominently in Newman’s efforts to justify
faith as a legitimately rational act. Faith’s judgment can be fully legitimate—i.e., in accordance
with the demands of the rational subject—even while not being reducible to apodictic
demonstration on universally approvable grounds, because it pertains to matters for which the
moral ballast of the soul is decisive in the interpretation of the evidence. As we have seen, “though
a given evidence does not vary in force, the antecedent probability attending it does vary without
limit, according to the temper of the mind surveying it,” 324 such that “a good and a bad man will
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think very different things probable.” 325 In other words, faith depends on the “moral sense,” an
aspect of conscience, which is itself irreducible to explicit rational measures, but which is fully
justified in its assessments nonetheless. Faith can neither survive nor come to be apart from this
faculty. 326 It presupposes for its act the imperative of “duty” which it can only receive from the
dictates of conscience. 327
Such is the case for faith, but the implication is that the same rule applies to all of the
mind’s judgments in “concrete” or “existential” matters. Faith is legitimate because it comports
with the way the mind works in general. 328 In abstract questions the immoral man may be a fine
judge of evidences—“irreligious men are adequate judges of the value of mere evidence, when the
decision turns upon it” 329—but in concrete considerations he meets his limit. Here finer
instruments are required. Newman speaks of certitude, the “bell” by which the mind springs from
the obscurity of converging probabilities to the clarity of assent, as the conscience of the intellect,
and compares its attunement (or “illative sense”) to that of moral phronēsis. 330 In certain passages
we find these two faculties (conscience and certitude) set in parallel to one another, such that the
two “triggers” appear as mirror images operating in distinct fields, one in the arena of assent what
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the other is in the arena of action. 331 But if we read such descriptions in light of what has been said
regarding the necessary intertwining of the mind’s speculative and practical aspects, the two
correlates will be seen to be internal to each other’s acts. 332 The trigger of one does not fire without
that of the other; assent is often a matter of action and actions often imply assents. Conscience
provides the mind with crucial “presumptions” and “first principles” that lie at the basis of its
judgments, 333 and it can impel men to make decisions that the “mere intellect” could not make on
its own. “Act we must,” 334 Newman says of the assent of faith, “not knowing how to
choose…sooner or later he must; or rather, he must choose soon, and cannot choose late, for he
cannot help thinking, speaking, and acting, and to think, speak and act, is to choose.” 335 Newman
thus speaks of the moral implications of assent, 336 and of the conscience as decisively shaping our
imaginative vision of reality, enabling the upright man to come to certitudes that unconscientious
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men cannot. 337 As “a constituent element of the mind,” 338 it shapes the imagination which in turn
shapes the illative sense.
There is, then, a two-way influence to be acknowledged. On the one hand, Newman says
that “knowledge must ever precede the exercise of the affections” and that “imagination and
affections should always be under the control of reason.” 339 Conscience, which operates primarily
through affection and imagination, 340 must accordingly act in light of what the mind already knows
through the clarity of assents and propositions. On the other hand, conscience is an “original
principle” that does not depend on any process of “reasoning” prior to it, 341 and it positively shapes
the mind in its judgments of what is real. 342 This tension can be resolved only if we conceive of
the two poles (conscience and intellect) as internal to one another. Thus we return to the
hermeneutic circle mentioned above: faith shapes the heart, and the “right state of heart” acts as a
safeguarding criterion for faith; 343 the imagination governs judgment, and judgments shape the
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imagination; “conscience is a simple element in our nature, yet its operations admit of being
surveyed and scrutinized by Reason;” 344 the impressions of conscience give rise to assents, and
assents shape conscience. The two cannot be separated: they mutually interpenetrate and ground
one another. In the realm of Christian faith, this means that conscience tends toward and stands in
need of dogma and ecclesial authority as a sort of midwife to its development, and that dogma
requires conscience as its presupposition and inner measure; 345 conscience, after all, being that
place in us from which we become willing to offer our lives for the sake of truth.
Newman thus locates conscience at the very foundation of faith. It is by conscience, he
says, and not by “proofs,” 346 that the truths of “natural theology” are brought home to us in a real
way. By its intimation of an absolute moral imperative, 347 by its pleasant approbations and stinging
accusations, 348 the well-heeded conscience tends toward the formation in us of an impression of a
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conscience and so would be identical to conscience…the act of tradition may be described as the functioning of the
conscience of the Church.”
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See Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 74: “I have no intention whatever of denying the beauty
and the cogency of the argument which these books [of Natural Theology and Evidences] contain; but I question
much, whether in matter of fact they make or keep men Christians… the best argument…an argument which is ‘within
us’ – an argument intellectually conclusive, and practically persuasive…is that which arises out of a careful attention
to the teachings of our heart, and a comparison between the claims of conscience and the announcements of the
Gospel.” cf. id., Oxford University Sermons, 63: “it is as absurd to argue men, as to torture them, into believing.”
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See Newman, Grammar of Assent, 99: “conscience does not repose on itself, but vaguely reaches forward to
something beyond self, and dimly discerns a sanction higher than self for its decisions, as is evidenced in that keen
sense of obligation and responsibility which informs them. And hence it is that we are accustomed to speak of
conscience as a voice, a term which we should never think of applying to the sense of the beautiful; and moreover a
voice, or the echo of a voice, imperative and constraining, like no other dictate in the whole of our experience.”
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See Newman, Grammar of Assent, 99: “Conscience is ever forcing on us by threats and by promises that we must
follow the right and avoid the wrong.” cf. ibid., 105: “there are things which excite in us approbation or blame, and
which we in consequence call right or wrong; and which, experienced in ourselves, kindle in us that specific sense of
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personal God, 349 one who beholds us at every moment and who in his goodness holds us
responsible for our actions, rewarding the good and threatening the wicked with punishment. 350 It
is thus that conscience “does not repose in itself” 351 but “throws us outside of ourselves” in search
for a good word from the God who thus threatens us, 352 since it convinces us well enough that we
are alienated from this providential Being, 353 while offering us no clear directives as to how our
situation is to be rectified. 354 In this way we arrive at a fundamental awareness of our need for
salvation. A yearning is kindled in us that opens us up to the message of revelation. Conscience
yearns for a definitive message.
Conscience accordingly becomes the primary receiver of revelation, for it recognizes in
Christ and in his disciples the righteousness which it seeks, 355 and resonates with a proclamation
pitched directly to the heart of its dilemma. Newman speaks of the honest man as having “that

pleasure or pain, which goes by the name of a good or bad conscience.”
349
See Newman, Grammar of Assent, 103: Conscience “involves the impression on his mind of an unseen Being with
whom he is in immediate relation…What a strong and intimate vision of God must he have already attained.” cf. ibid.,
304: “Conscience, too, teaches us, not only that God is, but what He is; it provides for the mind a real image of Him.”
cf. id., Oxford University Sermons, 18: “Conscience implies a relation between the soul and a something exterior, and
that, moreover, superior to itself; a relation to an excellence which it does not possess, and to a tribunal over which it
has no power.”
350
See Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 64: “he has within his breast a certain commanding dictate,
not a mere sentiment…but a law, an authoritative voice, bidding him do certain things and avoid others…it
commands…it praises, it blames, it promises, it threatens, it implies a future, and it witnesses the unseen.”
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Newman, Grammar of Assent, 99.
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See Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 65: “its very existence throws us out of ourselves, and
beyond ourselves, to go and seek for Him in the height and depth, whose Voice it is.”
353
See Newman, Grammar of Assent, 309-10: “My true informant, my burdened conscience, gives me at once the true
answer to each of these antagonist questions:—it pronounces without any misgiving that God exists:—and it
pronounces quite as surely that I am alienated from Him.”
354
See Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 67: “It suggests to him a future judgment; it does not tell
him how he can avoid it…it does not tell him how he is to get better.”
355
See Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 80-1: “Their conscience still speaks, but having been trifled with, it does
not tell truly; it equivocates, or is irregular. Whereas in him [Christ] who is faithful to his own divinely implanted
nature, the faint light of Truth dawns continually brighter; the shadows which at first troubled it, the unreal shapes
created by its own twilight-state, vanish; what was as uncertain as mere feeling, and could not be distinguished from
a fancy except by the commanding urgency of its voice, becomes fixed and definite, and strengthening into principle,
it at the same time develops into habit. As fresh and fresh duties arise, or fresh and fresh faculties are brought into
action, they are at once absorbed into the existing inward system, and take their appropriate place in it.”
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within him which actually vibrates to the lessons” he receives from the teachers of religion. 356 For
insofar as “[God’s] representative was in their hearts” already “as a lawgiver and a judge,” the
conscientious can “respond to the Apostle's doctrine, as the strings of one instrument vibrate with
another.” 357 For such persons, the mere existence of Christianity is evidence enough to warrant
belief in its message, as it perfectly corresponds to their inborn sense of need. 358 “No mere promise
was sufficient to undo the impression left on the imagination by the facts of Natural Religion; but
in the death of His Son we have His deed—His irreversible deed—making His forgiveness of sin,
and His reconciliation with our race, no contingency, but an event of past history.” 359 The deed of
Christ’s redemption aligns directly with conscience’s secret hopes, such that meager evidence is
sufficient to impel it to surrender itself to the authoritative proclamation that comes to meet it in
the gospel.
Dogmatic authority, then, and the conscience that constitutes the most intimate foundations
of the human heart, can in no way be set at odds with each other for Newman. 360 Each is grounded
in the other. For that which conscience dimly gropes after comes to meet it in God’s saving Word,
whose voice conscience represents in each man’s breast, and which now offers to conscience its
transcendent justification. Conversely, the ecclesial authority that represents this Word in dogmatic
form depends on the “prior representative” that dwells in men’s hearts as its most basic
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Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 248-9. cf. ibid., 236: “those who believe in Christ, believe because they
know Him to be the Good Shepherd; and they know Him by His voice; and they know His voice.”
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See Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 66.
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Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 119.
360
See Joseph Ratzinger, “Cardinal Frings’ Speeches During the Second Vatican Council” in Joseph Ratzinger in
Communio. Vol I, 103: “That the Church is founded on authority and not on personal preference was the basic insight
of his [Newman’s] long Christian path. But because this authority on its part rests not on positivistic conclusions but
on trust in tradition, trust in God who reveals himself, it does not for him contradict the conscience, which is God’s
organ in man… Conscience in the proper sense—not to be confused with personal preference—is the basis for papal
authority.”
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presupposition. The Pope and the magisterium would have no authority were it not for conscience,
for such authority presumes the faith of the faithful, which lives from conscience. Hence the
famous lines from the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk: “did the Pope speak against Conscience in the
true sense of the word, he would commit a suicidal act. He would be cutting the ground from under
his feet;” 361…“the championship of the Moral Law and of conscience is his raison d'être;”362…“I
shall drink—to the Pope, if you please,—still, to Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards.”363
This implies that conscience (as distinct from the counterfeit of self-will) must be obeyed even
when its dictates appear to contradict the word of the Church, for “he who acts against his
conscience loses his soul.” 364 Ecclesiastical power can never contradict this prior “power.”365
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Newman, Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, 45: “…it is by the universal sense of right and wrong, the consciousness
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Newman, Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, 50.
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through no fault of their own. cf. ibid., 70. See also Ratzinger, “The Dogmatic and Ascetical Meaning of Christian
Brotherhood” in Man Before God, 129: “The harsh and woeful words of our Lord concerning the Judaic mission of
his time (Mt 23:15) should be a warning to the Church against a false proselytizing, to respect another’s intellectual
freedom, and to encounter that person always in the true love of brotherhood.” cf. id., “What Unites and Divides
Denominations?” in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio. Vol I, 8: “one cannot live ecumenism against one’s own Church,
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back to another important passage from Newman, Grammar of Assent, 202: “It is conceivable that a man might travel
in his religious profession all the way from heathenism to Catholicity, through Mahometanism, Jansenism,
Unitarianism, Protestantism and Anglicanism, without any one certitude lost, but with a continual accumulation of
truths, which claimed from him and elicited in his intellect fresh and fresh certitudes.” All conversion is positive.
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As Ratzinger puts it, insofar as the Church’s only power is the power of conscience, then its primary expression
must be that of suffering in witness to the Truth which sets a limit on all worldly power. See Joseph Ratzinger,
“Conscience in Time” in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio. Vol II, 22: “Conscience was recognized in principle as
setting a limit to power…the power of conscience consists in suffering, in the power of the Crucified; only in that way
can it be kept from inaugurating yet another kind of enslavement. It redeems only as the power of the Cross; its mystery
lies in this powerlessness and it must remain powerless in this world in order to remain itself.” cf. id., “Free Expression
and Obedience in the Church” in The Church: Readings in Theology. (New York: P.J. Kenedy & Sons, 1963), 215:
“might she [the Church] not be taken to task for taking the reins a bit to tightly, for the creation of too many
norms…might she not be rebuked for trusting too little in the power of truth which lives and triumphs in faith, for
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Nevertheless, “conscience has rights because it has duties,” 366 and for the believer these duties
include the effort to seek as far as possible to harmonize its commands with those of the Church:
“the onus probandi of establishing a case against [the Pope] lies, as in all cases of exception, on
the side of conscience.” 367 Without this effort it would contradict itself, for it is determined by an
inner dynamism of transcendence that attains to its definition only in the propositional articulation
of God’s revelation. 368
Dogma meets the human heart in its most personal of judgments. Its universal certainty is
not arrived at by grounds that are “common to all,” but rather, as in all cases of certainty, by the
most personal grounds of all: by the heart’s implicit judgments, shaped as these are by the vivid
apprehensions of an imagination alive to the voice of the Creator as it addresses the intimate core
of each person. Such reasonings are unique to each man, and incommunicable as such:
Conscience is a personal guide, and I use it because I must use myself; I am as little able to
think by any mind but my own as to breathe with another's lungs. Conscience is nearer to me
than any other means of knowledge. And as it is given to me, so also is it given to others; and
being carried about by every individual in his own breast, and requiring nothing besides itself,
it is thus adapted for the communication to each separately of that knowledge which is most
momentous to him individually. 369

This uniqueness, however, need not prevent a shared enjoyment of truth, since it is precisely at this
incommunicable and irreducible level—where freedom lives and individuality is realized—that the
universal authority of the Creator, which ties all things together, sounds forth. His voice echoes in
each breast, as in all of the real apprehensions that mark man’s consciousness, bidding each to

entrenching herself behind exterior safeguards instead of relying on the truth…‘wherever the spirit of the Lord is,
there is freedom.’”
366
Newman, Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, 43.
367
Newman, Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, 48. “Unless a man is able to say to himself, as in the Presence of God, that
he must not, and dare not, act upon the Papal injunction, he is bound to obey it, and would commit a great sin in
disobeying it.”
368
cf. Joseph Ratzinger, “Jesus Christ Today” in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio. Vol II, 94: “Christian exodus
involves a conversion…overcoming of self-reliance and the entrusting one’s self to the mystery…that losing of self
in love which is resurrection because it is a dying.”
369
Newman, Grammar of Assent, 304.
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honesty and humility in his response to reality. 370 Revelation brings this dynamic to its perfection.
Dogmatic faith, then, does not crush the personal subject but in a real sense depends upon it,
provides it with its deepest grounds, and brings it to its fullest freedom and inner realization—it
enables conscience to flower forth into martyrdom. 371
C. Conclusion: the Apologia and Overcoming Modernity from Within
If modernity is defined by its quest for a universally available ground of certitude in the
“neutral” standpoint of scientific rationality, we find Newman running in the exact opposite
direction: not that he denies certitude—far from it—but rather that he seeks its grounds in that
which is incommunicable and proper to the person as such. Thus, from another angle, we can
regard Newman as running in the same direction as modernity. For insofar as modernity’s desire
for universal objectivity drives it to seek bedrock within the structures of the human subject,
Newman’s project pursues the same goal still more radically. Indeed, he takes the modern quest a
step further than it is generally willing to go, discovering with Augustine in the depths of the
subject the transcendent “light,” 372 the opening to the Other, which alone makes sense of the
human person and allows his life to become one of witness. In this way, Newman overcomes
modernity from within. This is the fundamental shape of his thought, and we discover it not only
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See Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 9: “She [nature] refuses to reveal her mysteries to those who come
otherwise than in the humble and reverential spirit.”
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No man dies for an inference, but real assents are typified by the fact that they are rooted in what is personal to us,
in that incommunicable center of our responsibility, in our conscience, which makes us willing to die for our
convictions. That is the test of conscience’s power, the force of its inexorable demand, and Christian faith is verified
in the fact that it lends conscience the only material proportionate to its formal force. Dogma alone can create martyrs.
See Newman, Grammar of Assent, 89: “Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us. Many
a man will live and die upon a dogma: no man will be a martyr for a conclusion…No one, I say, will die for his own
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as “the true light that enlightens every man.” See Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 64.

73

in the corpus of his writings, but more significantly as embodied in his person in the course of his
life.
A consideration of Newman’s Apologia pro vita sua can thus serve as a summarizing
conclusion to our reflections, for it exemplifies the unity between his thought and his person. The
Apologia seeks to detail the history of Newman’s mind in the gradual development of ideas that
led to his eventual conversion to Roman Catholicism. In this it is far from a standard
autobiography. Nevertheless, at the same time, it is also far from a modern catalogue of freefloating ideas. The fact that he responds to his critics precisely by relating his story—“…the true
key to my whole life; I must show what I am, that it may be seen what I am not…I wish to be
known as a living man…” 373—reflects his conviction that truth is revealed precisely in the
incarnate, historical life of man. “It is the concrete being that reasons…the whole man moves;
paper logic is but the record of it.” 374 Thus, far from succumbing to modern isolation of thought
from reality, Newman heals its breach by his incarnational sensibility.
But what is also clear from the Apologia, as from his other works, is that he does not heal
this breach from the perspective of an external observer, but truly “from within.” For his writings
show him to be a thoroughly modern man. Indeed the very self-knowledge displayed in the
Apologia manifests the modern turn to the subject. In recounting his youth, Newman notes the
impact left upon him from reading Hume and Voltaire, along with the Calvinist William Romaine,
who encouraged in him a solipsistic doubt of the reality of the material world: “…confirming me
in my mistrust of the reality of material phenomena, and making me rest in the thought of two and
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two only absolute and luminously self-evident being, myself and my Creator.” 375 On repeated
occasions, he admits of the distinction between material reality and its phenomena, even to the
point of questioning the objective existence of space and time. 376 Only the romantic “sacramental
system” he received from Butler and Keble was able to deliver him from such doubts. 377 Thus it
is clear that he is not insensitive to the concerns of modern epistemology in his apology for the
faith, nor does he simply deny the bases for its questions. He even grants many legitimate
difficulties with regard to the question of God, and admits that these have the power to shake his
soul. 378 “How dreadful, and yet how plausible!”: this was his initial reaction to the writings of
Voltaire. 379 Newman was a modern man who felt the power of its critique from within. 380
Yet he overcomes this critique by resituating the life of thought within the full context of
the life of man. The life of the mind does not stand on its own: “the whole man moves.” 381 And
this concrete man is not a mere computer unfolding the necessary deductions of “paper logic.” He
is set in flesh, shaped by a historical imagination, by sympathy, emotional prejudice, anticipatory
desire and a sense of duty, all of which affect his assessment of the antecedent probabilities
pertaining to the question of what is reasonable or convincing. This, Newman explains, is why his
conversion took as long as it did, even as many of his disciples and enemies saw the implications
of his principles long before he did. 382 Not only was his imagination “stained” by a “false
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conscience” holding him back from Rome, 383 he was also bound by ties of loyalty and affection to
his Church, to his friends, to his nation and to his followers. Thus his discernment was driven by
the test of “daily duty”: theory could not be divorced from the demands of action and of one’s duty
before God. 384
Hence Newman cannot describe the flow of his ideas without adverting to the question of
conscience. Throughout the account, it is this that leads him by the hand: not merely what truth
demands for truth’s sake, but what conscience demands for God’s sake. This is the ghost that
haunts him, the shadow on the wall, the knock upon his heart. 385 He acts or refrains from acting in
accord with his conscience—it is this voice which, in the light reason, acts as the final criterion of
truth. This is why in the preface he equates his intellectual life with “the intercourse between
myself and my Maker.” 386 Despite all appearances to the contrary, Newman’s account is not
merely an intellectual memoir but truly a spiritual autobiography.
By the same token, the idealism and skepticism of the modern age are not merely
intellectual problems, but spiritual problems. This is what is set in relief by Newman’s life. The
fundamental issue with “liberalism,” as Newman understands the term, is not a faulty premise here
or a misdrawn conclusion there. It is a matter of one’s fundamental relation to and disposition
towards truth. Is the truth something set before the mind to be determined by it according to its
own needs and criteria? Or is it rather that before which the mind is set, the ultimate judge, to
which the whole thinking man is bound by the obligation of duty? The basic error of liberalism
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and its concomitant pathologies is that it opts for the former stance in opposition to the latter, and
this decision is spiritual before it is intellectual. The human mind is not set apart from the world to
play its self-congratulatory games. It is set before man and before God, and it can only operate
authentically insofar as it remains consciously within that setting. “Truth for truth’s sake” is only
comprehensible if man is for God’s sake. 387
Ultimately, what emerges in the Apologia is that while Newman is in one sense the main
character of his drama, he is not really the chief protagonist. He is being led step by step by another
character, mysterious at first, but gradually becoming more clear as the narrative unfolds. This
character is the conscience, the very voice of Truth, who addresses Newman and bids him along a
path of sacrifice, and indeed of heroism. 388 Such a voice cannot be accounted for if we understand
truth merely as an abstraction or notional proposition or philosophical posit. But this is never really
what Newman means by the term “truth”:
It is faith and love which give to probability a force which it has not in itself. Faith and love
are directed towards an Object; in the vision of that Object they live; it is that Object, received
in faith and love, which renders it reasonable to take probability as sufficient for internal
conviction. Thus the argument from Probability, in the matter of religion, became an argument
from Personality, which in fact is one form of the argument from Authority. 389

We see here the “preference of the Personal to the Abstract” 390 which so definitively shaped
Newman’s character and thought, and the stance of his life before the truth. In the end, what is
affirmed by the his life is that Truth is first and foremost a Person, a person who addresses man’s
heart and conscience and calls him to life and freedom.
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Newman thus leads us to a personal notion of truth, and it is here that we discover the
crucial link that ties his vision together with that of Joseph Ratzinger. For the insight that lies at
the center of Ratzinger’s theological project is the realization that, in Christianity, the Truth reveals
itself precisely as a person: Jesus Christ. Hence we read, in the oft-quoted line from Deus Caritas
Est, “being Christian is not the result of an ethical choice or a lofty idea, but the encounter with an
event, a person, which gives life a new horizon and a definitive direction.” 391 Ratzinger sees this
insight as the key to any effective response to the contemporary world’s hesitations before the
claims of truth. He is well known, of course, for his opposition to relativism’s false solution to the
problem posed by the potentially divisive and totalitarian nature of truth-claims. 392 Like Newman,
he is great defender of objective truth and of the human mind’s capacity to know it. But what is
often less appreciated is the degree to which he, again like Newman, sympathizes with the modern
(or post-modern) plight and embraces its concerns from within.
In Lumen Fidei, promulgated by Pope Francis but written mainly by Benedict XVI, 393 we
find a concerted effort to speak into this plight and to offer the Christian faith as its ultimate
remedy. In light of our preceding investigation, it can be regarded as a thoroughly Newmanian
document: 394 the contemporary world’s suspicions are treated with sympathy, 395 even as the need
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for objective truth is insisted upon; 396 the personal nature of faith is repeatedly emphasized, 397 and
the heart is identified as its organ, 398 as the place where truth and love (the intellectual and the
ethical) are united and recognize their need for one another; 399 love is thus regarded “as a source
of knowledge” 400 endowed with its own logic, 401 opening us up to a new vision of reality; 402 faith,
which moves by love, is accordingly both a matter of hearing from authority (dogma) 403 and of
seeing for ourselves (image), 404 which two modes are united in Jesus, who as the Word made flesh
is the Truth in person; 405 the rational light of truth therefore acquires a personal countenance which
is capable of addressing us in love; 406 and, crucially, this fact opens up the possibility of a truth
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It is a question about the origin of all that is, in whose light we can glimpse the goal and thus the meaning of our
common path.” cf. ibid, 34: “Truth nowadays is often reduced to the subjective authenticity of the individual, valid
only for the life of the individual. A common truth intimidates us, for we identify it with the intransigent demands of
totalitarian systems.” cf. ibid., 47: “we find it hard to conceive of a unity in one truth. We tend to think that a unity of
this sort is incompatible with freedom of thought and personal autonomy.”
396
Lumen Fidei, 24.
397
Lumen Fidei, 8, 11, 13, 18.
398
Lumen Fidei, 26: “Here a saying of Saint Paul can help us: "One believes with the heart" (Rom 10:10). In the Bible,
the heart is the core of the human person, where all his or her different dimensions intersect: body and spirit, interiority
and openness to the world and to others, intellect, will and affectivity. If the heart is capable of holding all these
dimensions together, it is because it is where we become open to truth and love, where we let them touch us and deeply
transform us. Faith transforms the whole person precisely to the extent that he or she becomes open to love. Through
this blending of faith and love we come to see the kind of knowledge which faith entails, its power to convince and
its ability to illumine our steps. Faith knows because it is tied to love, because love itself brings enlightenment. Faith’s
understanding is born when we receive the immense love of God which transforms us inwardly and enables us to see
reality with new eyes.”
399
Lumen Fidei, 27: “If love needs truth, truth also needs love.”
400
Lumen Fidei, 28.
401
Lumen Fidei, 27: “love is itself a kind of knowledge possessed of its own logic.”
402
Lumen Fidei, 27: “One who loves realizes that love is an experience of truth, that it opens our eyes to see reality in
a new way, in union with the beloved.”
403
Lumen Fidei, 29.
404
Lumen Fidei, 30.
405
Lumen Fidei, 31: “How does one attain this synthesis between hearing and seeing? It becomes possible through
the person of Christ himself, who can be seen and heard. He is the Word made flesh, whose glory we have seen (cf.
Jn 1:14). The light of faith is the light of a countenance in which the Father is seen. In the Fourth Gospel, the truth
which faith attains is the revelation of the Father in the Son, in his flesh and in his earthly deeds, a truth which can be
defined as the "light-filled life" of Jesus. This means that faith-knowledge does not direct our gaze to a purely inward
truth. The truth which faith discloses to us is a truth centred on an encounter with Christ, on the contemplation of his
life and on the awareness of his presence.”
406
Lumen Fidei, 33.

79

that no longer threatens the person’s autonomy but offers him the liberation of love, 407 creating in
him the capacity for a shared knowledge of the truth via love’s transcendence to community. 408
Such is Benedict XVI’s answer to the crisis of the modern world: not primarily a
philosophical response to a merely philosophical problem, but a theological response to what is
fundamentally a spiritual malady. The mind that seeks its grounds exclusively within its own
sealed structures comes to fear anything that approaches it from without, which can only appear
as a foreign imposition. Such fear, accordingly, will not be cured by new arguments, but only by
a renewed encounter with the Truth as Person: not a truth of bald abstractions whose universality
stands as an ideological threat to personal authenticity, but the Truth who is revealed as Love, who
thus, far from threatening the person, rather opens the path to redemption and true authenticity. It
is the contention of this paper that this response shares a common shape with that of Blessed John
Henry Newman, to which it owes much, and which it in turn helps to illuminate, as both seek to
correlate the subjective depths of the person to the objective truth that comes to meet it in
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nowadays is often reduced to the subjective authenticity of the individual, valid only for the life of the individual. A
common truth intimidates us, for we identify it with the intransigent demands of totalitarian systems. But if truth is a
truth of love, if it is a truth disclosed in personal encounter with the Other and with others, then it can be set free from
its enclosure in individuals and become part of the common good. As a truth of love, it is not one that can be imposed
by force; it is not a truth that stifles the individual. Since it is born of love, it can penetrate to the heart, to the personal
core of each man and woman. Clearly, then, faith is not intransigent, but grows in respectful coexistence with others.
One who believes may not be presumptuous; on the contrary, truth leads to humility, since believers know that, rather
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Ratzinger in Communio. Vol II, 98-99: “Truth has been discredited in history because it has been offered from a
position of domination and made an excuse for force and oppression. Plato had already seen the danger that comes
when one sees truth as a possession and thus as power for domination…” But Jesus “is the image of God, because his
the shining forth of love, and therefore the cross is his ‘glory’…The truth, the real truth, has made itself tolerable to
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revelation: Cor ad cor loquitur. In what follows, we will seek to further illustrate this relationship,
especially as it is manifest in the ways in which Newman and Ratzinger approach the theological
interpretation of history.

Part II: Reading History
A. Development and Stability
The foregoing investigation into the relationship between objectivity and subjectivity in
faith has laid the foundations for what follows. For, as we saw in the introduction, the question of
objectivity and subjectivity bears implications for the question of the relationship between faith
and history. The more one views faith as objective to the exclusion of all subjectivity, the less one
will be able to admit of changes in faith’s articulation through the centuries. Conversely, the more
one views faith as subjective to the exclusion of all objectivity, the less one will be able to account
for faith’s stability and normativity through history. So long as objectivity and subjectivity are thus
viewed to stand in competition with one another, then, we will be forced to choose between a
modernism that allows for no real continuity in tradition and an exaggerated dogmatism that
tendentiously reads its conclusions back into the past. Newman’s genius, however, in correlating
objectivity and subjectivity such that they grow in direct and mutual proportion to one another,
allows him to read history in such a way that he can account both for faith’s development and for
its stability in history. 409 This is what becomes clear in his classic Essay on the Development of
Christian Doctrine, to an analysis of which we will now turn.
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cf. Günter Biemer, Newman on Tradition. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 145: “Tradition is more than the
static repetition of a doctrine, less than rank proliferation; more than logical consequence, less than the random thrusts
of the life-force.” cf. Norris, “The Development of Doctrine,” 486. Newman achieves a “dynamic continuity avoiding
the Scylla of corruptive innovation and the Charybdis of a statuesque immobility.”
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Newman’s original concern in examining the history of the early Church was to render the
tradition of Christian orthodoxy intelligible in a skeptical modern age, and initially, to do so by
justifying his proposal of Anglo-Catholicism as the Via Media between Roman and Protestant
extremes. 410 On the one hand, his studies had already convinced him of the untenability of the
Protestant position as an orthodox Christian option: “to be deep in history,” he wrote, “is to cease
to be a Protestant.” 411 On the other hand, several facets of Roman Catholic belief and practice
appeared to him as obvious novelties, foreign to the ancient tradition. 412 The alleged virtue of the
Anglican vision—or rather, of the theoretical vision proposed by the Oxford Tractarians—was its
pristine fidelity to the classical Catholic tradition of the Fathers, admitting neither of Protestant
attenuations nor of Papist accretions. By this proposal, Newman hoped to offer an orthodoxy that
could stem the liberalizing tide already threatening to eviscerate the English Church. 413
The trouble that emerged for this thesis, however, was the lack of an adequate criterion by
which to validate the specifically Anglican version of orthodoxy. The Protestant sola scriptura
was clearly insufficient to bear the dogmatic assertions of the first Christian centuries. 414 But the
alternative “canon” of St. Vincent of Lerins—quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus—
appealed to by Pusey, Keble and other Tractarians as an abiding rule for Christian doctrine, 415 was
almost equally unsuited: it refuted the Gnostics only so far as it also justified the semi-Arians and
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Monophysites in their exceptions to Nicaea and Chalcedon, the decrees of which Councils
appeared as “novelties” to these heretical sects. 416 The challenge for Newman was thus to articulate
a reading of Christian history that could defend the various “novelties” of the orthodox tradition,
while also refuting the novelties of the liberals, who were citing the ambiguities of history as an
excuse to abandon dogmatic commitments. In other words, he needed to show how the tradition
could simultaneously change and remain the same: “it changes…in order to remain the same. In a
higher world it is otherwise, but here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed
often.” 417 The Essay on Development was the fruit of this quest, a fruit which coincided with his
entrance into the Catholic Church, and which would itself become a landmark text in the tradition
it seeks to illustrate. 418
The thesis which Newman was pursuing was not entirely new. As Owen Chadwick has
pointed out, the medieval scholastics admitted of a certain growth in the body of Christian
knowledge along the analogy of a rational inference, whereby the latent contents of a given premise
are drawn out either by analysis or by combination with some other premise. 419 This theory,
Chadwick notes, was given a very literal interpretation by later modern commentators such as
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Molina, Vasquez and Suarez. 420 In contrast to the rigid assertions of the uniform continuity typical
of Bishop Bossuet, 421 these thinkers posited that Christian doctrine could legitimately grow when
one divinely revealed proposition was combined with another premise, drawn either from
elsewhere within the Sacred Deposit or from the certain truths of natural reason. Thus, by
syllogism, the Church could arrive at a “new” proposition of divine truth—already virtually
contained within Revelation if not explicitly stated—that could now be dogmatically affirmed: a
“theological conclusion.” 422
The difficulty with such a theory is two-fold. First, when such conclusions involve the
combination of a divine truth with a truth of natural reason, it is plausible and indeed likely that
the minor (natural) premise will not be beyond dispute. Yet if the theological conclusion of such a
syllogism be dogmatically defined, then that previously contested premise must be affirmed with
a certainty it did not previously merit. A new proposition would thus appear to be drawn up into
the realm of divine faith. 423 This consideration led Suarez to affirm that the Church’s Magisterial
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definitions are occasions of ongoing revelation in the Holy Spirit, allowing the Church to affirm
natural propositions with divine authority. 424 The Magisterium, of course, declined to assume that
level of authority, but however much other thinkers may have tried to finesse the matter,425
Suarez’s conclusion is difficult to avoid if we assume this model of development. However much
the Holy Spirit’s activity in enlightening the magisterium must be affirmed, it cannot be construed
as ongoing revelation.
The second difficulty with the theory lay in its failure to comport with the actual outlines
of history. Not only do we witness several heretics across the ages fashioning apparently valid
syllogisms from scriptural premises, 426 we also see the Church discerning the orthodox response
in a manner not easily reducible to syllogistic reasoning. The doctrines surrounding purgatory,
indulgences and Marian piety emerged more out of venerable practice than from any set of logical
deductions, yet they cannot be simply dismissed on that score, any more than can the canon of the
Scriptures or Eucharistic transubstantiation. 427 Admitting these examples and the kind of
development they exhibit was crucial for Newman’s journey into the Church.
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On Newman’s hands, then, was the task of presenting a theory of growth or development
in Christian doctrine through the centuries which conformed to the actual patterns of history and
at the same time excluded any notion of “ongoing revelation,” then very much in vogue among
Christians seeking to conform their faith to the sentiments of the times. 428 As mentioned, this task
would require some way of affirming the paradox of a simultaneous identity and change within
the tradition, and, if this change was to involve a real learning on the part of the Church, also a
simultaneous knowing and not-knowing. “The Church does not know more than the Apostles
knew,” 429 even as the list of dogmas which we now know to belong of necessity to the faith has
grown significantly since the death of John the Evangelist. The saving essence of the faith must
remain qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged, even its creedal and conceptual articulations
have undoubtedly advanced. How can this be?
Newman solves the dilemma by drawing a powerful distinction. It first emerges in the
discussion regarding the “development of ideas in general” that introduces the Essay. Here, in his
first paragraph, Newman once again asserts the active role of the mind in knowing. In opposition
to the merely passive “impressions” of Locke, he states that as soon as our minds apprehend an
object “we judge: we allow nothing to stand by itself: we compare, contrast, abstract, generalize,
connect, adjust, classify: and we view all our knowledge in the associations with which these
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processes have invested it.” 430 The output of these processes of judgment are the various
“aspects” 431 under which we know and seek to know the things we encounter. Of these aspects not
all are of equal value. Some are less sure than others, some better grounded; some more peripheral,
and others more central; some will need refinement and purification whereas others are more or
less accurate from the beginning. 432 But crucially, none of the aspects resulting from our judgments
are fully adequate to the object of those judgments. 433 None of them can exhaust its contents. They
are all partial and perspectival, and the integral “idea” truly adequate to the object only corresponds
to sum total of all possible aspects. 434
This implies that our explicit knowledge of things is always incomplete and progressive. 435
For who of us can know all of the possible aspects of a thing, a variety potentially infinite in
number? A certain aspect may at some point take the lead in our conception, an essence or nature
may emerge that allows us to tentatively assess the whole, but this will always be by way of an
abstraction that necessarily takes a step back from the concrete reality of the original. 436 The
marble sculpture can only really be known when the full sweep of its circumference is beheld at
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once, something no individual can accomplish on his own. 437 It is only through “the action of mind
upon mind,” minds all possessed by the same idea, that the full truth progressively emerges.438
Only then, through the gradual accumulation of perspectives, can all the possible aspects be
collected and allowed to balance, purify and strengthen one another. Only then, as it were
asymptotically, does the full idea begin to appear. 439
But this last point introduces another crucial dimension. The whole collective venture
towards truth depends on the fact that all of the “minds” involved are indeed possessed by the same
idea, even as their explicit judgments only admit of diverse, partial aspects. Otherwise, we would
be condemned to a subjectivism utterly incapable of attaining to truth. 440 For without an objective
reference beyond our various aspects how could our collective effort be guaranteed a coherent
direction? The idea must live of its own accord: it must be “of a nature to arrest and possess the
mind, may be said to have a life, that is, to live in the mind…it becomes an active principle within
them, sending them to an ever-new contemplations of itself.” 441 The object thus necessarily
“impresses an idea of itself on our minds” and henceforth it is more this idea that works out its
conclusions in us than we that work out our conclusions in it. 442 Thus, in the midst of all the partial
aspects by which we consciously judge the object, the integral idea is also present, as an
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“impression” that exercises a governing role over the whole process. Crucially, for Newman,
Christianity is but one integral idea and not a set of ideas, even as it is an idea that gives rise to
manifold aspects. 443
It becomes immediately evident here how important Newman’s doctrine of imagination
and implicit knowledge is for grounding his theory of development. For it is that which is
impressed upon the imagination, the “imaginative idea,” of which the knower may be only partially
aware in his explicit consciousness but of which his mind is nevertheless fully possessed on the
implicit level, that serves as the bedrock of constancy amid changing articulations. Language is
only able to communicate realities by relating them to others within its field of vision—a tree is a
tree, for instance, by relation to other trees—but in this it necessarily grasps only parts and misses
that which belongs incommunicably to the whole in its concrete uniqueness. 444 That which is
incommunicable in others requires something incommunicable in us for its proper
apprehension. 445 Thus the aspects of things that men develop through explicit words and
concepts—which will frequently require balancing and purification—must be rooted in something
deeper within the person, something that can serve to check and order these developments vis-àvis a more direct contact with the reality in question. 446
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Thus the fundamental distinction drawn in the Essay is one between the (implicit)
impression of the integral idea and the various (explicit) aspects according to which it is judged. It
achieves fuller definition in the Grammar of Assent, where we find the distinction between “real”
and “notional” apprehensions, and between corresponding “real” and “notional” assents. 447 Here
the designation “real” accrues to our apprehensions of and assents to those concrete objects which,
when encountered, leave a distinct impression upon the mind,448 whereas the term “notional”
attaches to our apprehensions of and assents to the lines of relation by which we connect those
objects to others within our field of knowledge. 449 Hence the notional apprehension is always to
one degree or another abstract and partial, and so conceptual, while the real apprehension is always
concrete, individual and whole, something communicated by an impression upon the imagination
which subsequently makes an energetic demand upon our field of action. 450 The latter is deep and
focused, playing a fundamentally conservative role in governing the activity of the mind; the
former, conversely, is comparitivley shallow and broad, that by which the mind makes connections
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stimulates the affections and passions, by bringing facts home to them as motive causes.” cf. ibid., 76: “in real [assents,
the mind] is directed towards things, represented by the impressions which they have left on the imagination. These
images, when assented-to, have an influence both on the individual and on society, which mere notions cannot exert.”
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and advances in its knowledge. 451 Eventually Newman describes notional apprehensions explicitly
as “aspects,” and describes them in parallel fashion to the “aspects” outlined in the Essay, just as
he describes the “real” apprehensions in parallel fashion to the integral “ideas” of his earlier
work. 452 Thus the impression-aspect distinction finds its completion in the real-notional
distinction.
It is important to note once again here that this distinction in no sense entails a separation.
The real impression of the object and the notional delineation of its aspects occur simultaneously,
and may or may not be consciously distinguished by the apprehending subject. 453 While in the
Grammar Newman has no trouble setting real apprehensions and assents into explicit propositional
form, the implication in the Essay on Development is that the Christian idea can never be fully
grasped by any single proposition and must accordingly be approached through a variety of
angles. 454 In the latter case, the impression of the integral Christian idea would not be consciously
apprehended in any conceptual form, whereas in the former the impression would be graspable by
proposition. 455 In either case, the overall sense given is that the two modes—real and notional—

451

Newman, Grammar of Assent, 47.
Newman, Grammar of Assent, 44, 49, 57. cf. id., Lectures on Justification, 9: “If there be such a thing as a real
apprehension of Christ, it must necessarily be beyond explanation. It is a feeling, a spiritual taste, perception, sight,
known only to him who has the blessedness to experience it. It is something beyond and above nature.”
453
Newman, Grammar of Assent, 93. cf. ibid., 44: “Instinctively, even though unconsciously, we are ever instituting
comparisons between the manifold phenomena of the external world, as we meet with them, criticizing, referring to a
standard, collecting, analyzing them.” Thus, as Tillman and O’Connell put it, “there is a general, natural and direct
correspondence between a given explicit dogma and the inward idea held by faith which the dogma represents, despite
reason’s inability to spell out explicitly and exactly all the lines of that correspondence.” (O’Connell and Tillman,
“Development: The context and the content,” 454.) cf. Sillem, The Philosophical Notebook, 122: “Newman sees mind
and imagination, abstract idea and image, as contributing by their conjoined partnership to all human thinking.”
454
Newman, Grammar of Assent, 55: “It is characteristic of our minds, that they cannot take an object in, which is
submitted to them simply and integrally. We conceive by means of definition or description; whole objects do not
create in the intellect whole ideas, but are…thrown in a series, into a number of statements, strengthening, interpreting,
correcting each other, and with more or less exactness approximating, as they accumulate, to a perfect image.”
455
The discontinuity here again suggests a distinction between “real ideas” and “real apprehensions,” the former being
received by the latter in a mode that immediately combines implicit content with an explicit expression. This is a
necessary nuance to keep in mind as we proceed with our investigation, even if a detailed investigation of this
relationship would inject too much complexity for our present purposes. Newman also at times suggests the possibility
of a notional apprehension of a real idea.
452
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pass into and inform one another: the real apprehension grounds and governs the notional, while
the notional conditions and defines our conscious appreciation of the real. 456 This corresponds with
our earlier statements regarding the interrelationships between the implicit and the explicit,
imagination and judgment, conscience and dogma. As the real demands the notional for its
appreciation and preservation, the notional depends on the real for its foundations.
Also noteworthy here is the fact that the ultimate factor by which Newman differentiates
the real from the notional is its heightened capacity to make practical demands upon the subject.
A real apprehension, begetting a real assent, is something that subsequently shapes the orientation
of the person’s life. It is an apprehension the assent to which forces me to adjust my life to its
reality, and indeed, to stake my life upon its truth if challenged. 457 It is therefore crucial for
Newman that Christianity be essentially rooted in a real apprehension and assent, and only
secondarily in the notional, though this need imply no derogation of the notional. 458 For this reason,
in Newman’s understanding, the real must always take priority over the notional, and not viceversa. 459 It is the impressed idea that is the governing principle over the development of the

456
Newman, Grammar of Assent, 44: “Nay, as if by one and the same action, as soon as we perceive them, we also
perceive that they are like each other or unlike, or rather both like and unlike at once. We apprehend spontaneously,
even before we set about apprehending, that man is like man, yet unlike; and unlike a horse, a tree, a mountain…yet
in some, though not the same respects, like each of them…we are ever grouping and discriminating, measuring and
sounding, framing cross classes and cross divisions, and thereby rising from particulars to generals, that is from images
and notions.”
457
That is to say, it involves the conscience. See Newman, Grammar of Assent, 35. Though a man should die even for
a notional assent if forced by necessity to choose between denial or death, real assent is differentiated by the fact that
a man would “spontaneously challenge so severe a trial” to witness to its veracity. Clearly, Newman has martyrdom
on his mind in this passage. cf. ibid., 87, where real assent is defined by the affect it has upon man’s conduct. cf. id.,
Oxford University Sermons, 332: “Knowledge is the possession of those living ideas of sacred things, from which
alone change of heart or conduct can proceed.”
458
Newman, Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects, 293: “The heart is commonly reached, not through the
reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history,
by description. Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us. Many a man will live and die
upon a dogma: no man will be a martyr for a conclusion.”
459
See Newman, Grammar of Assent, 47. cf. ibid., 90: “…man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling,
contemplating, acting animal. He is influenced by what is direct and precise. It is very well to freshen our impressions
and convictions from physics, but to them we must go elsewhere.” cf. id., Oxford University Sermons, 123, where the
inherent weakness of a merely notional grasp of Christianity is highlighted: “Hitherto they have learned revealed truths
only as a creed or system; they are instructed and acquiesce in the great Christian doctrines; and, having virtuous
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conceptual aspects, not the aspects over the idea. 460 This by no means entails a relativization of
the aspects; rather, as implied above, these are absolutely essential to the knowledge and
appreciation of the object, and the accuracy of their development is crucial for the “life” of the
“idea.” But they are nonetheless secondary and subordinate to the real impression, from which
they can never be considered in isolation; 461 this all the more so in that they are liable to imbalance
and inaccuracies when not held in the context of all other possible aspects. 462 We witness again
here the unique role which Newman affords to the imaginative faculty of human knowledge, in
some sense ranking it ahead of the explicitly ratiocinative faculty, though not in any way opposing
the two. 463
This unity-in-distinction between the real-impression and the notional-aspect, rooted as it
is in Newman’s articulation of the relationship between imagination and truth, is precisely what
grounds Newman’s theory of the development of doctrine, for it is this that enables Newman to

feelings, and desiring to do their duty, they think themselves really and practically religious.” cf. ibid., 331-2: “Creeds
and dogmas live in the one idea.”
460
cf. Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 334: “though the Christian mind reasons out a series of dogmatic
statements, one from another, this it has ever done, and always must do, not from those statements taken in themselves,
as logical propositions, but as being itself enlightened and (as if) inhabited by that sacred impression which is prior to
them, which acts as a regulating principle, ever present, upon the reasoning, and without which no one has any warrant
to reason at all…though the development of an idea is a deduction of proposition from proposition, these propositions
are ever formed in and round the idea itself (so to speak), and are in fact one and all only aspects of it.”
461
See Newman, Grammar of Assent, 45-46: Newman bemoans the “gratuitous idealism” of those who invert this
order, and attempt “to draw the individual after the peculiarities of his type.”
462
See Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 36: “one aspect of Revelation must not be allowed to exclude
or dominate another.” cf. id., Lectures on Justification, wherein Newman frequently attributes the woes of theology
to isolation of one aspect from another. See ibid., 16: “what Saints and Martyrs have in substance held in every age,
though not apart from other truths which serve to repress those tendencies to error…when exclusively cherished by
the human mind… detached and isolated.” cf. ibid., 32: “justification and sanctification are…parts of one gift,
properties, qualities, or aspects of one; that renewal cannot exist without acceptance, or acceptance without renewal.”
cf. ibid., 4, 101. cf. id., Oxford University Sermons, 88-9.
463
Newman’s creative response to the problem of modern skepticism is evident again here: rather than simply calling
a procedural foul and disqualifying its questions as misplaced, he absorbs its critique and overcomes it from within
through a two-fold assertion: a) that the quest for knowledge is of a communal nature, operating within a tradition,
and b) that the conceptual aspect of reason is secondary and subordinate to the real, impressed “idea” of the object.
Further, the “real” apprehensions before which reason is always responsible is the voice of conscience, which, closely
allied with the illative sense, informs the soul not only of whether or not it is reasonable to give one’s assent, but
whether duty demands it. Truth, for Newman, is something toward which we are responsible as an aspect of our
relation to our Maker.
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affirm a simultaneous knowing and not-knowing in the life of the faith—an identity even in
change. 464 For as it is with ideas in general, so also with the “idea” of Christianity: its content is
judged according to various and partial aspects, none of them adequate or comprehensive of
themselves, but all of them needing the others in order to be balanced and refined by the whole set
of alternative aspects. 465 And because these “aspects” consist in relations of the object to other
judged aspects of reality, there is always the possibility that the foibles of a given culture or age
may inhibit or obscure the articulation of the faith in that age, which obscurities will then need to
be adjusted, purified or counterbalanced at a later time. 466 Hence the stream is not always “purest
nearest the source…[belief] is more equable, and purer, and stronger, when its bed has become
deep, and broad, and full.” 467 In this respect, the knowledge of the Christian faith is progressive
and never complete.
Yet, at the same time, this knowledge is constant and full, for prior to and above these
sometimes disparate notional apprehensions there lies the real apprehension of the integral “idea”
of Christianity, which, impressed upon the mind of the Church, is whole and complete in itself and

464

cf. Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 206: “the unity and identity of the idea with itself through all
stages of its development from first to last.” cf. ibid., 186-7: “a mere formula either does not expand or is shattered in
expanding. A living idea becomes many, yet remains one. The attempt at development shows the presence of a
principle, and its success the presence of an idea.” cf. Biemer, Newman on Tradition, 60: “The deposit of faith is not
‘a list of articles that can be numbered,’ and it is ‘not a number of formulae.’”
465
Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 55: “…they accumulate, to a perfect image…We cannot teach except
by aspects or views, which are not identical with the thing itself.”
466
cf. Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 39: “it may be interrupted, retarded, mutilated, distorted, by
external violence…But whatever the risk of corruption from intercourse with the world around, such a risk must be
encountered if a great idea is duly to be understood.” cf. ibid., 173: “unity of type, characteristic as it is of faithful
developments, must not be pressed to the extent of denying all variation, nay, considerable alteration of proportion
and relation, as time goes on, in the parts or aspects of an idea.” cf. ibid., 176: “it may happen that a representation
which varies from its original may be felt as more true and faithful than one which has more pretensions to be exact.”
cf. ibid., 17: “real perversions and corruptions are often not so unlike externally to the doctrine from which they come,
as are changes which are consistent with it and true developments.” cf. Ratzinger, “Free Expression and Obedience in
the Church,” 208, where Ratzinger expounds on the paradox of the simultaneously irreformable and reformable nature
of the Church: “‘Dark I am and Comely’…the institution as institution also bears its burden of humanity; it too shares
the human vanity of the stumbling block.”
467
Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 40.
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essentially unchanging: 468 semper idem. This is the principle which gives stability to the faith even
amidst the ever-changing 469 stream of its articulations, the bedrock of constancy which governs
and directs the development of its doctrines. 470 Though the apostles may not have recognized the
language of homoousios or hypostasis, yet they shared pre-eminently in the same real apprehension
from which those later definitions of faith took their rise, and bequeathed to the Church the
normative testimony of what that apprehension entails. 471 This fundamental apprehension and
assent, passed down as a living principle from generation to generation, continues to shape the life
and profession of the Church’s faith throughout the whole course of her history, each new twist
and turn spurring a new aspect or development. 472
Seeing this is what led Newman into communion with Rome.473 For he saw that the ancient
Catholic tradition could not be reduced to the merely conservative principle of St. Vincent of
Lerins, nor to a set of logical deductions from past statements. 474 Since the apprehended “idea”
could not be reduced to the conceptual, neither could its developments. Despite the protestations

468
cf. Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 328: “if Almighty God is ever one and the same, and is revealed to us as
one and the same, the true inward impression of Him, made on the recipient of the revelation, must be one and the
same.” cf. ibid., 336: “That idea is not enlarged, if propositions are added, nor impaired if they are withdrawn: if they
are added, this is with a view of conveying that one integral view, not of amplifying it. That view does not depend on
such propositions: it does not consist in them; they are but specimens and indications of it…portions or aspects of that
previous impression.”
469
Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 40: “It changes with them in order to remain the same. In a higher
world it is otherwise, but here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often.”
470
Newman, Grammar of Assent, 47: real apprehension “is the conservative principle of knowledge.”
471
cf. Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 191: “the holy Apostles would without words know all the truths
concerning the high doctrines of theology.”
472
Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 53: “Creeds and dogmas live in the one idea which they are designed
to express, and which alone is substantive; and are necessary, because the human mind cannot reflect upon that idea
except piecemeal, cannot use it in its oneness and entireness, or without resolving it into a series of aspects and
relations.”
473
See Newman to David Moriarty, 20 March 1870, Letters and Diaries, 25:58.
474
cf. Ratzinger, Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, 187-8: “[the Council] refused to quote again the text
of Vincent de Lerin…it has another conception of the nature of historical identity and continuity. Vincent de Lerin’s
static semper no longer seems the right way of expressing the problem…This kind of new orientation simply expresses
our deeper knowledge of the problem of historical understanding…[acknowledging that] explanation, as the process
of understanding, cannot be clearly separated from what is being understood…[This] dissolved the clear antithesis of
object and subject, without leading to an identification of both.”
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of some, 475 doctrinal development is not mathematical: 476 the Church’s implicit judgments cannot
be fully mapped by explicit reason. 477 Rather the living principle spurs new conclusions in a host
of different ways, all of them enmeshed within the incarnate and historical life of the Church.
Newman catalogues several such “kinds” of development—political, historical, logical, ethical,
metaphysical—a list suggesting no simple linear path of explication, but rather a complicated
history, messy and risky, conditioned by the “numberless vicissitudes of the world.” 478 This is the
reason why revelation demands an infallible monarchial principle for the preservation of its
integrity, 479 and hence the reason why the “notes” of the true Church are to be found preserved in
communion with the Petrine See, where that principle—which belongs properly to the whole of
the communion—is ultimately concentrated and enfleshed. 480 While logical truth can be preserved
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e.g., Greenstock and Garrigou-Lagrange.
Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 41: “Arguments will come to be considered as suggestions and
guides rather than logical proofs; and developments as the slow, spontaneous, ethical growth, not the scientific and
compulsory results, of existing opinions.” cf. ibid., 10. cf. Biemer, Newman on Tradition, 128. cf. O’Connell and
Tillman, “Development: the Context and the Content,” 464: “Newman does not mean some kind of syllogistic or
demonstrative development such as a scholastic philosopher might mean, whereby this follows with necessary from
that…”
477
cf. Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 334-5: “the early Fathers…for the charge of weak reasoning, commonly
brought against those Fathers; for never do we seem so illogical to others as when we are arguing under the continual
influence of impressions to which they are insensible.”
478
Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 43. cf. id., Oxford University Sermons, 317: “Wonderful it is, to see
with what effort, hesitation, suspense, interruption,—with how many swayings to the right and to the left—with how
many reverses, yet with what certainty of advance, with what precision in its march, and with what ultimate
completeness, it has been evolved; till the whole truth "self-balanced on its centre hung," part answering to part, one,
absolute, integral, indissoluble, while the world lasts!” cf. id., Letter to Norfolk, 76, where Newman discusses later
Councils trimming and balancing earlier ones that might have otherwise led to excess.
479
See Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 148-165.
480
One might ask here whether this does not rather unrealistically demand that the Pope somehow transcend the
“vicissitudes” of history himself. To this objection Newman would likely respond: no more than it would demand a
council or a scriptural writer to transcend. It belongs to the essence of Christian belief that divine authority can appear
and be recognized in the history of human flesh. The “illative” sense is what allows us to such discern universal truth
precisely in the world of particulars. What no amount of mathematical calculus can achieve, the human subject can
by the “leaps” it takes at the promptings of conscience, which structures the subject all the way down. The Church,
too, can make definitive judgments from what would otherwise be merely “probable” historical evidence because she
possess an illative sense of her own, one which comes into its exercise through the decisions of popes and councils.
cf. J.D. Holmes, “A note on Newman’s historical method” in The Rediscovery of Newman, 97-99.
476
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by mere rule, personal truth requires a personal locus of authority: 481 no revelation is given unless
an authority is given to secure it. 482
All of this implies that the original content of the governing real-impression, though surely
inclusive of intellectual commitments, cannot be limited to the conceptual dimension. While
certain logical and metaphysical modes of development admit of strong intellectual bases, the
historical, ethical and political modes suggest a converse path wherein intellectual conclusions are
discerned from the basis of ethical attitudes, habitual practices or situational exigencies. 483 The
truth of Christianity must be held by the heart as well as by the mind. For Newman, as we have
seen, truth is never reducible to the notional operations of paper logic. 484 It is a vision that is real,
concrete and personal, set within the landscape of man’s relation to God and all of the demands

481
As J.D. Holmes puts it, citing a passage from the Grammar of Assent, there is “a personal element in history…‘far
too subtle and spiritual to be scientific.’” (Holmes, “A note on Newman’s historical method,” 99) But “dead things
have no history.” (Development of Christian Doctrine, 351) cf. Sillem, The Philosophical Notebook, 111, on the
difference between existential knowledge and the abstract knowledge that is subject to the uniform and “mechanical
manipulation of rules.” cf. Joseph Ratzinger, “Cardinal Frings’ Speeches During the Second Vatican Council” in
Joseph Ratzinger in Communio. Vol I, 93: “If I equate revelation with the text…then there is nothing living but rather
something dead—having settled down in illo tempore. Then revelation is delivered up to historicism; it is subjected
to human criteria. If, on the contrary, it is true that Scripture is the objectification of revelation which precedes it,
which cannot be caught in any human word, then exegesis must look beyond the letter and read the text in connection
with what is alive…what is living, revelation itself, is Christ…Christ is alive.”
482
See Newman Development of Christian Doctrine, 88.
483
See Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 199: “life passes on to its termination by a gradual, imperceptible
course of change.” For examples of ethical development in the history of Church, see Newman, Consulting the Faithful
in Matters of Doctrine, 70, on the development of the dogma of beatific vision of the saints from the devotion of the
faithful, and 64, on the liturgy as a source of theological discernment. See also Pope Benedict XVI, Spe Salvi, 45-48,
where he presents the doctrine of purgatory as emerging out of the ancient ecclesial practice of prayer for the dead.
484
Newman, Grammar, 151: “It is the mind that reasons and assents, not a diagram on paper.” cf. id., Apologia, 158:
“I had a great dislike of paper logic. For myself, it was not logic that carried me on; as well might one say that the
quicksilver in the barometer changes the weather. It is the concrete being that reasons…the whole man moves; paper
logic is but the record of it.” cf. id., Lectures on Justification, 62-3: “Our duty is to be intent on things, not on names
and terms; to associate words with their objects, instead of measuring them by their definitions; to speak as having
eyes, and as if to those who have eyes, not as groping our way in the dark by intellectual conceptions, acts of memory,
and efforts of reason…to have a meaning and grasp an idea…words too may mean more than they need mean
grammatically or logically; and what they do mean may be determinable historically, that is, by the records of
antiquity…If no word is to be taken to mean more than its logical definition, we shall never get beyond abstract
knowledge.” cf. Biemer, Newman on Tradition,128: “All consequences of the idea given in revelation, in so far as
they are true developments and explicitations, are identical with the idea itself. They are not just the deductions of
mere logic, ‘like an investigation worked out on paper.’ It is the life of faith and not mere logic that has worked out
these truths from revelation…in life, and not just on paper, that the revealed idea has expressed itself.” cf. Coulson,
Religion and Imagination, 63.
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for action which that landscape entails. Hence, the impression of the Christian “idea” results in a
nexus of deeply intertwined ethical and intellectual commitments whose content is grasped more
by the integral “vision” 485 of faith than by abstract notions. 486 Again, the illative “sense” by which
the mind “sees” the grounds for its assent always operates in concert with the “voice” of conscience
by which man “hears” his duty. 487 There is a sensibility appealed to here that cannot be reduced to
physical sensation any more than to conceptual reason. 488
Everything depends, then, on the “idea” or “impression” as it is held by the “imagination,”
which power cannot be equated merely with the mind’s capacity to formulate and recall sense
phantasms. Such a faculty would be highly fallible, sub-intellectual, and hence incapable of truly
governing intellectual developments. But the proposal that lies at the foundation of the theory of
development is precisely that which we detailed above regarding the imagination as a truly
intellectual faculty: it is a power of human knowing capable of influencing logical and
metaphysical developments, yet one that is itself non-conceptual and equally as practical as it is
theoretical. This is what allows Newman to acknowledge the dynamism of the Christian tradition,
for it grounds the distinction that enables him to discern the consistent logos beneath the flowing

485
Newman, Grammar of Assent, 359: “…we recognize this central Image as the vivifying idea both of the Christian
body and the individuals in it...the Thought of Christ…a mental vision.” cf. id., Oxford University Sermons, 176: “To
them Christ was manifested as He is to us, and in the same way; not to the eyes of the flesh, but to the illuminated
mind, to their Faith.”
486
cf. B.C. Butler, “Newman and the Second Vatican Council” in The Rediscovery of Newman, 239-41: “This notion
of the life of an idea, with its implied depreciation of formal logical process as dominant in the real history of the
human mind, is the major theme of the Grammar of Assent, where the resultant ‘real assent’ is contrasted with the
conclusions of purely logical inference…It is characteristic of ‘real assent’ that, whereas the conclusions of logical
inference have a universality which is also impersonal, real assent is a fully personal commitment.”
487
See Newman, Grammar of Assent, 190, on the analogy of conscience with certitude, 252, on the moral nature of
assent.
488
See Newman, Grammar of Assent, 249. Newman speaks of a “manifestation” to the “inward sense.” cf. Han Urs
von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, Vol. I, 356-415, on the spiritual senses. cf. Mark McInroy, Balthasar on the
Spiritual Senses: Perceiving Splendour. (Oxford: University Press, 2014).
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stream of history. 489 However many questions such a doctrine might raise, 490 it is crucial
nevertheless to recognize how fundamental it is to Newman’s thought, both to his theory of
development and to his epistemological response to modern skepticism. 491 Indeed, his whole
project can be seen to rest on this revolutionary positioning of the imagination as a faculty, in a
certain sense, over and above strictly logical ratiocination. 492
In this specification of the imagination and its “real” impressions vis-à-vis the notional
aspects of our thought, Newman was truly prescient, anticipating much of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth-century quest for the pre-rational grounds of rational thought, 493 and laying the
groundwork for the movement for reform that so definitively shaped the Church in the twentieth
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cf. Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 303: “As the world around varies, so varies also, not the principles of the
doctrine of Christ, but the outward shape and colour which they assume…as Wisdom only can apply or dispense the
Truth in a change of circumstances, so Faith alone is able to accept it as one and the same under all its forms.”
490
It might be wondered, for instance, how the concrete impression can serve as a properly intellectual principle,
rooted as it is in particular material reality, which philosophy has traditionally considered to be intrinsically
unintelligible, only becoming strictly knowable through abstraction. Does not this step elevate subjectivity over
objectivity, the relative over the absolute? We should not assume, however, the Newman was ignorant of such
tensions. He was well versed in the history of philosophy, particularly in Plato and Aristotle. Though he is sometimes
accused of nominalism, he was by no means anti-intellectual or anti-universal. He is only keen to make sure that we
maintain the right order between thought and existential reality—“Let units come first, and (so-called) universals
second; let universals minister to units, not units be sacrificed to universals” (Grammar of Assent, 223)—lest a
pretended-wisdom not loose its footing in experience and proceed to insensible deductions. cf. Newman, Lectures on
Justification, 33, 50-1, 61-2.
491
cf. Sillem, The Philosophical Notebook, 121.
492
As we have said, this should not be taken to imply that reason can in no way critique or purify the imagination.
Newman states quite clearly that it can and must: “…the imagination and affections should always be under the control
of reason.” (Grammar of Assent, 109) But it is equally clear that in this very operation, reason is itself shaped and
influenced by the controlling nexus of real apprehensions that form, as it were, the imaginative air in which logical
inference lives and breathes. “…methodical processes of inference, useful as they are, as far they go, are only
instruments of the mind, and need, in order to their due exercise, that real ratiocination and present imagination which
gives them a sense beyond their letter, and which, while acting through them, reaches to conclusions beyond and
above them. Such a living organon is a person al gift, and not a mere method or calculus.” (ibid., 250) Thus we
envisage within man’s ratiocination a cyclical rhythm of mutual influence between the logical reasoning (which tests
and purifies particular apprehensions) and the illative imagination (which ultimately governs on all particular
reasoning). On this theme, see also in the Grammar of Assent, 174, on the role of real apprehensions in certitude; 205,
on the lack of an objective test for certitude; 239, on the role of good sense over logic; 241, on feeling over deduction;
249, on the Image vis-à-vis deduction; 251, on supra-logical judgment; 253, on the role of personality in reasoning;
260, on concrete reasoning; 263, on instinctive perception; 268-9, on the eye of experience; 283, on the role of the
Illative sense throughout the process of rational argumentation.
493
We have in mind here the line stretching back to Pascal, and forward to Bergson, Kierkegaard, Husserl, Buber,
Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and more recently, MacIntyre. cf. Frederick D. Aquino, “Philosophical Receptions
of the Grammar of Assent, 1960-2012” in Receptions of Newman, 54-56.
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century. Indeed, the principal concerns of the ressourcement can be viewed as emerging precisely
out of this line of thought. Whatever else Blondel might have intended by his adaequatio realis
mentis et vitae, this was surely part of it: that the abstract conceptualism of Cartesian rationalism
had alienated us from reality, and that the road to reconciliation passed by way of a renewed and
deeper conception of what “truth” is; that the things we truly “know” are those things by which
we live our life, which shape our action and take their shape from that action; 494 that this is what
“real” knowledge is, as opposed to that which is typically dismissed today as “theoretical” and so
not taken seriously. 495 The later theologians of the ressourcement were concerned that, in its
reaction against modernism, neoscholastic Thomism had transformed the faith into something
basically abstract, hyper-notionalized in such a way that it had grown detached from the real
apprehensions in virtue of which those notions were originally intelligible. 496 Hence faith had
come to appear as a mere “theory,” aloof from reality, with little or no power to affect men’s lives.
Men, after all, do not die for notions. As Newman himself put it: “no man will be a martyr for a
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Marvin O’Connell notes that Blondel had not read Newman until late in his career, after his basic views had already
been established. [See O’Connell, Critics on Trial, 185.] Regardless, the standpoints of the two thinkers converge on
important points, albeit amid some important differences in emphasis and expression. At the very least, a strong
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conclusion.” 497 That for which men do die, which gives dogma its force, had to be rediscovered as
the soul of theology and of Christian history.
B. Personalism and the Christian “Idea”
We have already discussed what Newman means in general by the term “idea” in his
affinity with the romantic thinkers of his time: how it refers not so much to abstractions held by
the “intellect only” as to those focal points of the “imagination” that facilitate the apprehension of
unity amid diversity, and how these “living educts” are distinct from the linguistic (or doctrinal)
articulations to which they are nonetheless intrinsically related. Moreover, since conscience lies at
imagination’s center, such “ideas” must also address man to some extent at his personal core,
where he finds himself responsible beyond himself to a transcendent personal authority. Such is
the personal notion of truth that we detailed in the first part of this paper. The “real apprehensions”
described in the Grammar of Assent in their differentiation from the “notional apprehensions” of
aspects are but further articulations of this personal knowledge in its opposition to any knowledge
that is merely abstract.
The question now before us is that of what Newman specifically means by the “idea” of
Christianity, to which he so often refers and which grounds his theory of development. What is
this common impression that unites the minds of Christendom and underlies the course of
doctrine’s developments, around which all resulting doctrines must be gathered if they are to
remain transparent to their source of unity and life? 498 We know from what has been said that it is
“one,” that it is “not a thing in parts,” that it exerts a moral influence on the person who receives
it, and that no number of words can be adequate to explicating its depth. But what is it exactly that
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Newman has in mind by referencing this Christian “idea?” The answer often remains unspoken
and implicit in Newman’s writings, but the many hints and half-sentences scattered throughout his
corpus point together in one common direction. The fundamental “Object” of the Christian’s faith
can only be a person: Jesus Christ,499 the Logos, who is at once manifold in the life and belief of
the Church and personally distinct in his incarnate reality.
It is precisely the Incarnation that Newman regards as the fundamental doctrine of
Christianity. He calls it “the central truth of the gospel,” 500 the article of belief upon which the
Church stands or falls, 501 which “occupies the principal place” in the Gospel’s “system of truth.”502
Indeed, the whole history of theology and doctrinal development takes its departure from the
Petrine confession that the man Jesus is, in fact, the Christ, the Son of the living God. “This world
of thought,” he says, “is the expansion of a few words uttered, as if casually, by the fishermen of
Galilee.” 503 This is because the mystery of the Incarnation concentrates all of the truths that can
been known about God, whether from natural reason or from the revealed words of Scripture, into
the form of a concrete person, and so “addresses itself to our senses and imagination.” 504 In this
way, it achieves what previously neither philosophy nor religion could ever deliver. Prior to
revelation, religion could provide material for the imagination and the affections, but only in ways
that were untrue, through imperfect and distorted media. Philosophy, on the other hand, could
deliver many profound truths about the absolute, but always in a mode that was abstract and
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unimaginable. 505 It could never conceive of the most profound truths: that the Infinite one could
be truly personal, 506 one on whom the affections could be trained, 507 that His omnipotence could
express itself (at its peak) in the mode of weakness, 508 that He could reveal himself by the
mysterious means of “self-denial” in order to “impress upon our minds the personal character of
the Object of our worship.” 509 But it is precisely these truths that appear in the Gospel, revealed in
that incarnate economy that “collects the scattered rays of light” around the definitive symbol of
Christ. 510 Therefore, if we do not “know Him by His names”—i.e., His Incarnate names—we have
but a “half-knowledge” of God. 511 In accord with the “method of personation” that Newman sees
as typical of the Scriptures, what might otherwise be an abstraction comes to be perfectly known
only in the concrete person of Jesus. 512
Because Truth has been thus “committed to One come in the flesh,” 513 Newman always
speaks of faith’s “Object” in personal categories, as one who is known, attended to, and loved. 514
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Indeed, the “true Object” to be placed before the faithful is none other than Jesus Christ, 515 personal
attention to Him being practically “the definition of a Christian.” 516 Newman accordingly insists
that He who is the foundation of the Church’s very existence always be placed at the center of her
belief and practice. 517 Doctrinal correctness, along with all ecclesiastical discipline, is intended
solely to focus us more perfectly on Him, 518 as indeed it was the devout love of Him that spurred
their development in the first place. 519 Thus we can say that the foundation and essence of faith,
for Newman, is the real apprehension and personal knowledge of Jesus Christ, lodged in the heart
that recognizes in Him “the very Object…correlative to its own affections.” 520
In his sermon on “Personal Influence, the means of propagating the Truth,” Newman
describes the process by which the believer comes to this recognition in his life. He imagines a
perfect “Teacher of the Truth” as one who never disobeys the dictates of his conscience but always
follows it perfectly, and ponders what sort of influence this man might have on those who meet
him. 521 Doubtless, many would become annoyed at such a presence, and would accordingly reject
him or dismiss him as a dreamer. 522 Others, however, those who are honest at heart, would be
attracted by the majesty of such a figure, and would find themselves drawn in by curiosity and
wonder. Such, Newman says, is the convincing power of Christ in the hearts of those who receive
him, and the secret to the perseverance of his doctrine through the centuries. By a mysterious and
untraceable influence, men find themselves “as it were, individually addressed” 523 by the example
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of holiness that they meet in Christ and his saints. “At length, with astonishment and fear, they
would become aware that Christ's presence was before them,” and would find themselves
“changing into that glorious Image which they gazed upon.” 524 In this way, Newman describes
what contemporary parlance might call the “encounter with Christ”: “the keen, vivid, constraining
glace of Christ’s countenance…the piercing, soul–subduing look of the Son of man.” 525
We see here, then, that Newman’s abovementioned personalism is not limited to a
personalism of the subject. It is not only a matter of recognizing the unique and incommunicable
core of the knowing person that defies any reduction to universal forms. It also extends to a
personalism of the object, for in fact the primary object to which the human person responds is
also a person: above all, the Person of God, revealed to faith in the Person of Jesus. 526 The
incommunicable in us thus corresponds to the incommunicable outside of us 527—Cor ad cor
loquitur—and this implies further that, in the field of knowledge in general, persons themselves
can be and indeed are the most fundamental objects of personal knowledge. It is no stretch to see
this facet of Newman’s thought as a certain anticipation of what later twentieth century thinkers
would come to call the “dialogical principle,” 528 which received its classic articulation in Martin
Buber’s I and Thou. 529 Indeed, it is possible to detect a deep kinship between these two thinkers,
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Newman and Buber, one which will be vital for our appreciation of Ratzinger’s reception of
Newman.
Buber famously characterizes modern thought and culture as dominated by what he called
the I-it relation, wherein man’s comportment with reality is determined by an instrumentalizing
rationality which analyzes, synthesizes, compares, contrasts, categorizes, and generally treats of
being as an impersonal “object” to be dominated by the “subject.” The sickness of modern
consciousness lies, for Buber, in its profound inability to conceive of reality or self apart from this
relation. This he sees as a profound alienation, because for him, the I-it is not what is first, final or
most important about reality. Rather the whole dignity of the person, and with it the dignity of
being, is rooted in the ability to discover the Thou beyond the self. Indeed, this I-Thou relation is,
according to Buber, the very basis of man’s self-conscious identity, the ground on which the I-it
is founded and to which it must return if it is to be finally fruitful and properly human in its
operations. Man is constituted in his relation to the Thou, and to be man he must remain ever
ordered to that relation. Buber’s prescription then for the healing of the modern crisis is a
rediscovery of the Thou—in men, in being, and in God—such that we might once again find a
home for ourselves in the cosmos.
The parallels between Buber’s description of the I-Thou—I-it distinction and Newman’s
real–notional distinction are striking. Both explain their oppositions as differentiations between
modes of knowing; 530 both align their subordinate modes with operations typically assigned to
reason; both portray their preeminent modes in terms of a non-conceptual or pre-conceptual
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“perception” which is at once theoretical and ethical in its import; 531 and, most importantly, both
lament the negative consequences when the prerogatives of the preeminent are elapsed in favor of
the subordinate. Newman’s description of this circumstance, when the notional is isolated from
the real, could have been taken from a page in Buber’s I and Thou:
In processes of this kind we regard things, not as they are in themselves, but mainly as they
stand in relation to each other. We look at nothing simply for its own sake…'Man’ is no longer
what he really is…He is attenuated into an aspect, or relegated to his place in a classification.
Thus his appellation is made to suggest, not the real being…but a definition…he is made the
logarithm of his true self, and in that shape is worked with the ease and satisfaction of
logarithms…thus it comes to pass that individual propositions about the concrete almost cease
to be, and are diluted or starved into abstract notions. The events of history and the characters
who figure in it lose their individuality. States and governments, society and its component
parts, cities, nations…all that fullness of meaning which I have described as accruing to
language from experience, now that experience is absent, necessarily becomes to the multitude
of men nothing but a heap of notions, little more intelligible than the beauties of a prospect to
the short-sighted, or the music of a great master to a listener who has no ear. 532

This passage bears striking similarities to Buber’s account of what becomes of man under the reign
of the I-it relation. In both cases, the person disappears when the proper order is inverted. 533 While
these two thinkers clearly come from different intellectual worlds—and there is no intention of
conflating them here—they are at one in elevating the human person above all abstract notions,
and in giving the knowledge that apprehends persons priority over that which grasps only at aspects
of things.
This kinship becomes especially important as we turn to consider the unique contribution
of Joseph Ratzinger in his reception of Newman’s vision. For we will see his insight flowing from
a natural confluence of these two streams. That Ratzinger was struck by the insights of Buber’s
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personalism is indisputable. He recognized in it the language of the Augustine, 534 and made it one
of the principal integrating themes of his theological project. Throughout his diverse academic
corpus, and again in his pontifical teaching, one detects this personalism as an overriding concern:
to reconnect and re-center all of theology upon the Thou encountered in faith. This, in turn,
becomes the central prism through which Ratzinger reads Newman. 535 The Christian “idea,” which
must remain at the center of everything in the Church, is nothing other than the person of Jesus
Christ, a person who can truly be known (i.e., “real-ly” apprehended) in faith’s I-Thou encounter.
Once again: “being Christian is not the result of an ethical choice or a lofty idea, but the encounter
with an event, a person, which gives life a new horizon and a definitive direction.” Faith, for
Ratzinger as for Newman, is not merely a notional assent to abstract theses on the basis of an
external authority that is discerned through credible reports of ancient miracles. 536 It is a real,
present, I-Thou encounter, which carries its evidence and authority in itself. 537
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C. Ratzinger’s Christocentric Imagination
As the above makes clear, revelation for Ratzinger cannot be simply identified with any
list of propositions deposited in the “sources” of Scripture and tradition. These are but the
“objectifications” of something that precedes them and which remains ever greater than them. 538
If revelation is identified with the (written or oral) “text,” he says, it is necessarily reduced to a
mere report from the past that is no longer capable of addressing man in his present depths.
Delivered up to the “human criteria” that investigate historical “sources,” it can attain only to the
status of the informative “letter,” and never to that of the transformative “spirit.” 539 But
revelation’s primary purpose, Ratzinger insists, is “not information, but unity and
transformation.” 540 God wishes to address man’s innermost depths in order to raise him, who is
“the creature of dialogue,” 541 to a more perfect “relation of the human ‘I’ to the divine ‘thou,’”542
wherein he is constantly addressed and related beyond himself in that mode of listening that makes
him “contemporaneous with the presentness of God.” 543 Revelation, therefore, does nothing to
compromise the situation in which “every man stands in direct relation to God…known and loved
by God as a person…[and] called personally.” 544 Faith is not simply a hearing “about something
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that is quite external to the person” from a heteronomous authority, 545 but “a profoundly personal
contact with God, which touches me in my innermost being and places me in front of the living
God in absolute immediacy.” 546
All of this flows simply from the fact that Jesus Christ himself is the fulfillment of
revelation and that the encounter with his person is the essence of revelation’s reception in faith.
For Jesus is the place where God’s dialogue with man attains to its goal—“it has become
union” 547—such that after him there is nothing more to be said. His person is the Word that sums
up all possible words that can be written or spoken, and all such words must now be read in light
of the Spirit that lives in him. “God does not arbitrarily cease speaking,” as certain legalistic models
of revelation as divine promulgation might have it. Rather, according to the sacramental view
embraced by Ratzinger and the Second Vatican Council, Christ is the incarnate and definitive
“image” in which the Father is truly “seen,” and by entrance into his dialogue with the Father, man
comes to discover his eternal destiny. 548 In this dialogue, man’s personhood is not threatened but
rather augmented, since the encounter can only develop from that center of conscience wherein
man is most keenly related to his Creator. While this relationship depends on the mediation of the
Church for its birth and proper sustenance, this does nothing to threaten its truly personal nature:
“The ‘we’ of the Church does not rest on a cancellation of conscience, but…exactly the opposite,
it can only develop from conscience.” 549 Man’s direct and personal relation to God cannot be
contradicted by the authority of ecclesial faith, because the heart of this faith is liberating encounter
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with a person, to which encounter ecclesiastical authority must conduce man if it is to remain true
to itself and not reduce revelation to a dead artifact. 550 Dogmatic authority implies and, in some
sense, relies upon an inner participation in the truths it propounds.
We have already seen how this vision of revelation forms the centerpiece of Ratzinger’s
response to the modern crisis of truth, in which he discerns not primarily an intellectual malady
but rather the eclipse of truth’s personal dimension and of the spiritual relation that this involves.
It is Jesus who is the Logos. He who says “I am the Truth” (Jn 14:6). But when this is forgotten,
when reason is divorced from encounter and notional assessment from the real apprehension, the
result is an ideology which tends to assert its universal claims at the expense of human persons.
Ratzinger discerns here the root of modern relativism: from the mounting traumatic experiences
of ideological truth claims it is judged that it is better to avoid such claims altogether, that
potentially controversial “truths” are best relegated to the realm of private taste and sentiment, and
that man’s public existence should rely solely upon only those “facts” that can be verified by the
objectivity of science. Ratzinger, of course, sees through the false promise of this pretended
“neutrality.” Nevertheless, he does not respond first by reasserting old and rejected notions,
however important these may be. Rather he responds by seeking to trace everything back to the
person of Christ, a person whom we know as the revelation of infinite love, and who thus does not
ultimately threaten the human person but rather safeguards and elevates him precisely by means
of his unique divine truth. 551
Accordingly, it is vital to the Church’s mission that she rediscover and represent Jesus as
the center and sum of revelation, locating faith’s semper idem primarily in him rather than in those
“objectifications” that necessarily fall short of explicating his full incarnate reality. This non-
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identity between “the Word” and his many “words” allows—in Newmanian fashion—for a
flexibility and dynamism in faith’s articulation through history. 552 For if revelation is Christ,
exceeding what words can master, and if it accordingly embraces both “what is said and what is
unsaid…what the Apostles in their turn are not able to express fully in words,” 553 then it is clear
that tradition cannot be “merely a process of handing-down words” if it is to transmit revelation
adequately. 554 It too must have some means of embracing what is “unstatable,” and of gradually
articulating what it thus embraces, as though seeking progressively to “catch up” with a content
that always overwhelms its capacities. 555 The material conception of tradition must accordingly be
complemented by the formal, which understands tradition not as “propositional statement” but as
a “fundamental hermeneutical decision” that allows for faith’s “dynamic realization” in a process
leading to “ever deeper insight.” 556 As Newman saw, the “static semper” of Vincent de Lerins will
not suffice to account for this reality. 557 Faith’s continuity cannot be viewed simply as a “rigid
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external identification” with past formulations, but must rather take the form “a preservation of the
old, established in the midst of progress,” 558 whose “going back is at the same time, and from
within, a moving forward.” 559 Christ is not simply a memory from the past, but an ever present
reality, whose final coming the Church also awaits. 560 Doctrinal development, accordingly,
continually advances forward through the “inner relecture” of Christian history, 561 a reading that
never rests in the mere letter but always presses on to the level of the spirit, so that it might “read
the text in connection with what is alive”: that is, with the living Christ, who, present in the Church,
“binds us irreversibly to that beginning in illo tempore and at the same time leads us forward to
his full maturity.” 562 Tradition can only live in personal connection with Christ.
The movement of this life toward full maturity coincides with the quest for wisdom that,
for Ratzinger as for Newman, necessarily marks the dynamism of Christian faith in history. As we
saw with Newman, so also for Ratzinger, the encounter, while always transcending the logical
content of its articulations, cannot exist without passing over into explicit doctrinal confession,
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which movement is partly constitutive of its essence. The believer in Jesus cannot but cry out: “My
Lord and My God,” “You are the Christ, the Son of the Living God!” Thus, to use a patristic image,
the spiritual revelation that essentially transcends words becomes clothed in the flesh of words,
which must be read according to the hermeneutic of faith if they are to be properly understood. 563
These statements, in turn, give rise to new questions and to a series of subsequent derivations,
which theology, in its quest for the inner “logic of faith,” 564 seeks to tie together into a coherent
system that will correspond to the initial simplicity of vision. In this process of growth and
clarification, it is inevitable that there will be a shift in emphasis from the historical to the
ontological, “from the work of Christ to His Person [ontologically conceived].” 565 But this
dynamic, essential as it is, must always be viewed in subordination to the original encounter that
it serves, 566 and should accordingly guard itself against premature absolutizations.
This process of development can be regarded as an aspect of the “ongoing” incarnation of
the Word in history. As the utterly unique and incomprehensible “culture” of Christ encounters
the various cultures in which believers encounter Him, it finds itself articulated by the native genius
of each, even as it simultaneously transcends and purifies them. In this way, the Word continues
to descend to man in the historical life of the Church in order to raise him up to himself, even as
this process only brings to explicit expression what is already contained in the original
incarnation. 567 There is again a two-way dynamic here, what Ratzinger calls “dynamic interculturality,” somewhat similar to the interactions between weather systems or magnetic fields and
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their surroundings. 568 The Word assimilates to Himself everything that belongs properly to man
and to human culture, and so receives from culture a more manifold concrete expression, just as
culture receives from Him its transcendent perfection. Thus the Word continues to be clothed in
the flesh of history in order to be more perfectly known. As Christ is ever greater than any of these
assimilations, the process is never complete, and faith’s articulations will always be suspended in
a middle between faith’s certitude and its awareness of the inadequacy of its notions.569
Nevertheless, it is the task of theology to draw out these assimilations and to synthesize them into
a system that can present the unity of Christ ever more powerfully to the human imagination and
intellect. 570
Ultimately, however, the goal of Christian preaching, which theology serves, is not to
“proclaim a system of truths logically proceeding one from another, but [to expound] a reality.”
Christianity “is no mere ‘metaphysical system’ to be explained to men; it is a reality in which they
must train themselves.” 571 Thus everything must resolve to the simplicity of the original encounter
with Christ. As Bonaventure teaches, the sapientia nullaformis that marked the Church’s
beginnings must also come to reign at its end. That mystical contemplation wherein love keeps
watch amid the silence of the intellect, that original revelation that receives its “objectification” in
the body of the Scriptures and which coincides with their “spiritual sense,” must be discovered
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again behind the letter of history. 572 This is the “vanishing point” toward which theology trends: 573
“the comprehension of Christ…realized here on the highest level of love, on the level of the
Seraphim.” 574 In this way, the Church gains an “entrance into that form of knowledge which the
apostles had,” 575 who, as Newman teaches us, “would without words know all the truths
concerning the high doctrines of theology.” 576 This, for Ratzinger, is theology’s primary goal: to
move from contemplation to contemplation, and from wisdom to wisdom—from what the apostles
knew to what the Church will know, from implicit simplicity to explicit simplicity, in order to
return everything to the harmony of the mystical vision at the center. Omega revolvit ad Alpha. 577
Accordingly, it is Ratzinger’s project to tie everything back to this fundamental center. 578
Everything must remain transparent to the One in whom “word and reality [are] reconciled” and
in whom the “antithesis between intellectual dogmatic faith and the yielding-up of one’s whole
existence in trust [is] overcome,” because he is “indissolubly, both the truth and the way.” 579
Dogma must accordingly be united with relationship and discipleship, doctrine with encounter,
notions with the real imaginative apprehension, if they are to adequately communicate the content
of revelation, which is personal and must be known personally. “Where there is no relationship
with God” we cannot come to know Christ as he is in himself, but only to know the “various
aspects of him.” 580 Good theology, therefore, always “develops revelation from its Christological
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center,” 581 and never abstracts from the Christian encounter and relationship with that center. This
implies that faith’s explicit articulations should never rest in themselves, but must understand
themselves as words at the service of the higher, personal, incarnate Word, to which they point
and on which they rely for their ultimate meaning. Because they represent aspects of a prior whole
that cannot be properly apprehended in isolation from that whole, their value is relative to the
“real-ly” apprehended unity which grounds them.
Such transparency to the center is jeopardized, however, by an excessive stubbornness in
attachment to notional articulations, and here we gain deeper insight into the reasons for
theological reform. Granted, certain articulations can strike so much at the heart of revelation that
they become practically identified with the preservation of its encounter in the historical life of the
Church: this applies to certain formulations of the apostles and to the dogmatic decisions of
councils and popes, which enjoy such a level of enduring validity that they can never be
contradicted. But this is not the case with every articulation. If the cultures that receive the Word
are progressively purified by that Word, then their words of articulation must also be subject to
progressive purification, and, by implication, to certain imperfections at their inception. The
stream is not always “purest nearest the source.” In Newmanian terms, if notional aspects trace the
lines of relation connecting the integral “idea” to other realties within our field of knowledge, and
if all such aspects are inherently interrelated as fragments of the same whole, then these notions
must be open to occasional adjustment when, in course of time, previously underappreciated
aspects of the faith emerge from the center to throw the others into new relief, or when the earthly
realities to which notions relate are themselves impacted by new discoveries or apprehensions that
call for new calibrations. To falsely absolutize the notional aspects of theology in such situations
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would be to risk obscuring their transparency to the center, such that this center’s fundamental
outlines become hidden from view in a twin temptation to fideism and rationalism: fideism insofar
as stagnated theological language might force us to bracket our understanding of faith from our
natural and experiential knowledge, rendering faith’s object unrelatable and hence
unencounterable; rationalism insofar as a strict adherence to ultimately inadequate notions might
force us to deny the mysteries of faith when these notions are paradoxically outstripped. 582 Many
heresies in Church history have developed from one of these two errors. The goal, of course, is not
simply to abandon traditional notions, but rather to continually resituate and refine them within
the matrix of faith and reason such that they can always serve as proper avenues and instruments
of the “real” encounter.
By reading Ratzinger and Newman together in this way, and by viewing Ratzinger’s
christocentrism precisely as a development and continuation of Newman’s own project, we arrive
at a diagnosis of the fundamental concern that lies at the heart of the ressourcement’s critique of
neoscholasticism. In its exaggerated objectivism that tended to reduce revelation to its distinct
propositional content, neoscholasticism had also tended to isolate and absolutize notions at the
expense of personal apprehension. In such a circumstance, however, faith is “starved into notions”
and loses its consonance and inner vitality. The multiplicity of statements, then, “forms no
harmonious and consistent picture upon [the] imagination…[as] the tapestry of human life [seen]
on the wrong side…nothing has a meaning, nothing has a history, nothing has relations.” 583 But
theology serves faith precisely by helping it to discern “the whole in each part” 584 so that “the
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whole becomes in the imagination like a spirit, everywhere pervading and penetrating its
component parts, and giving them their one definite meaning.” 585 This “whole,” this integral
“idea,” as we have seen, is nothing other than the person of Christ Himself, the Incarnate Word of
the Father, who is encountered in the real apprehension of faith. By their treatments of subjectivity
and history, then, both Ratzinger and Newman are seeking to root the notional back into the real:
every doctrine, every system, every theological inference and conclusion back into the person of
Christ from which all derive. For He is the perfect revelation of the Father:
“Anyone who has seen me has seen the Father already.”

Part III: Important Objections
At this point it will be appropriate to raise certain vital objections to our schema as it has
been presented thus far. For, undoubtedly, some of the affirmations made above have provoked
serious questions among the philosophically astute. Has not a fundamental order been dangerously
inverted in all of this? Plato also knew of a common method of reasoning among men, as of the
impressions that commonly held sway in their minds; yet it was the principal project of his
philosophy to seek a universal means by which such beliefs (doxa) could be justified and so attain
to a genuine knowledge (episteme) that could adequately ground the pursuits of the polis. This
quest, along with its implicit prioritization of episteme over doxa, has definitively structured the
subsequent history of the philosophical tradition. But Newman’s prioritization of the implicit
imagination over and above explicit ratiocination, and Ratzinger’s of the personal encounter over
and above the propositional, seemingly amount to a reversal of this order. Does this not eviscerate
the philosophical project? What can be left after such an upheaval but a descent into relativism, as
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indeed the postmodern world dramatically illustrates? Clearly, before drawing any final
conclusion, these considerations need to be directly addressed.
On the philosophical level, one of the primary questions put to Newman’s epistemological
schema is whether it does not blur the distinction between the phenomenological and the properly
epistemological. 586 Granted that men do reason in such a manner, does it follow that they are
justified in doing so? There can be no question that Newman achieves a profound analysis of the
concrete workings of the human mind, and that his descriptions of its processes have contributed
a great deal to the illumination of human experience. But can this description amount to a
vindication? If so, how can we any longer distinguish between good and bad reasoning, if each
man has a personal standard that is not surveyable by explicit forms? Will every man be justified
according to his private measure, a measure for which there is no “internal test of accuracy?” 587 Is
he not thereby rendered incapable of convincing others or of being convinced by them? But this
would seem to make a public truth impossible, which is exactly the opposite of Newman’s stated
intentions.
If we reply that this objection fails to consider the role of conscience in human judgments,
the intimate participation of which faculty secures the transition from “fact” to “value” in the
human experience by relating all judgments to our moral duty before God, 588 this still falls short
of securing a “common measure between mind and mind” by which men can enter into
conversation with one another about the truth. 589 For conscience is evidently differently attuned in
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different men, and the autonomy of its voice in each breast does not allow for “coercion” by the
tools of logic. If language is thus an “imperfect exponent” of human thought and “feeling,” the
prospects of authentic communication about profound realities begin to dwindle. Hence the
accusation, frequently directed at Newman, that he embraced, or at least prepared the ground for,
a perilous nominalism and a subjectivism that could only give way to an insoluble relativism.590
Wittgenstein’s incommensurate language games appear to be the consequence of Newman’s
epistemological foundations. 591
All of this is relevant for questions of faith, for if language cannot measure reality in a
communicable way, dogma is evacuated of its significance, since dogma attempts to set
transcendent realities into linguistic form: an impossible task. Hence modernists like Henri
Brémond could assert that “what cannot be done after Newman…is to equate faith with submission
to authority…instead, faith must accord with the dictates of conscience.” 592 Nothing that authority
proposes in its linguistic definitions can communicate faith’s essence. Rooted in the personal, faith
can only be personal, not public. Dogma is at best the “expression” of this deeper truth, and, arising
from below as it does, can only arrive at the normativity of a “consensus,” never the authority of
a proclamation “from above.” 593 Thus for the same reason that Newman is accused of an irrational
fideism, he is also accused of liberal anti-dogmatism. Despite his protestations to the contrary, his
fundamental theology and epistemology relativize both dogma and reason to the norm of inner
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feeling, of the wordless impression, which bears no real responsibility to the authority of either
dogma or reason.
The same critique can be leveled against Ratzinger’s Christocentrism. For if the encounter
with Jesus communicates a personal truth beyond the power of words to grasp, in what sense can
it be commensurate with verbal formulas at all? How can it norm them, or be normed by them?
The two would seem to operate on distinct and independent planes, and if the stability of faith
through history is said to consist in one, it is difficult to see what implications this bears for the
other. So long as one claims to “know” Christ, in what sense is he responsible to formulations of
prior ages? Is this determination not simply rendered up to the personal judgment of each believer,
according to the dictates of each one’s personal relationship with Jesus? Again, if there are to be
any normative judgments about what counts as authentic development, will this be anything more
than a consensus that depends fundamentally on the personal standpoint of each believer for its
validity? 594 The appeal to encounter, then, seems to amount to an appeal to subjective experience,
which accordingly takes priority over any explicit formulation.
Newman himself anticipates the essence of this objection in his Oxford University sermon
on “The Theory of Development in Religious Doctrine,” where he notes the seeming incapacity
of finite words or “ideas” to communicate infinite and transcendent reality. In words that we could
imagine coming from either a liberal or a traditionalist interlocutor, he asks:
How should any thing of this world convey ideas which are beyond and above this world? How
can teaching and intercourse, how can human words, how can earthly images, convey to the
mind an idea of the Invisible? They cannot rise above themselves… yet (it seems) we are to
say what we, without words, conceive of them, as if words could convey what they do not
contain. 595
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This puts the issue plainly. For as words and formulas appear incapable of conveying the
transcendent God, revelation must either be transcendent and beyond words or formulaic and thus
immanent—a mere report from afar rather and not an encounter. Either it will transcend words
utterly or it will consist in words and nothing more. It cannot be both. Therefore it seems we must
choose again between modernism and traditionalism. Faith’s doctrinal formulations must have an
absolute significance or none at all, for they are either the unchanging revelation itself or mere
relative expressions that communicate nothing essential and so change from person to person and
from age to age. 596
Newman responds to this objection by appealing to his sacramental imagination, which, as
we have seen, allows an inner transcendence to finite words and impressions such that they can
speak to us of higher realities. 597 In this sense they can carry more than their own weight:
“something are they besides themselves, which we cannot compass, which we cannot utter.”598
We have already treated this theme at length in this paper, and indeed, it goes a long way toward
answering the present difficulty. Faith’s impression cannot exist in the absence of explicit certitude
and confession, as it contains the dynamism toward their formation within itself, just as these
formulations cannot exist without pointing to the impression. But the question remains as to how
impressions so personal can arrive at a common measure and a communal expression that is truly
normative for all believers, as dogma presupposes. That faith must speak is one thing; that it should
always say the same thing is another. A full response to this question will thus require the unfolding
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of yet another decisive aspect in our investigation, one which Newman anticipates in many implicit
ways, but which awaits Ratzinger’s particular genius for its full articulation. We will now proceed
to a direct consideration of this final, integrating theme.

Part IV: Communal Subjectivity
A. The Church as Communal Subject in History
The final response of Ratzinger and Newman to the modern crisis of faith comes not with
a rejection of the “turn to the subject” but with a critique of the individualism on which that turn
founders. For it is the assumption of the atomic individual as set forth by Descartes that seals the
subject within itself and denies it any transcendence. But the Christian understanding of
subjectivity can have nothing to do with such notions, insofar as Christian subjectivity is always a
subjectivity set within the broader embrace of the Church, which takes the individual beyond
himself in the liberating encounter with Christ. While this critique is only developed in its full
outlines by Ratzinger, it is nevertheless latent in many passages of Newman’s corpus and remains
implicit as a foundation of his overall vision.
We have already seen how, for Newman, man’s innermost personal depths are
characterized by the call of conscience which refers man beyond himself toward a universal
authority and thus toward a common measure of action. As this supreme authority can only be one,
so its voice is also one in all men, even if it is in each case utterly personal in its resonance. Thus
Newman’s “personal liberalism” does not necessarily inhibit the collective apprehension of truths.
As Sillem notes, “his method of philosophizing differs radically from that of Descartes or Locke”
in that knowledge for Newman is “the more intimately our own when held in union with other
people…[for] other people act upon our minds at a deeper level than things, methods or
124

arguments.” 599 This is true in part because the consciences of others can speak to our own as echoes
of the creator’s voice, reflections by reference to which we can arrive at a deeper appreciation of
the shared impression that is within us. For the one God creates but one impression of himself in
the hearts of men:
If Almighty God is ever one and the same…the true inward impression of Him…must be one
and the same; and, since human nature proceeds upon fixed laws, the statement of that
impression must be one and the same. 600

This is true both on the level of natural religion and on that of revelation. As the common
impressions of conscience tend toward the articulation of a common law of action, so too does the
common impression of the revealed divine “idea” lead to the articulation of a shared law of faith:
“we may as well say that there are two Gods as two Creeds.” 601 This implies once again that
revelation is “no private imagination,” 602 that it is an impression shared by many, which thus draws
many minds together in the formation of a “social mind” or collective “mental constitution”
wherein its truths can be firmly lodged. 603 This communal mind becomes, as it were, the proper
subject of tradition and doctrinal development. As we have seen, development can only take place
within a community in which all members are possessed of a single “idea.”
The Church can thus be said to be endowed with a mind and a conscience of its own: the
consensus fidelium, which as the “voice of tradition” can serve as a barometer of faith. 604 God
accordingly continues to speak through the “Church collective.” 605 The infallibility of popes and
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councils is but the authoritative concentration of what is already present in this universal
communion, 606 as the dogmatic principle which the pastors guard and serve is first of all something
implanted in the heart of the body of believers. 607 The “supreme authority” in the Church,
therefore, even prior to the explicit judgments of its pastors, is that of “Christian fellowship,”608
the enfleshed life of which fellowship is what gives the texts of belief their “illuminating
power.” 609 In this we see to what extent the heritage of revelation is entrusted to a “visible
polity,” 610 and how it is that Newman can speak, in his “organic view of the Church,” 611 of the
Church’s “individuality and…personality.” 612 The Church is indeed a living subject, one in which
the subjective life of each Christian is fostered and developed, and in which the personal
apprehensions of the faithful find their inner norm: she is the pillar and bulwark of truth. (1 Tim
3:15)
Ratzinger brings these insights to their full development by explicitly identifying the
Church as the receiving subject of revelation, the historical life of whose tradition becomes the
locus of the living encounter with Jesus Christ. 613 This is a crucial moment in the arc of
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development we have been tracing thus far, and its exposition will bring our investigation to its
synthetic climax. 614 According to Ratzinger, by entering into the mind of the Church, the Christian
believer is enabled to read history around the figure of Christ, who comes to light precisely as
history’s center. Thus a shared subjectivity emerges together with a shared memory and a shared
history to engender a unity of mind and heart that admits of articulation in a normative common
confession: “interior unity of the Spirit” includes “intellectual unity.” 615 In Newmanian terms, we
can say that the shared impression of Christ creates shared presumptions in the hearts of believers
that correspond to certain truth claims which can be gradually drawn forth in the life of the Church.
What is intimately personal therefore has “inseparably to do with the community” insofar as it is
ipso facto “introduced into the ‘we’ [of communion]” by the structure of faith wherein “the
Lord…gives himself as the center and form of [my] own existence” such that “I myself become
open, torn from my closed solitude and received into the living community of the Church.” This
community, which lives in history, thus becomes the “mediator of my encounter with God” insofar
as its history becomes my history. 616
i. Revelation as Dialogue
This commitment to what we might call the Church’s “historical subjectivity” 617 stems
from Ratzinger’s abovementioned conviction regarding the essentially dialogical nature of
revelation. In his study of Bonaventure for his habilitation thesis, 618 he discovered that the modern
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conception of revelation—i.e., as the objectified, discrete propositional content of Scripture and
tradition 619—was quite foreign to the medieval mind of the Seraphic Doctor. Rather, for
Bonaventure, revelatio is first and foremost something active, an event of unveiling that
necessarily occurs between persons: between the one who reveals himself and the one(s) to whom
this revelation is addressed. 620 As such, the receiving subject enters into the very notion of
revelation. As Ratzinger writes:
‘Revelation’ is always a concept denoting an act. The word refers to the act in which God
shows himself, not to the objectified result of this act. And because this is so, the receiving
subject is always also a part of the concept of ‘revelation.’ Where there is no one to perceive
‘revelations,’ no re-vel-ation has occurred, because no veil has been removed. By definition,
revelation requires a someone who apprehends it. 621

But this implies that revelation cannot be conceived as a monologue wherein the divine
object would merely inform men about himself through a series of true propositions. 622 God does
not simply tell us about himself, but reveals his very self to us by entering into a historical
interaction with a people, an interaction of words and deeds that calls forth a response from man. 623
He addresses man personally, and of its nature this address beckons for the response by which
alone the revelation can be fully received and hence completed. Revelation, then, is not a
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Made Love, viii, on Ratzinger’s central affirmation that the Truth is a Person, known in the Church.
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monologue, but a dialogue in which the recipient has a constitutive role—one which unfolds over
time in a dramatic history of interaction that reaches its fulfillment in the person of Jesus Christ,
in whom the communication between God and man attains to the perfect consummation of
communion. 624 In Him, man, formerly hampered by sin, is finally rendered capable of fully
receiving God and of rendering Him a full response. Hence all of revelation can be viewed as
summed up and contained in the person of Christ. 625
From this it becomes clear how, for Ratzinger, revelation cannot be conceived apart from
history. While its origin lies beyond history, it is only accomplished in history, in the activereceptivity of humanity, 626 in the Logos becoming sarx. 627 This means, first of all, that Scripture
can only be adequately understood in light of the whole arc of salvation history as it is formally
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revealed in Christ, and in the dialectical relationship that emerges between the Old and New
Testaments around his central figure. 628 Ratzinger sees the New Testament writings fundamentally
as interpretations of the Hebrew Scriptures through the hermeneutical key of the Christ-event, 629
which thus simultaneously interpret this event as the definitive Word: the fulfillment of Israel’s
history which points forward to the fulfillment of all time. They understand the present in light of
the past, and the past in light of the present, and in this correlation also grasp the essence of the
future. This pattern, Ratzinger says, is formal to all true apprehensions of Christ, who can never
be known simply as present or simply as past: “only that which possesses roots in yesterday and
the power of growth for tomorrow and for all time has true power over today and in today.”630
Hence, “knowledge of history arises in the interplay between the Old and the New Testament.”631
ii. The Role of Tradition
This dynamic is not left behind with the death of the last Apostle and the closing of the
scriptural canon. Though, objectively considered, the divine self-disclosure is completed in Christ,
its subjective appreciation must continue to unfold in the life of the Church. “Certainly Scripture
is closed objectively. But its meaning is advancing in a steady growth through history; and this
growth is not yet closed…[it] develops in a constant process of growth in time.” 632 Ratzinger
supports this claim by noting an example in the book of Acts, wherein the Apostles at first believe
their mission to be limited to the Jews, and only after successive events are led to recall the words
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of Jesus in a new light and so to realize the mission to the gentiles. 633 Elsewhere he cites the
example of the immanent expectation of the eschaton—evident in many schematic statements
throughout the New Testament—which must later be re-read in light of the unfolding life of the
Church. 634 In each of these cases Ratzinger sees fulfilled the promise of Jesus to the Apostles: “the
Counselor, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things,
and bring to your remembrance all that I have said to you.” 635 The Holy Spirit continues to teach
Christ’s disciples in the life of the Church, reminding them anew of His words such that their
appreciation of the gift given in Him can be continually deepened and sharpened. There can be no
artificially construed end-point to this dynamic. While a “material” understanding of tradition
might conceive it as “the handing down of fixed formulas and texts,” it is better seen as a “living
process” wherein “the Holy Spirit broadens and deepens the memory of the Church in order to
guide here ‘into all the truth.’” 636
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Thus salvation history (i.e., history) does not come to a close in Christ, as Augustine
thought, 637 but continues to unfold from Christ, who is thus seen to inhabit the center of history.
This is the vision articulated by Bonaventure in his response to the Joachimite crisis, which shook
the Franciscan Order of his time by positioning Francis at the dawn of the new age of the Holy
Spirit wherein the Church and Christ’s revelation would be surpassed. Rather than rejecting
Joachim’s historical vision tout court (à la Thomas Aquinas 638), Bonaventure sought to purify his
insight by centering it more fully on the figure of Christ. 639 In his Hexaemeron, he develops a
novel method of scriptural exegesis by positing, beyond the traditional three-fold division of the
spiritualis intelligentia, 640 also the figurae spiritualis—which treat of Christ and the Anti-Christ—
and, most importantly, the multiformae theoriae. 641 These latter are the many “intimations”642 of
the future that lie hidden in the scriptural word, compared to that word as so many innumerable
rationes seminales springing from the original seed. 643 Bonaventure writes:
Who can know the unlimited number of seeds which exist? For from one single seed, entire
forests grow up: and they in turn bring forth innumerable seeds. So it happens that innumerable
theories can arise from Scripture which only God can grasp. 644

Bonaventure has in mind here the correlative reading of the Old and New Testaments in
terms of one another, which continues to progressively mature in the life of the Church such that
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ages of the Old are seen to unfold in parallel fashion to the ongoing history of the New. Thus, as
its historical life progresses, the Church is able to discover more and more “seeds”—multiformae
theoriae—in her study of the scriptural word, continually reading the present in light of the past
and the past in light of the present according the central axis of Christ, thereby grasping ever more
the essence of the future. 645 Ratzinger writes: “Scripture points to the future; but only he who has
understood the past can grasp the interpretation of the future because the whole of history develops
in one unbroken line of meaning in which that which is to come may be grasped in the present on
the basis of the past.” 646 In this sense, the full import of the revelation of Christ continues to dawn
on the subjective consciousness of the Church, and this allows Bonaventure to grant a certain
eschatological and revelatory significance to the figure of St. Francis without thereby diminishing
the centrality or definitiveness of Christ. 647 Salvation and its history cannot be viewed, as it were,
from the outside, as though it were a completed and “self-enclosed Ding-an-sich.” 648 There is no
neutral standpoint from which to assess revelation’s content. 649 Rather, we are still within salvation
history, and, in this sense, revelation continues. 650 As Ratzinger concludes:
This meaning [of Scripture] develops in a constant process of growth in time. Consequently,
we are able to interpret many things which the Fathers could not have known…and so, new
645
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knowledge arises constantly from Scripture. Something is taking place; and this happening,
this history, continues onward as long as there is history at all. This is of fundamental
importance for the theologian who explains Scripture. It makes it clear that the theologian
cannot abstract from history. 651

Theology, then, cannot remain indifferent to the great events and epochs that shape the
history of the Church, precisely because it is through these moments that the Spirit continues to
enrich the Christian memory in its appreciation of revelation. 652 Therefore, theology must always
continue to take its bearings from the saints and great converts of Christian history. 653 Indeed,
Ratzinger suggests that the understanding of faith cannot remain unaffected by the lives of such
figures, and points to certain theological developments which would not have been conceivable
apart from the experience of the saints. 654 The full meaning of Scripture can only be unlocked
through the lives of disciples who are led by the Spirit.
From this it is obvious why Ratzinger cannot accept the Protestant dictum of sola
scriptura. Even if it were possible to speak with Josef Geiselmann of a “material sufficiency” of
Scripture—and this Ratzinger finds dubious 655—it would be impossible to isolate its true meaning
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from its proper history in the living ecclesial tradition. 656 Thus tradition is revealed as the
indispensable locus from which to access the Scriptures. To accept the “varied literature” of the
Bible “as one book” is already to accept the decisions “of the ancient Church” and of the Fathers; 657
thus “Scripture ultimately always only exists una cum traditione,” which is its present
“hermeneutical center.” 658 Ratzinger notes that the apostolic preaching that produced the New
Testament was itself already the explication—i.e., “an unfolding”—of the Christ-event, not only
in terms of the past but also in terms of the ecclesial present as this is illuminated by the Spirit: “It
is also an interpretation of the Christ-event itself on the basis of the pneuma, which means on the
basis of the Church’s present. The latter is possible because Christ is not dead but living, not only
Christ yesterday but Christ today and tomorrow.” 659 This interpretation “in the Spirit” is thus
already the beginning of ecclesial tradition, which continues to interpret the New Testament by
reference to the ever unfolding present of the Church, who continues to be guided by the Spirit
“into the fullness of Truth” as she strives to view everything in light of the full arc of salvation
history.
It is in this sense that Ratzinger regards tradition as a kind of memory, which gathers all
the fleeting moments of the ages into a cohesive vision of the whole. 660 Memory, he says, is the
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mediator between being and time, between the chaotic-nihilism of continual becoming and the
unified stability of meaning (logos). 661 As such it stands at the foundation of intelligence and of
what it means to be human. Drawing on the work of psychologist Wolfgang Köhler, 662 Ratzinger
claims that the ultimate factor by which man is distinguished from other animals is not invention
(homo faber) but the capacity to preserve, communicate, and so to pass on what is learned to
succeeding generations, establishing—beyond the mere individual memory—that communal
memory which gives rise to history, and hence to humanity:
[Intellect] manifests itself in the transcendence of time, of the moment; intellect is basically
memory—a context that fosters unity beyond the limits of the present moment…It is as
memory that intellect proves itself qua intellect. 663

But precisely as such, and in the same moment:
…memory generates tradition; tradition realizes itself in history; as the already existing context
of humanity, history makes humanity possible—for without the necessarily transtemporal
relationship of person to person, humanity cannot be awakened to itself, cannot express
itself. 664

Tradition, then, is constitutive of humanity, as the basis of the communal and historical awareness
that is the necessary condition of personal existence. 665 But if humanity requires such a collective
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invention into tradition and so into a historical context.”
663
Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 87.
664
Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 87: “The inseparable connection between humanity and history
becomes apparent: humanity and historicity, intellect and history, are inextricably related. The human spirit creates
history; history conditions human existence.” - “tradition properly understood is, in effect, the transcendence of today
in both directions…tradition, as the constitutivum of history, is constitutive of a humanity that is truly human, of the
humanitas hominis.” - “How can memory actually become tradition?...How else but by communication, by a sharingwith [Mit-teilung]? By the transmission of memory to others. Communicability becomes, then, a second mark, along
with transtemporality, of the concept of ‘intellect’ and, at the same time, a second contextual element of
tradition…tradition is dependent on man’s ability to speak.” See also ibid., 88: Ratzinger depicts the causal chain from
memory to tradition to history to humanity. In this analysis, memory, language, communication, reason, intelligence,
tradition, and history all appear co-constitutive principles of one another. See Rowland, Ratzinger’s Faith, 60-61.
665
Ratzinger presents this thesis in direct opposition to the atomistic notions of modern individualism.
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consciousness in order to exist, there is need for a notion of subjectivity that transcends the limits
of the isolated Cartesian ego; there is need of a communal subject in whom the memory of tradition
can inhere: “Tradition requires a subject in whom to adhere, a bearer, whom it finds (not only, but
basically) in a linguistic community…It [tradition] is possible only because many subjects become,
as it were, one subject in the context of a common heritage.” 666 Humanity, in other words, is
possible only if we discover ourselves as members of a larger whole, within the “We”—the
collective subjectivity—of a linguistic culture, wherein there subsists the common memory that
conditions and enables our personal self-awareness. 667
iii. The Communal Subject
This is a crucial dimension of Ratzinger’s thought, for if the subjectivity of the Christian
memoria were understood to be merely that of the individual, then the content of faith would be
subjected to the conditioned limitations of each believer, and the path to modernist relativism
would be set. 668 But this is not the subjectivity which Ratzinger intends. Rather it is the Church
herself who, taken as a whole, is the subject of this memoria, in whom the unity of history emerges
together with the unity of the Scriptures and the unity of faith. 669 In absence of this common
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Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 88.
cf. Ratzinger, “Communio: a program” in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio. Vol I, 128-9. Here Ratzinger defines
“tradition as growth into identity,” which definition “clarifies what it means to be Catholic: the Lord is whole wherever
he is found, but that also means that together we are but one Church and that the union of humanity is the indispensable
definition of the Church.” [emphasis added]
668
…as Garrigou-Lagrange saw very well. cf. Ratzinger, Eschatology, 44: “the unity of faith cannot rest upon a
hypothetical reconstruction of some primitive nucleus. Rather does it find its support in the unity of the believing
subject—the Church, which is responsible for our different experiences with the word and holds them together as
one.” cf. Benedict XVI, “Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI to the Roman Curia Offering Them His Christmas
Greetings”: “…[the Church allows] the ‘hermeneutic of reform’, of renewal in the continuity of the one subjectChurch which the Lord has given to us. She is a subject which increases in time and develops, yet always remaining
the same, the one subject of the journeying People of God.”
669
Ratzinger views the Church not as an aggregate but as a subject who is best understood in personal terms. See
Ratzinger, Mary: the Church at the Source, 27: “The type remains true to its meaning only when the
noninterchangeable personal figure of Mary becomes transparent to the personal form of the Church herself. In
theology, it is not the person that is reducible to the thing, but the thing to the person. A purely structural ecclesiology
is bound to degrade Church to the level of a program of action. Only the Marian dimension secures the place of
affectivity in faith and thus ensures a fully human correspondence to the reality of the incarnate Logos.”
667
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recollection, not only would the act of faith reduce to something merely individualistic, but in the
same stroke its object would disintegrate into a mere catalogue of disjoined propositions to be
believed, and would no longer present someone to believe in. 670 The Church provides the
hermeneutic space, the locus of memory, wherein the parts can converge around the center to form
a whole. 671
In explaining this notion of communal subjectivity, Ratzinger rejects the doctrine of the
isolated and autonomous individual, bequeathed to modernity by Descartes, in favor of what he
regards as the far more ancient and biblical understanding of communal intersubjectivity. The
Hebrew Scriptures frequently instance a notion of “corporate personality” in their presentation of
patriarchal figures as representative of larger bodies: in the king the entire nation is encompassed,
in Jacob the people of Israel are writ large, in Adam the whole of humanity is subsumed, such that
all mankind can be addressed as Adam (“God says to man”), and the people as Israel ("my servant
Israel, Jacob whom I have chosen”). 672 This pattern is fulfilled in the Pauline presentation of Christ
as the New Adam, in whom inheres the new people of God, the new mankind. 673 The image of the
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See Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 21-23: “God does not exemplify loneliness but ec-stasy, a complete
going-out-from himself. This means that ‘the mystery of the Trinity has opened to us a totally new perspective: the
ground of being is communion.’ [Ratzinger cites De Lubac, Le Foi chretienne] From this perspective, we can now
understand how the unity of the object can include that of the subject: belief in the Trinity is communio; to believe the
Trinity means to become communio. Historically, this means that the ‘I’ of the credo-formulas is a collective ‘I’, the
‘I’ of the believing Church, to which the individual ‘I’ belongs as long as it believes. In other words, the ‘I’ of the
credo embraces the transition from the individual ‘I’ to the ecclesial ‘I’.” - “The seat of all faith is, then, the memoria
Ecclesiae…without this believing subject, which unifies the whole, the content of faith is neither more nor less than
a long catalogue of things to be believed; within and by the Church, they are made one. The Church is the locus that
gives unity to the content of faith.…”
671
cf. Ratzinger, “Cardinal Frings’ Speeches During the Second Vatican Council” in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio.
Vol I, 90: “the whole is always of interest. Faith always creates from the whole…today, too, the proclamation of faith
must be catholic—that is, it must live from the whole, draw again and again directly from the Bible, drink again and
again from the great, pure sources of all times.”
672
See Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 35-6: “Today the [Cartesian] concept of subject is gradually unraveling; it
is becoming evident that the ‘I’ locked securely in itself does not exist but that various influences pass in and out of
us. At the same time there is a renewed understanding that the ‘I’ is constituted in relation to the ‘thou’ and that the
two mutually interpenetrate. Thus, the Semitic view of the corporate personality—without which it is difficult to enter
into the notion of the Body of Christ—could once again become more easily accessible.”
673
See Joseph Ratzinger, “Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology.” Communio XVII:3, 452-3: “Christ, whom
Scripture calls the final Adam, that is, the definitive human being, appears in the testimonies of faith as the all-
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Church as the Body of Christ needs to be understood in this light. It is not a mere Stoic metaphor
for the divisions of labor within the body-politic of a perfect society. Rather it is an exposition of
the fact that, in the redeeming the world, Christ has handed himself over so thoroughly as to give
his own personal “I” to man, such that his filial identity can now truly be claimed by men, and
they can join Him in addressing God as Father. 674
This reality finds its pinnacle expression in the Christian Eucharist, where the self-giving
of the Son is expressed in flesh and blood, and Christ gives his body—i.e., his very self 675—to be
taken in by believers. Ratzinger recalls Augustine’s famous reflection on the inverse metabolism
at work in this mysterious exchange: in communion it is not Christ who is transformed into us, but
we who are transformed into Christ. “When we truly communicate, this means that we are taken
out of ourselves, that we are assimilated into him, that we become one with him and, through him,
with the fellowship of our brethren.” 676 As such, the communion of liturgy can be viewed as the

encompassing space in which the ‘we’ of human beings gathers on the way to the Father.” - “In Christianity there is
not simply a dialogical principle in the modern sense of a pure ‘I-thou’ relationship, neither on the part of the human
person that has its place in the historical ‘we’ that bears it; nor…on God’s part who is, in turn, no simple ‘I’, but the
‘we’ of Father, Son, and Spirit.”
674
See Ratzinger, “Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology,” 33-40. cf. Joseph Ratzinger, The Meaning of
Christian Brotherhood. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 45-55. “The belief that we have all become a single
new man in Jesus Christ will always call us to let the separating particularity of our own egos, the self-assertion of
human selfhood, melt into the community of the new man Jesus Christ.” (55) cf. id., Principles of Catholic Theology,
73: “For one who has grown up in the Christian tradition, the way begins in the ‘thou’ of prayer: such a one knows
that he can address the Lord; that this Jesus is not just a historical personage of the past but is the same in all ages.
And he knows, too, that in, with and through the Lord he can address him to whom Jesus says ‘Father’. In Jesus, he
sees likewise the Father. For he sees that this Jesus does not have his life from himself, that his whole existence is an
exchange with the Other, a coming from him and a returning to him. He sees that this Jesus is truly ‘Son’ in his whole
existence, is one who receives his inmost being from another, that his life is a receiving. In him is to be found the
hidden foundation; in the actions, words, life, suffering of him who is truly Son it is possible to see, hear and touch
him who is unknown. The unknown ground of being reveals itself as Father…as Person.” cf. id., Called to
Communion, 33: “Through baptism…we are inserted into Christ and united with him as a single subject;…Only
Christ’s self-identification with us, only our fusion into unity with him, makes us bearers of the promise.”
675
See Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 36: “The body is man’s self, which does not coincide with the corporeal
dimension but comprises it as one element among others.”
676
Joseph Ratzinger, God is Near Us: The Eucharist, the Heart of Life. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003), 78. cf.
id., Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith: the Church as Communion. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 78: “Eucharistic
Communion is aimed at a complete reshaping of my own life. It breaks up man’s entire self and creates a new ‘we’.
Communion with Christ is necessarily also communication with all who belong to him: therein I myself become part
of the new bread that he is creating by resubstantiation of the whole of earthly reality.”
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principal locus from which the communion of the Church as the Body of Christ is continually
being born and brought to life through the transcendence of the isolated ego into the greater “I” of
Christ:
The outward action of eating becomes the expression of that intimate penetration of two
subjects…Communion means that the seemingly uncrossable frontier of my ‘I’ is left wide
open and can be so because Jesus has first allowed himself to be opened completely, has taken
us all into himself and has put himself totally into our hands. Hence, Communion means the
fusion of existences…my ‘I’ is ‘assimilated’ to that of Jesus, it is made similar to him in an
exchange that increasingly breaks through the lines of division. This same event takes place in
the case of all who communicate; they are all assimilated to this ‘bread’ and thus are made one
among themselves—one body…Communion makes the Church. 677

Ratzinger views this transition from the isolated “I” of the autonomous self into the new
subjectivity of Christ as essential to the nature of conversion and faith. Noting the radicalism of
the Pauline “no longer I who live but Christ who lives within me,” 678 he characterizes conversion
as a “death-event” in which the old “I” gives way before the “not-I” and so is drawn to live beyond
itself in an entirely new existence: “It is snatched away from itself and fitted into a new subject…it
must really release its grip on itself in order then to receive itself anew in and together with a
greater ‘I.’” 679 But the unity of this new “I” entails that this transition cannot occur in isolation
from the greater “We” that finds its unity in the same head: “I can have the one Lord only in the
unity that he himself is, in the unity with the others who also are his body.” 680 All who have “put
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Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 37. cf. id. “The Dogmatic and Ascetical Meaning of Christian Brotherhood” in
Man Before God: Readings in Theology, 118-9: “when he allows the Lord to give himself as the center and form of
his own existence, man interiorly merges, as it were, with Christ and becomes with him ‘one individual’” such that he
“participates in the mode of existence of Christ” and can say with him “Our Father.”
678
Gal 2:20. See Ratzinger, Nature and Mission of Theology, 50: “[in this phrase] St Paul describes the distinctive
element of Christianity as a personal experience which revolutionizes everything and at the same time as an objective
reality.”
679
Ratzinger, Nature and Mission of Theology, 51: “It is a death-event. In other words, it is an exchange of the old
subject for another. The ‘I’ ceases to be an autonomous subject standing in itself. It is snatched away from itself and
fitted into a new subject. The ‘I’ is not simply submerged, but it must really release its grip on itself in order then to
receive itself anew in and together with a greater ‘I’.” - “[conversion] is the surrender of the old isolated subjectivity
of the ‘I’ in order to find oneself within the unity of a new subject, which bursts the limits of the ‘I’, thus making
possible contact with the ground of all reality.”
680
Ratzinger, “The Ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council” in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio. Vol I, 69.
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on Christ” in baptism must also be united with each other in this new subjectivity, such that all
become “one [man] in Christ Jesus,” 681 bearers of the promise made to the singular heir of
Abraham. 682
Thus faith, together with its proper subjectivity, cannot be construed as the result of a
private process of reflection or as the achievement of individual study. 683 Its source is not in the
private ego but in the “not-I” beyond oneself. As such, even as it calls for a personal appropriation
on the part of each believer, 684 it is always something that comes fundamentally from without,
something that is received together with the community by whom it is borne through history.685
Similarly, the subjectivity of the Church is not something that properly belongs to her, but
something that once again lies outside of herself in the person of her Head. 686 Her collective
subjectivity is a participation in the “I” of Christ, just as the subjectivity of each Christian is a
participation in her “We,” such that in each case the participans is normed by the participatum. 687
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Gal 3:27-29. See Ratzinger, Nature and Mission of Theology, 52: Ratzinger stresses that Paul does not write in the
neuter, “one thing,” but in the masculine, “one man.”
682
Gal 3:26 cf., Ratzinger, Meaning of Christian Brotherhood, 51-2: “only one man has the right to say ‘my Father’
to God, and that is Jesus Christ…All other men must say ‘our Father’, for the Father is God for us only so long as we
are part of the community of his children. For ‘me’ he becomes a Father only through my being in the ‘we’ of his
children …‘Our’ assigns the Christological component.” cf. ibid., 55: “The belief that we have all become a single
new man in Jesus Christ will always call us to let the separating particularity of our own egos, the self-assertion of
human selfhood, melt into the community of the new man Jesus Christ.”
683
See Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 73: against the possibility of an self-achieved meaning, Ratzinger
asserts that meaning must always be received from above. “Meaning that is self-made is in the last analysis no
meaning. Meaning, that is, the ground on which our existence today can stand and live, cannot be made but only
received.” cf. ibid., 92: “I did not come to believe through a private search for truth but through of process of
reception…” See also Heim, Joseph Ratzinger, 147-9, on the communal “we” nature of faith.
684
See Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 92: “the goal must be to make what is received more and more my
own, by handing myself over to it as greater.”
685
This belongs to the very “structure of encounter.” cf. Ratzinger, “The Ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council”
in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio. Vol I, 69: “one cannot make the Church but only receive it… from the sacramental
community of Christ’s body passing through history.”
686
See Ratzinger, Nature and Mission of Theology, 54: “the Church is in no wise a separate subject endowed with its
own subsistence. The new subject is much rather ‘Christ’ himself, and the Church is nothing but the space of this new
unitary subject which is, therefore, much more than mere social interaction.” cf. Collins, Word Made Love, 110: “The
church can only be its true self insofar as it is the authentic place of encounter with the person of Christ.” This dynamic
can be viewed as summed up in Mary, who is gifted with a center outside of herself.
687
We should note well, however, that this relationship is not wholly linear. It is not only that the individual is
connected to Christ through the Church, but also that, at the same time, the Church is derived from the mutual
communion of individuals. cf. Joseph Ratzinger, The Yes of Jesus Christ: Spiritual Exercises in Faith, Hope, and
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Hence, “the faith community does not create itself…the Church is not self-made, she was created
by God and she is continuously formed by Him.” 688
iv. Authority and Subjectivity
We can begin to see in this how Ratzinger, precisely through his consideration of
subjectivity, grounds the authority of the church not as something external to the Christian subject
but as something internal and constitutive. Here the tension between authority and subjectivity that
ran through our exposition of Newman’s thought is finally resolved in full. The Church is not
fundamentally a matter of formal structure and legal constraint, but of the inner constitution of
each individual’s faith, of which it is an organic principle. 689 Just as the human person can only
live and know himself within the context of the linguistic community which precedes him and of
which he is a part, so the Christian person can only live and believe within the “We” of the ecclesia,
wherein the contours of revelation are disclosed through an entrance into its history. Indeed, it is
within the Church that each man finds his “place in history.” 690 But because this entrance

Love. (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 28: “Our relationship with God is first of all and at the same time also a
relationship with our fellow men and women: it rest on a communion of human beings, and indeed the communication
of relationship with God mediates the deepest possibility of human communication that goes beyond utility to reach
the ground of the person…God does not reveal himself to the isolated ego and excludes individualistic isolation: being
related to God is tied up with being related to our brothers and sisters, with communion with them.”
688
Interview of Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI by Fr. Jacques Servais, S.J., Rome, October 2015.
689
See Ratzinger, Journey to Easter, 147: “Catholicity is not therefore only an external thing, but also an internal
characteristic of personal faith.” cf. id., “The Ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council” in Joseph Ratzinger in
Communio. Vol I, 62-4. Ratzinger describes Guardini’s “awakening of the Church in souls,” which he saw as reaching
its fruition at the Second Vatican Council, as the realization that Church was “something inward” and “alive in
us…encompassing us all from within,” through which “the Incarnation remains present.” It was not simply a “centrally
governed institution” that “confronted one from the outside.” This realization allows dogma to be received “not as an
external shackle, but as the living source.” (Milestones, 57) It also opens a path for ecumenism, which can now be
viewed as a “deepening of the reality which is the Church” that is already present in all believers, albeit imperfectly
understood. Thus the way forward for ecumenism need not imply an external break: “one cannot live ecumenism
against one’s own Church, but only by trying to deepen it in relation to what is essential and central. This means that
one must seek the center in one’s own Church, and this, after all, for all Christians and Churches is truly one.” (“What
Unites and Divides Denominations?”, 8).
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Ratzinger, “The Dogmatic and Ascetical Meaning of Christian Brotherhood” in Man Before God: Readings in
Theology, 120-1: “Their destiny is so fully interwoven that the fate of the individual can be fulfilled only when the
whole has reached its goal…[thus] the Church as such (as a whole) has a function in the course of history…The
Christian, through his membership in the Church, receives his place in history…in the last analysis, there is but a
single, indivisible history that encloses all.”
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necessarily involves a transition from the closed “I” to the transcendent “Thou” within and through
the communal “We,” it can never become the object of mere personal invention, 691 anymore than
the Church’s dogmatic teachings can be reduced to matters of “majority vote.” 692 Faith belongs to
me only insofar as I first belong to it: I believe only through the We believe that precedes me, in
virtue of whose concrete witness I am enabled to enter into faith’s transcendence. 693 The
incarnational and historical logic of revelation is thereby perpetuated in the Church, insofar as the
Word of revelation is intrinsically bound up with the concrete and sacramental witness of those
who precede me in faith: “God wishes to approach man only through man…[His] dialogue with
men operates only through men’s dialogue with each other.” 694 Precisely in virtue of this structure,
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See Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 88: “faith is located in the act of conversion…[it] is not a recitation of
doctrines…in this process of turning about…the I and the We, the I and You interact.” cf. ibid., 90: “This dialogue
refers for its part to a ‘We believe’ in which the ‘I’ of the ‘I believe’ is not absorbed but allotted its place…belief is
not the result of lonely meditation…it is the result of a dialogue, the expression of a hearing, receiving, and answering
that guides man through the exchanges of ‘I’ and ‘You’ to the ‘We’ of those who all believe in the same way…”
692
See Interview of Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI by Fr. Jacques Servais, S.J., Rome, October 2015: “It is not an
assembly of men who have some ideas in common and who decide to work for the spread of such ideas. Then
everything would be based on its own decision and, in the final analysis, on the majority vote principle, which is, in
the end it would be based on human opinion. A Church built in this way cannot be for me the guarantor of eternal life
nor require decisions from me that make me suffer and are contrary to my desires.
693
See Ratzinger, Nature and Mission of Theology, 61: “the Church is not an authority which remains foreign to the
scientific character of theology but is rather the ground of theology’s existence and the condition which makes it
possible. The Church, moreover, is not an abstract principle but a living subject possessing a concrete content. This
subject is by nature greater than any individual person, indeed, than any single generation. Faith is always participation
in a totality and, precisely in this way, conducts the believer to a new breadth of freedom.” cf. Benedict XVI, “Address
of His Holiness Benedict XVI to Member of the International Theological Commission,” (2010): “theology always
lives in a continuity and in a dialogue with the believers and theologians who came before us; since ecclesial
communion is diachronic, so also is theology. The theologian never begins from zero, but considers as teachers the
Fathers and theologians of the whole Christian tradition”
694
Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 94-95. cf. id., Called to Communion, 67-68: “the word is tied to witness,
who guarantees it an unambiguous sense, which it does not possess as a mere word floating in isolation. But the
witness is not an individual who stands independently on his own...He is not a witness as ‘flesh and blood’ but as one
who is linked to the Pneuma, the Paraclete who authenticates the truth and opens up the memory and, in his turn, binds
the witness to Christ.” cf. ibid., 120: “[the apostle’s position] carries forward the dialogical structure that pertains to
the essence of revelation. Faith is not something we excogitate ourselves…[man] always becomes a Christian from
outside: by means of a gift that can only come to him from another, through the ‘thou’ of Christ…Whenever this
opposition, which expresses the fact that grace comes from outside us, disappears, the essential structure of
Christianity is destroyed.” cf. id., The Yes of Jesus Christ, 27: “God’s speaking to us reaches us through men and
women who have listened to God and come into contact with God; through men and women for whom God has
become an actual experience and who as it were know him at first hand…through my trust I come to share in another’s
knowledge…faith forms a network of mutual dependence that is at the same time a network of mutual solidarity”
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which is essentially sacramental, 695 faith is always dependent upon the received testimony from
another. Thus, unlike philosophy wherein word follows from thought, “in faith the word takes
precedence over the thought.” 696
Nevertheless, this external witness is not the destruction, but rather the ground and source
of the Christian subjectivity of each believer—of his participation in the “I” of Christ—which
accordingly finds its home within the communion of faith. The primacy of the “converse of the
Son with his bride” in no way “excludes converse with the individual,” but rather “places the
individual dialogue within the dialogue between the Son and his bride.” 697 The local communion,
in turn, is similarly always responsible beyond itself—in the public and universal nature of its
Eucharistic profession—to the whole of the catholica that ontologically precedes and grounds it.
As the “I” of Christ precedes the “We” of the Church, so the universal Church must precede each
local communio in order to guarantee the latter’s authenticity. 698 The particular “we” depends on
the authoritative testimony that establishes it, and this testimony, embodied in the bishop, will only
be valid to the extent that it is the faith of the apostles which is shared by all. 699 Without the
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See Ratzinger, “The Ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council” in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio. Vol I, 68:
“no one can make himself into the Church…the element of receiving belongs essentially to the Church, just as faith
comes from hearing and is not the product of one’s own resolutions and reflections. For faith is an encounter with that
which I cannot think up or bring about through my own achievements but which simply ahs to encounter me. We call
this structure of receiving and encountering ‘sacrament’.”
696
Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 91. cf. ibid., 92: “Because faith is not something thought up by me but
something that comes to be me from outside, its word cannot be treated and exchanged as I please; it is always
foreordained, always ahead of my thinking…the fore-given word takes precedence over the thought, so that it is not
the thought that creates its own words but the given word that points the way to thinking that understands…”; cf. id.,
Revelation and Tradition, 28-31: Ratzinger notes the Protestant inversion, resulting from the rejection of tradition and
the concrete witness of magisterial authority, wherein word becomes criterion of ministry, and no longer ministry the
criterion of world. Word is no longer entrusted to the Church, but must rather be guarded from Church, and stands
free over the Church. Yet it is precisely here that scripture is yielded up to the “caprice” of the critical scholar: “[the
word is] posited as independent…delivering it up to the caprice of exegetes.”
697
Ratzinger, Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, 189.
698
See Ratzinger, “The Ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council” in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio. Vol I, 67-9:
However much “every Eucharistic community…is entirely church already,” nevertheless “the unity with one another
of the communities celebrating the Eucharist is not an external addition to Eucharistic ecclesiology but its inner
condition.”
699
See Ratzinger, “The Ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council” in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio. Vol I, 70-1:
“the primitive Church was not familiar with a self-sufficiency of the individual communities…the presbyters who
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“ligature” 700 of the bishop, the communion would splinter and harden into a mere private
sectarianism. 701 But if the bishop himself should become isolated from the catholica, then the local
church that remains united to him would be deprived of its inner logic, the claim of its Eucharistic
celebration marred by a deep contradiction. 702 It is for this reason that the authority of the universal
church emerges as an internal principle of the local communion wherein the “We” of faith achieves
its most basic embodiment. 703 Patriarchs, councils, and finally the Pope of Rome serve as the
safeguards and guarantors of the integrity of each local Church, and by extension, of each Christian
subject. 704
Thus Ratzinger can assert that “the true sense of the teaching authority of the Pope consists
in his being the advocate of the Christian memory,” 705 which memory takes root in each Christian
as he is incorporated into the Church. The complementarity suggested here between subjectivity

serve them belong together; together they form a ‘council’ with the bishop. The communities are held in the greater
unity of the Church as a whole through the bishop…the bishop is not the bishop alone but only in the Catholic
community of those who were bishops before him, and will be bishops after him.”
700
Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 88: “the bishop is the ligature of Catholicity…no community can simply give
itself its own bishop…” [referring to the fact that every bishop in the ancient Church had to be ordained by at least 3
neighboring bishops].
701
See Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 78: “One cannot benefit from the ‘blood shed for many’ by withdrawing to
the ‘few’.”
702
See Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 90: “This sort of ecclesiology, however, lacks the element of responsibility
for the universal Church embodied in the apostle. Thus, the Episcopal office itself is foreshortened, with the result that
even the local Church is no longer seen in her full intrinsic breadth.” cf. ibid., 81-2: “[it] inevitably destroys the public
nature and the all-embracing reconciliatory character of the Church, both of which are represented in the Episcopal
principle and result form the essence of the Eucharist. The Church becomes a group held together by her internal
agreement, whereas her catholic dimension crumbles away…Communio is catholic, or it simply does not exist at all.”
703
cf. Newman’s monarchial principle, which becomes embodied in the Pope.
704
See Ratzinger, Called to Communion, 75-103. Ratzinger describes the process whereby “letters of communion”
led eventually to the recognition amongst the Christian churches of certain “reference points” of communion—
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receiving in the great communion of the one Church.” (92) cf. “Letter to Bishops of the Catholic Church on Some
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and authority is only inconceivable to modern man on account of the impoverishment of his
notions, which “do not allow for bridges between subject and object.” 706 But, as we have seen,
Ratzinger’s understanding of subjectivity is far removed from any “liberal notions of autonomy,
which preclude transcendence of the subject,” and concerns rather that “much deeper sense that
nothing belongs less to me than I myself. My own ‘I’ is the site of the profoundest surpassing of
self and contact with him from whom I came and toward whom I am going.” 707 Conscience
(synderesis) constitutes “something like an original memory” implanted deep within the heart of
man as an “inner ontological tendency” towards the Creator who addresses him and calls him.708
In this sense, the love of God as it is stipulated in the commandments cannot really be considered
as an imposition that crushes the freedom of the subject; rather it must be seen as the profoundest
affirmation and liberation of the subject—whose dignity is rooted in its orientation to truth—
recalling to it the deepest structures implanted in its origin. 709 Indeed, the Church’s primary
mission in history can be viewed as the increase of freedom through the empowerment of
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conscience, 710 provided she retains her authority always in the “powerlessness” of conscience and
does not confuse it with worldly power. 711
As the Christian is incorporated into the new subject of the Church, his freedom increases
as he is endowed with a new supernatural conscience. He receives “the anamnesis of the new
‘we’”:
The original encounter with Jesus gave the disciples what all generations receive in their
foundational encounter with Lord in baptism and the Eucharist, namely, the new anamnesis of
faith, which unfolds, like the anamnesis of creation, in constant dialogue between within and
without…712

This new memory is something internal within each Christian, even as it requires assistance from
without in order to come to full knowledge of itself amidst the contrary pressures of a fallen world
forgetful of its being. 713 The role of the Pope, then, is not to impose from without, but to affirm,
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elucidate and actualize the interior authority proper to each Christian. 714 The more one grows in
the Spirit, in the exodus from self into the new man of Christ, and so into the communal subjectivity
of the Church, the less one experiences the Church’s authority as an external constriction, and the
more he knows it as the internal principle of his thinking and feeling. 715 Hence, “John could say,
You do not need such instruction; as anointed ones (baptized ones) you know everything.” 716
v. The Hermeneutic of Faith
The Church has a maternal role in fostering this connatural knowledge within her children
which far outstrips any mechanical or institutional function. It is a personal role, one which comes
to light only when the “personal figure of Mary becomes transparent to the personal form of the
Church herself.” 717 Mary indeed provides the necessary correlate to the Christ’s revelation insofar
as his filial existence can only be received and appropriated through her perfect response of faith:
fiat. 718 His Word can resound in history only through the space opened up in her immaculate heart,
a space which the Church in turn must perpetuate as the center and form of her personal existence
if she is to be herself. Faith’s object cannot be separated from its subjective appropriation; it is not
a fixed result of scientific objectivity that can be passed on as an accomplished formula requiring
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no further effort on the part of the recipient. 719 It is only received through transformative decision,
the decision of faith, which is always fundamentally Marian. 720 Therefore, the Church endures
only as Marian, only as the mother who shares her life by engendering it in her children. By
participation in the Church’s personal life, every believer is thus given a Marian-ecclesial heart by
which to believe and to remember.
This memory, illumined by the spirit, inculcated in liturgy, guided and guaranteed by the
direction of magisterial authority, thus grows into a principle that allows the Christian, together
with the Church, to read the shape of revelation and salvation history. This reading is “anchored
in the whole life of the Church,” in her believing, praying and loving, through which “we hear in
what is said that which is unsaid” so as to draw forth for today the ever unfolding import of the
unchanging faith. 721 There is a “sureness” to this memory as it “distinguishes from within between
what is a genuine unfolding of its recollection and what is its destruction or falsification.” 722 In the
new space of the ecclesial “We” established by the Spirit, 723 it is able through the Spirit’s
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suggestio 724 to see the parts in light of the whole, to relate parts to whole and whole to parts,725
such that the gospel can continue to shine forth with an ever brighter intelligibility. “In
remembering, they knew him, as the Gospel has it in a number of place.” 726 This is not a process
that is measurable by explicit formal logic. 727 Crucially, it is only within this properly ecclesial
subjectivity that the objectivity of the Truth can be disclosed: “Understanding can take place only
within this ‘we’ constituted by participation in the origin.” 728 There is a certain “communality” or
“sympatheia” with the origin that is a necessary prerequisite to its appreciation. 729 Because faith
entails the personal taking-up of a stand on a new ground beyond oneself, there can be no true
understanding of Christ apart from faith. 730 Credo ut intelligam: to know him, it is necessary to
follow him. 731 For this reason, any attempt to reduce faith to a mere list of positive formulations
that are in principle intelligible to anyone is bound to falsify faith’s essence:
Formulas live by the logic that supports them; but logic lives by the logos, the meaning, which
does not reveal itself without the cooperation of life—it is bound to the ‘circle’ of communio
that can be penetrated only by the union of thought and life. 732
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This is also the reason why the liturgy, for Ratzinger, must be the primary locus of ecclesial
anamnesis: it is here that we are permitted to enter into Christ’s prayer and into His living “I,”
granting us that connaturality beyond words that enables us to read His revelation properly. 733
Jesus cannot be known apart from a participation in his prayer. “Given that prayer is central to the
person of Jesus, sharing in his prayer is the prerequisite for knowing and understanding Jesus.”734
In fact, Jesus is identified with his prayer to his Father, such that his person becomes
incomprehensible without an entrance into this life of prayer. 735 No “pure science” that might seek
to abstract itself from such subjective elements can therefore accomplish anything more than the
reduction of Christ to an object in the past. 736 Rather, a truly “scientific” knowledge of Jesus will
only be possible to the one who seeks that sympathy with his person that comes in communion
with his prayer, a communion which can only be found in his Church, for “communion with the
prayer of Jesus includes communion with all his brethren.” 737 This communion reaches its climax,
as we have seen, in the Eucharistic exchange of persons, wherein “the prison of the ‘I’ is laid open”

the Church herself. She came into existence because someone lived and suffered his word; by reason of his death, his
word is understood as word par excellence, as the meaning of all being, as logos…The Church’s creed has been
developed, above all, from the existential context of the catechumenate…Formulas live by the logic that supports
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and I find the “center of myself is outside myself” in the unity of love that grants me access to
Jesus’ person. 738 Love then becomes the “eye” 739 that allows us to see Christ in the connaturality
of the spirit that only exists in the Church. “Jesus and the Church…are inseparable.” 740
Ratzinger does not hesitate to label this “communality” between subject and origin a
“hermeneutic of faith,” which can grant exegetes, historians, theologians, and the experiencing
Christian access to their desired object without thereby demanding any compromise in scientific
rigor or philosophical honesty. 741 Indeed, for Ratzinger, taking up one’s hermeneutic stand within
the ecclesial tradition is simply part and parcel of being rational in the field of theology. 742 Because
the Scriptures are themselves documents of faith which belong to a communal tradition, and
because no document can be understood in isolation from the spirit in which it was written, faith
and its communal tradition become a necessary lens for the understanding of Scripture: 743 “Faith
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is itself a hermeneutic, a space for understanding, which does not do dogmatic violence to the
Bible, but allows the possibility for the Bible to be itself.” 744
It is also a hermeneutic for reading the history of the Church in its gradual articulation of
faith’s import. Ratzinger will even speak of a “hermeneutics of dogma” 745 that must govern our
reading of past ecclesial affirmations in light of the ongoing philosophical and theological
developments that follow from the Church’s reflection on revelation. This would apply to
articulations regarding, for instance, the nature of the resurrected body, 746 the mode of Christ’s
Eucharistic presence, 747 the relationship between body and soul, 748 the beatific vision of the
saints, 749 the status of those outside the Church’s sacramental bounds, 750 the definition of the
person, 751 and the mechanisms of salvation. 752 As revelation drives philosophical developments
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only gradually towards more and more adequate articulations, the Church is often forced to make
pronouncements with the inadequate notions available to her at the time, pronouncements which
must later be adjusted in light of further developments in language, albeit without fundamental
contradiction. It is then the role of the hermeneutics of faith, operating in obedience to hierarchical
judgment, to determine the proper import of these past pronouncements in light of the full course
of the history of tradition.
vi. The Redemption of Reason
In making these affirmations, Ratzinger is not naïve to the dangers inherent in the
hermeneutical turn of the twentieth century, nor to the implications involved in employing its
language in the arena of faith. He is keenly aware of the relativistic postmodern temptations—
latent in the self-awareness of its own subjective-historical conditioning—to despair of truth and
so lose sight of the fundamental orientation of the human mind and heart. 753 These have arisen, in
part, from abuses which allowed truth to be “discredited in history” insofar as it has been “offered
from a position of domination and made an excuse for force and oppression.” 754 In this Ratzinger
sees a kinship between the crisis of our age and that of Socrates: as the criterion of truth fades
thanks to its lost credibility, man becomes the measure of all things; but as such he is no longer
able to secure a meaning for himself in the midst of the ever more rapidly changing world; being
is eclipsed by time, the bonds of society fray, and man slips into a hopeless nihilism.755
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Ratzinger’s response in the face of this crisis, however, is not simply to identify
philosophical errors so as to reassert more forcefully a classical realism. Indeed, he does not offer
a philosophical solution at all. This is because he sees in the philosophical fault-lines that typify
our contemporary crisis the expression of something more basic and existential within man. If the
tensions between reason and tradition, history and truth, technê and theoria are but expressions of
the basic philosophical tension between being and time—the one and the many—this tension in
turn has its roots not so much in an intellectual error as in a deeper, spiritual condition: namely,
man’s alienation from his Origin, from the Father who as transcendent memoria embraces all time
within the unity of His absolute being. 756 Granted such a depraved isolation, man cannot forge the
unity of being on his own. He cannot give meaning to himself. However well aware his reason
may be of the necessity of such a unity, it cannot secure this by its own resources: lacking its
ultimate ground, it will either assert unity at the expense of the particular (Parmenides), or preserve
the particulars at the expense of unity (Heraclitus). Thus, as Newman saw, reason without faith
tends to despair of its object. 757 Man’s subjectivity stands in need of redemption.
Thus, as confident as Ratzinger is in reason’s capacity to come to the truth, he is even more
strident in his affirmation that it can only accomplish this goal through the aid of faith, which
liberates it from its always too-narrow perspectives. 758 It is only in Jesus Christ that man’s access
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never finding: at length, after various trials, he gives up the search altogether, and decides that nothing can be known,
and there is no such thing as truth…”
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See Rowland, Ratzinger’s Theology, 4-5, 34. cf. Ratzinger, “The Dignity of the Human Person,” in Commentary
on the Documents of Vatican II. Vol V, 120: “there is, and must be, a human reason in faith; yet conversely, every
human reason is conditioned by a historical standpoint so that reason pure and simple does not exist.” cf. id., “Truth
and Freedom,” Communio XXIII:1, 31: “There is no great philosophy which does not draw life from listening to and
accepting religious tradition. Wherever this relation is cut off, philosophical thought withers and becomes a mere
conceptual game.” cf. Cardinal Ratzinger’s address to the Communion and Liberation movement at Rimini in August
2002, where he recalls the medieval adage that reason “has a wax-nose” in that it “can be pointed in any direction, if
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to the divine memoria is restored; only in His “I” that man can come to share in the vision of the
Father that alone is adequate to mediate the tensions between being and time, reason and
tradition; 759 only in His Logos that man receives the meaning, the word, the person, the love 760 by
which to make sense of existence and to perceive the unity of history. 761 The Church, through
whose communal subjectivity this “I” of Christ is communicated through time and space, is then
the hope of history:
If there really is such a thing as this ‘I’ of the credo, called forth and made possible by the
Trinitarian God, then the hermeneutic question is thereby basically answered. For in that case
this transtemporal subject, the communio Ecclesiae, is the mediator between being and
time…Christian faith, by its vey nature, includes the act of remembering; in this way, it brings
about the unity of history and the unity of man before God, or rather: it can bring about the
unity of history because God has given it memory. 762

one is clever enough,” and argues that reason needs “encounter with the beautiful” (namely, the beauty of Christ) in
order to find the right criteria for judgment.
759
See Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 98: “Neither revolution nor traditionalism…Jesus wants to lead
us…to know the Father from the perspective of tradition and to understand tradition from the perspective of the
Father.” cf. ibid., 99: “The Christian sees in Jesus a point of access to the center of tradition, to that place where
tradition is, in very fact, a breakthrough to what was in the beginning; where it does not range itself against reason but
reveals the ground on which it rests. In other words, he sees himself protected not only against false tradition but also
against a false freedom from tradition, for he reads tradition as Jesus does. And that means, in truth, that he shares in
Jesus’ relationship to the Father, that he interprets tradition in conversation with God, the Father of Jesus Christ.”
760
See Collins, Word Made Love, 82: “The understanding of the Logos, by a process of historical and theological
appropriation in the Christian tradition, has gone through various stages of meaning: from ratio to verbum and then to
the appropriation of verbum that is communicated as prosõpon (person), the primary characterization of which is that
of filius.” cf. Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 189: “By its application to Jesus of Nazareth, the concept of
logos acquires a new dimension…The concept logos, which to the Greeks meant ‘meaning’ (ratio), changes here
really into ‘word’ (verbum). He who is here is Word; he is consequently ‘spoken’ and, hence, the pure relation between
the speaker and the spoken to.” cf. ibid., 26: “Logos signifies reason, meaning, or even ‘word’—a meaning, therefore,
that is Word, that is relationship, that is creative. The God who is logos guarantees the intelligibility of the world, the
intelligibility of our existence, the aptitude of reason to know God and the reasonableness of God…The world comes
from reason, and this reason is a Person, is Love—this is what biblical faith tells us about God.”
761
The apparent danger of fideism here can be countered by noting that Ratzinger fully acknowledges that human
reason is equipped with immanent structures rendering it capable of coming to truth. However, this structural capacity
depends upon a analogous participation in the divine Logos, which participation revelation shows to be concretely
ordered to the Logos incarnate. Thus philosophy can arrive at truth only insofar as it is “on the way” to Christ and His
Church; should it turn away from Christ in a sinful isolation, its capacity for truth is frustrated. The contemporary
philosophical crisis is accordingly the mark of a post-Christian age.
762
Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 23. cf., ibid., 100: “Tradition, we said, always presumes a bearer of
tradition…a community…the bearer of concrete memory…the Church…The Church’s role as bearer of tradition rests
on the oneness of the historical context and the communal character of the basic experiences that constitute the
tradition. This bearer is, consequently, the sine qua non of the possibility of a genuine participation in the traditio of
Jesus, which, without it, would be, not a historical and history-making reality, but only a private memory.”
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In the concrete communion of Jesus with the Father, which is rendered present through the
authoritative memoria of the Church, 763 man receives the singular perspective by which to
overcome the unhealthy dichotomy between revolutionary rationalism and fideistic
traditionalism—he receives “access to the center…to the place where tradition is, in very fact, a
breakthrough to what was in the beginning; where it does not range itself against reason but reveals
the ground on which it rests.” 764 In this sense, the hermeneutic of faith is the transcendent
resolution of all hermeneutics, insofar it offers the perspective of the Logos from which all things
can be (progressively) unified. This is a process which takes time, which is indeed never completed
in history, and the Church, which is never simply identical with Christ, accordingly stands ever
open to reform and continual conversion. 765 For this reason, it is vital that theologians take as
holistic a view of the tradition as possible so as to be able to assess the present in terms of the full
sweep of history, rather than adopting a legalistic formalism that assumes the present to be the
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See Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 100: “The Church is tradition, the concrete situs of the traditio of
Jesus.” cf. ibid., 101: “Salvation comes, not from the destruction of tradition or the archaeological neutralization of
tradition, but only when the Church, the bearer of tradition, penetrates to its true center, to the life at the heart of
tradition, to that community with God, the Father of Jesus Christ, that is revealed only through faith and prayer. Only
when this occurs can there be that true progress that leads to the goal of history: to the God-man who is humanity’s
humanization.”
764
Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 99.
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See Ratzinger, “The Ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council” in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio. Vol I, 74:
“the Church is not identical to Christ but stands opposite him. It is the Church of sinners which needs purification and
renewal again and again: it must become the Church again and again. The notion of reform thereby became a decisive
element of the concept of the people of God.” Thus “the recall of the Church from Babylon” is perpetual, “she is
summoned ever anew” and her historical journey is always “still underway.” cf. id., “The Dogmatic and Ascetical
Meaning of Christian Brotherhood” in Man Before God: Readings in Theology, 117-18: The Church is “a mandate
pressing toward realization,” since “‘to be a Christian’ can consist only in the constant process of ‘becoming a
Christian.’” cf. id., Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, 266-8: in maters of theological and spiritual
knowledge “the model of progress breaks down because the essentials have always to be found anew, and progress is
conceivable fundamentally only within collective orders, which do not reach down into what is specific to a
person…The ‘house’ of theology is not a building that has been erected once and for all, it stands only because
theologizing continues to go on as a living activity, and so the foundation is also something that is always actively
founding…” cf. id., Biblical Interpretation in Crisis, 10: “frequently…after a great breakthrough, generations of
descendants may come who reduce what was once a courageous new beginning to an academic commonplace.” All
of this against a linear and progressive model of tradition which would remove all need for reform.
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final. 766 This indeed was Ratzinger’s principal critique of the neoscholastic schemas at the Second
Vatican Council. 767 Nevertheless, even as the process remains always incomplete, the Church
presses on in confidence, knowing the resolution she aims at has already been given in principle
from her beginning, in the Lord revealed to the apostles, who is coming again. 768
Ratzinger thus overcomes the hermeneutic crisis not by rejecting hermeneutics, but by
positing a definitive hermeneutic, and in doing so also champions truth precisely by proclaiming
the redemption of subjectivity. His confidence in this program is witnessed by the characteristic
mode of his argumentation: he does not typically begin by isolating and critiquing the errors of his
opponents, but seeks first to enter into the heart of their concerns in order thereby to unfold the
inner logic of truth which must lead eventually to the Gospel perspective. He is convinced along
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See Ratzinger, Theological Highlights of Vatican II, 171, on the “contrast between historical thinking and formally
juridical thinking.” cf. id., “Cardinal Frings’ Speeches During the Second Vatican Council” in Joseph Ratzinger in
Communio. Vol I, 89, on Cardinal Frings’ desire for a “catholicity without shortcuts” which “shunned that positivism
based on the magisterium” in favor of a theology that breathed from the “whole of tradition.” cf. ibid., 95: “He again
opposed the whole breadth of the faith tradition to a theology whose memory seemed to reach back only to the First
Vatican Council…All this was at that moment ‘progressive’: it was the same progressivity which characterized
theologians like de Lubac, Danielou, Bouyer, and von Balthasar. Whoever grasps their intentions correctly will also
understand why precisely these men set themselves most against a post-conciliarism which replaces theology’s
previous foreshortening of memory with a new form of amnesia, and takes it up as modern.”
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See Ratzinger, Theological Highlights of Vatican II, 147-9: “the problem of the historical dimension in theology”,
introduced by the “so-called Modernist crisis”, occasioned “an enormous temptations for the faith…Pius X took
drastic measures…but this did not solve the problems. The schema of 1962 simply reiterated the theology of
prohibitions in a very elaborate way…this would have resulted not in the rescue of faith but in dooming it to
sterility…confining it in an ivory tower where it would have gradually withered away…would suffocate the faith from
within by cutting off its air supply.” cf. ibid., 171-2: “On the one hand we find a mentality that looks at the whole
spectrum of the Christian tradition and the wide scope of possibilities open to the Church. On the other hand there is
a mentality which is purely formal in approach and takes the current legal status of the Church as the only standard
for its considerations. It therefore regards any change beyond the limits as an extremely dangerous step. The
conservatism of this view is based on its aloofness from history and so it basically suffers from a lack of tradition—
i.e., of openness to the totality of Christian history. It is important that we see this because it gives us an insight into
the inner pattern of the opposing alignments of thought in the Council, often mistakenly described as an opposition
between progressives and conservatives. It would be more correct to speak of a contrast between historical thinking
and formally juridical thinking. The ‘progressives’ (at least the large majority of them) were in fact concerned with
‘tradition,’ with a new awareness of both the breadth and depth of what had been handed down in Christian tradition.
This was where they found the norms for renewal which permitted them to be fearless and broad in their outlook. It
was on outlook which came form the intrinsic catholicity of the Church.”
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See Ratzinger, “The Ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council” in Joseph Ratzinger in Communio. Vol I, 71:
“the Church is…something we pass on as unfinished, which will only be fulfilled at the coming of the Lord.” cf. ibid.,
74: “it will become itself only when the ways of time have been traveled and end in God’s hand.” cf. id., Theological
Highlights of Vatican II, 76: “Its decisive future and its transformation are still ahead. It must therefore always be
open to what comes and always ready to shed fixed formulations.”
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with Newman that there are finally only two consistent positions—Catholic Christianity and
atheism—to which all others must resolve if they are to avoid incoherence:
There is but one alternative: the alternative between the absolute dominion of technical reason,
which would presuppose the absurdity of being, and belief in creative reason, which, as the
tradition on which reason rests, also gives reason its meaning. 769

For this reason, Ratzinger cannot imagine a preambula fidei that would attempt to prescind from
faith. 770 For him, every rational appeal is already a call to conversion into the new space of faith’s
hermeneutic, and this is why Ratzinger’s arguments tend always to have something evangelical
about them: he is attempting to reveal the inconsistencies in his opponent’s positions so as to edge
them toward conversion to the position of faith. He is confident that it is only in the Catholic Truth
that the genuine concerns of any human heart can find their true validation.
It is in this sense that historical subjectivity and authority emerge as correlative and
mutually enabling co-principles in Ratzinger’s thought. On the one hand, the human subject finds
its true orientation and dignity in the revelation of Jesus Christ, and so must transcend itself into
communion with Christ and the ecclesial “We” in order find itself; hence its fulfillment will depend
upon submission to the authority of the Church, in which Christ is known. But, on the other hand,
this authority must itself depend upon the authority of revelation, which is only received and
appropriated via the collective subjectivity of the body of believers, who, guided by the Spirit,
continue to read salvation history according the central figure of Christ. Thus there can be no
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Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology, 99. Alternatively, we could put it that the only two ultimately consistent
are Heaven and Hell…Ratzinger does not believe in limbo. See Ratzinger, God and the World: A Conversation with
Peter Seewald. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002), 401: “…a teaching that seems to me rather unenlightened…”
cf. Collins, Word Made Love, 18: “Ratzinger makes a case to the world beyond the church for the intelligibility of all
creation—human existence in particular—in light of the Word being spoken by God that is the basis for all reality. In
so doing he provides a challenge to a postmodern tendency toward relativism…the case he makes is based not on
abstraction and rationalistic argumentation but rather on the narrative of salvation history…Logos comes to be known
as person, as love itself.”
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See Joseph Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
2004), 136: “It is my view that the neoscholastic rationalism that was trying to reconstruct the preambula fidei, the
approach to faith, with pure rational certainty, by means of rational argument that was strictly independent of faith,
has failed; and it cannot be otherwise for any such attempts to do that kind of thing.”
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question of an opposition between these poles. The path toward greater stability in faith lies not in
a return to a propositionalism that would abstract from history and subjectivity, but rather in a
more radical centering of these realities—in an ecclesial hermeneutic of faith—on the person of
Jesus Christ, Who redeems both history and subjectivity.

B. History and Truth
It is hoped that the profound connections that link the visions of Newman and Ratzinger
have at this point become sufficiently clear: how Newman lays the foundations for Ratzinger’s
accomplishment, and how Ratzinger carries Newman’s project forward to brings it to further
completion. This essay began with a consideration of modernity, of the subjectivism and
historicism to which modernity is prone, and of the threat that these characteristics of our era pose
to the life of faith. Many have responded to this threat by eschewing any serious consideration of
subjectivity and history, countering modernity rather with an unbending insistence on faith’s
objectivity and utter stability throughout history. Neither Newman nor Ratzinger, however,
adopted this approach. They did not flee consideration of the subject and its history but rather
pursued it with an ever greater insistence. They delved into the human subject and discovered at
its personal depths the point of transcendence unto a personal origin that can serve as a platform
for shared truth and shared ethical commitment, a transcendence which is fulfilled in the personal
encounter with Jesus Christ. At the same time, they delved into history and discovered in Christ
and in the memory of the Church the all-embracing hermeneutic that gives unity to history and
enables the arrival at truth. This pretty well encapsulates Newman’s journey into Catholicism: the
unity of history that his faith demanded was discovered only when he adopted the standpoint of
the Church, whose illative memory gathers the fragments into harmony and springs to grasp the
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whole beyond the collection of parts. Truth then emerges in history, where the personal Christ
continues to unveil himself to persons in and through the historical life of His Church.
In this way, both men overcome the crisis of modernity from within. They do not ask that
men leave their subjectivity and historicity behind as a prerequisite to faith, as certain versions of
the preambula fidei might suggest in their insistence upon abstract apodictic demonstrations and
their pretensions to universal validity regardless of subjective condition and historical standpoint.
Rather a certain entrance into subjectivity and a certain historical standpoint are presented as the
conditions of faith. When Ratzinger was confronted with the assertion that the Church’s creedal
language must be transhistorical, implying the need for a pre-established philosophia perennis to
adequately ground faith, he responded with the avowal that all language is historical, that a
historical approach is therefore vital to faith, and that Newman’s “seven notes” remain the best
guide available to the Church for the discrimination of development and corruption. 771 To see
Christ as the revelation of the Father, it is necessary to enter into the memory of the Church, where
Christ is known as the center and fulfillment of history and where he becomes truly present, and
to discover there the definitive resolution and interpretation of one’s own personal and historical
existence: only in the incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light. 772 If, on the other
hand, faith is understood to be grounded in the “pure objectivity” of rational “proofs” of preambles
and signs that establish the authority of the Church, to whose decisions I subsequently submit
irrespective of their material content or subjective resonance, it is difficult to see how faith can be
anything other than notional, and how it can necessarily entail anything like a conversion of heart.
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In the latter case, notional articulations will assume an absolute status in the life of faith,
and will accordingly resist any fluctuation aside from logical deduction, whereas the accounts of
Newman and Ratzinger allow for flexibility, growth and occasional reformulation in the Church’s
doctrinal tradition, even as there remains an ultimate underlying stability in the content of the
revealed impression and a continuity in the Church’s affirmations. The discernment of this
continuity, however, is not left to the logical analysis of formulas but to the hermeneutic of faith,
operating on an implicit level in the connaturality established in Christian hearts by the original
impression of faith’s object. It is because this impression is shared by all that it issues in a common
confession. The reason I submit to the Church’s formulations, then, is not because my faith is not
subjective and personal, but because it entails a subjectivity that always takes me beyond myself.
I belong to a larger whole, and this enables me to see and discern the whole.
It is this, in the end, that overcomes modern skepticism: a more profound subjectivity, and
not a reactionary objectivism. As the history of modernity shows us, the quest for “sheer”
objectivity actually tends paradoxically toward an ever more radical subjectivism, insofar as it
forces man to look for the grounds of epistemic certitude within his own immanent structures.
Thereby, however, he is cut off from what is most profound in him. For, as Ratzinger and Newman
each affirm in their own way, the deepest places in man are those that refer us outside of and
beyond ourselves, which open us out onto communal existence and transcendent truth. By
returning us to this heart, and to its fulfillment in the ecclesial encounter with Christ, they are able
to show us the meaning of our subjective and historical existence. Such is the profound
accomplishment of these two great figures, which links them across the century that separates their
lives. The truth appears in history, and history is its avenue, because the Truth is Christ, who comes
to us through the Church.
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Conclusion:
We are now at a point to hazard some summarizing conclusions of our study, final lessons
that Newman and Ratzinger offer to the Church of our age. First, and most important, is the
affirmation that revelation is one, “it is not a thing in parts,” and that it comes to us in a personal
mode, as a Person to be received by persons. Therefore it cannot be simply identified with any list,
no matter how extensive, of credenda to be embraced by the “intellect only,” or of propositions
admitting of cognitive understanding without the heart’s participation. Accordingly, to Wahlberg’s
insistence that revelation cannot be conveyed independently of propositions, we must add that it
also cannot be conveyed independently of personal manifestation. 773 No proposition, or system of
propositions, can begin to grasp the personal God—si comprehendus non est Deus. 774 Unless our
impressions admit of a symbolic transcendence that outstrips the capacity of words to embrace,775
we will be incapable of receiving a revelation of God’s very self. 776 Instead we will be limited to
hearing an impersonal report from third parties. But the New Testament seems to aim at something
more than this. 777 Newman’s romantic symbology and Ratzinger’s personalism both aim at

773

See Wahlberg, Revelation as Testimony, 94-5. Wahlberg insists that propositions are necessary for revelation: “It
is not possible, however, to infer from the occurrence of such events and nonverbal religious experiences that the
spiritual beings is [God]…there can be no coherent justification of belief in God if God has only revealed himself
manifestationally.” But he does not consider that a similar critique could be leveled against a revelation that was
merely propositional, or that perhaps each form needs the other.
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cf. Ratzinger, Milestones, 127: “Revelation…is always greater than what can be contained in human words, greater
even than the words of Scripture…Scripture is the essential witness of revelation, but revelation is something alive,
something greater and more: proper to it is the fact that it arrives and is perceived.” cf. Newman, Oxford University
Sermons, 336: “That view does not depend on such propositions: it does not consist in them; they are but specimens
and indications of it…portions or aspects of that previous impression.”
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cf. Coulson, Religion and Imagination, 15: “If we fail, therefore, to concede a middle ground between hard fact
and mere fantasy [i.e., poetic, imaginative intelligence], we deny the possibility of a religious faith which is
sacramental, because we deny transcendence to the incidents and situations of common life…religion will become demythologized into notions.”
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accounting for this transcendental capacity in our impressions, in order to articulate how we are
able to receive the Word made flesh in a properly incarnate and sacramental manner.
As this Word is personal, it must be received in a personal way, which is to say that it must
be received primarily by the heart, as articulated by Newman. 778 Cor ad cor loquitur. A vital faith
cannot be held by the “intellect only” but must live in the whole person, which implies that faith
cannot long survive the isolation of the dogmatic, spiritual and scriptural discourses from one
another. Moreover, since the human heart lives in history with all of the cultural and temporal
limitations that this implies, and since what it implicitly holds can never be simply identified with
any given explicit articulation, its articulations can and must change over history, albeit always
within an overarching continuity. Thus it is possible to embrace Loisy’s fundamental concern—
namely, that past articulations can become archaic and can actually obscure faith’s essence when
detached from their center—without falling into Loisy’s error—that past dogmatic assertions can
be simply left behind and contradicted. Faith can survive the passing of the biblical cosmology,
for instance, and would insist upon it only at the peril of distorting rather than conveying its integral
idea. Similarly, the untimely introduction of certain partial formulations of the past regarding the
doctrines of predestination or extra ecclesiam nulla salus can inhibit rather than promote access to
the person that lies at revelation’s core. 779 The hermeneutic of faith is needed to guide this
discernment.
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See Bouyer, Newman’s Vision of Faith, 202-3: “the heart here being not just the seat of emotions but that apex
mentis where moral conscience and intellectual consciousness are one, the ultimate source of our free decision to be
or not to be what we were meant and made for.”
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See Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 170: “an intellectual development may be in one sense natural,
and yet untrue to its original.” cf. ibid., 181: “A development, to be faithful, must retain both the doctrine and the
principle with which it started. Doctrine without its correspondent principle remains barren, if not lifeless, of which
the Greek Church seems an instance; or it forms those hollow professions which are familiarly called “shams,” as a
zeal for an established Church and its creed on merely conservative or temporal motives. Such, too, was the Roman
Constitution between the reigns of Augustus and Diocletian.”
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This need not imply any denigration of dogma or of its role in the life of faith. Doctrinal
articulations can indeed strike so much at the heart of revelation that they become vital to the
transmission and preservation of the whole. It is indeed the final judgment of both Newman and
Ratzinger that such formulations are constitutive elements of faith’s impression from the very
beginning: the Christological confessions of the apostles are already the origin of the dogmatic
tradition. But these live within a context,780 and this is what certain theologies in the Church have
tended to underappreciate. Neoscholasticism, in its fight against modernism, sought to safeguard
the objectivity and immutability of the faith by excising all subjectivity from its makeup. The
object of faith then became more or less equated with the abstract body of doctrine definitively
proposed by the Church, whose authority was discerned through the rational demonstration of
certain supernatural signs. But the result here was that faith, detached from the context of real
encounter, became entirely notional, and real only for the mystical few. There was then no way of
bridging the fateful divides in language between dogmatic, spiritual and scriptural theology. Nor
was there any way of meeting the quintessentially modern desire for authenticity, which instead
discovered in the language of faith yet another occasion of existential alienation. Faith, then, whose
notions had become frozen and impervious to the influence of new and changing apprehensions,
appeared as an ideology and thereby lost its credibility and enduring vivacity. 781
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“Creeds and dogmas live in the one idea.” (Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 331-2)
For his part, Garrigou-Lagrange saw the same problem as Ratzinger, and conceived of his mission largely in terms
of reestablishing the basic relation of the mind to being and truth. But he understood this primarily as an intellectual
malady and only secondarily a spiritual one. Thus he sought to heal the disease through a reaffirmation of the basic
Aristotelio-Thomistic notions. To his credit, he attempted to root these notions in the more primal intuitions of Le
Sens Commun, but in this he placed the priority decidedly upon the former rather than upon the latter. The controlling
influence was thus reversed in his system, and the conceptualizations were frozen and normalized: the conceptual
aspects now interpret, govern and control the real impressions, and not vice versa. Hence they become impervious to
the influence of new and changing apprehensions that might demand an adjustment, refinement, or in some instances,
a profound reform of notions.
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From the perspective of Newman and Ratzinger, this is an entirely inadequate situation for
theology. Notions, to really be known, must always flow from and return to the real, to the person.
They must be subordinated to the primary impressions that truly govern our thought, and, when
necessary, adjusted on their account. Otherwise theology will find itself devolving into an abstract
mind game: coherent, perhaps, but far from compelling. It is crucial therefore, if we want the
Christian truth to be truly known, that our aspectual explications of that truth employ notions
coherent with the real apprehensions of our faith, and indeed also with the legitimate apprehensions
of our age. 782 The conversio ad phantasmata is thus a perpetual prerogative in theology and
philosophy alike. We cannot simply ignore the emergence of new aspects that have reshaped our
apprehensions of reality. Every new aspect demands a recalibration and adjustment of all other
aspects so as to properly comport to the “real” source. 783
Hence the need for a certain flexibility in the Church’s theological tradition, and this not
primarily for the sake of accommodation to the age but rather for the sake of preserving the faith
itself. 784 Part of fidelity to an idea means allowing its hidden principles to unfold in sometimes
surprising ways, ways that call for ever newer integrations. 785 Similarly, fidelity to the past often
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Provided such apprehensions do not themselves flow from the rejection of faith or conscience, as, for instance,
modern apprehensions of sexual desire might, there is no need to fear such adjustments to the modern imagination:
the apprehensions attendant upon modern cosmology, geology and evolutionary biology provide us with important
examples of how theology must adjust itself in light of contemporary discovery in order to remain true to its mission.
Nor should we limit ourselves to examples from the scientific realm. Literature and art can also be occasions of
important new apprehensions to which theology must attend. After Dostoyevsky, certain things can no longer (or at
least should not any longer) be written in theology.
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virtue of a simultaneous and co-relative evolution of all ideas, each proportionate to the other. A theology which is
not current will be a false theology.” (Quoted disparagingly in Garrigou-Lagrange’s "La nouvelle théologie où va-telle?") Compare Newman’s words: “It changes with them in order to remain the same. In a higher world it is otherwise,
but here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often.” (Newman, Development of Christian
Doctrine, 40)
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cf. Yves Congar, The Meaning of Tradition. (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2004), 2-3.
785
cf. Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 303: “Faith, while it is so stable, is necessarily a principle of mental
growth also, in an especial way…and though since Christ came no new revelation has been given, yet much even in
the latter days has been added in the way of explaining and applying what was given once for all. As the world around
varies, so varies also, not the principles of the doctrine of Christ, but the outward shape and colour which they
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demands that we bring its light to bear upon new situations, thereby simultaneously bringing
present light to bear upon past affirmations. All of which is to say that sometimes new articulations
are called for precisely in order to preserve and remain faithful to the tradition, provided only that
these new articulations truly integrate within themselves, and never jettison, the concerns and
achievements of the past. Thus, for example, the change in import of the term “hypostasis”
witnessed between Nicaea and Chalcedon does not so much contradict as refine the insight of
Nicaea. 786 Similarly, the change in our understanding of what usury entails during the development
of capitalist economics does not so much contradict as refine the insights of the magisterium. 787
Or, to take an example from one of Garrigou-Lagrange’s principal targets, the proposal that we
complement or reformulate Trent’s definition of grace in light of the discoveries of modern physics
need not imply any contradiction of Trent so much as a refinement that preserves its central
insight. 788 This is certainly a risky venture, bound at times to end in failure, but it is necessary
nevertheless. 789 Ratzinger stresses that we adopt in order to de-Hellenize; 790 we engage the
saeculum in order to prevent secularization, because failure to do so would leave men’s thought
unconverted and unable to receive the gospel without distorting it; the inherent risk of this
procedure is why we have a Magisterium. 791 The alternative option of a merely conservative

assume.”… “as Wisdom only can apply or dispense the Truth in a change of circumstances, so Faith alone is able to
accept it as one and the same under all its forms. And thus Faith is ever the means of learning something new, and in
this respect differs from Bigotry, which has no element of advance in it, and is under a practical persuasion that it has
nothing to learn.”
786
The first Council of Nicaea anathematizes “those who say” the Son is “from another hypostasis.” cf. DH 126.
787
cf. Newman, Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, 93.
788
This is not to say that Bouillard’s specific suggestion is necessarily prudent or feasible; only that it is not a priori
impossible.
789
cf. Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 327: “The difficulty, then, and hazard of developing doctrines implicitly
received, must be fully allowed; and this is often made a ground for inferring that they have no proper developments
at all.”
790
See, for example, his discussion of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul in relation to its Greek and scriptural
sources in Ratzinger, Eschatology, 104-161.
791
i.e., only because the universality of faith’s claim must necessarily confront the universality of reason’s questioning
(and so address reason according to its terms) does the Church’s theology admit of such variability that a monarchial
principle becomes necessary for its preservation.
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traditionalism is, conversely, far more risky; it risks rendering the faith opaque, inauthentic, and
unintelligible to all but an esoteric few: the “knowing” remnant hanging on to the wisdom of a past
age.
No absolute relativism in faith’s notional articulation need be suggested here. It is not a
question of unprincipled and chaotic change, but of change according to an inherent logos, as the
flux of a mathematical curve is ultimately governed by a constant derivative. The change in such
instances is actually more conservative than progressive: the apparent material flux flows from a
deeper identity in principle. 792 The challenge is that, unlike the formulas of calculus, there is no
exclusively rational and explicit means by which to identify the terms of the principle that governs
Christian development. There is no “objective” third platform by which to ensure the accuracy of
our re-articulations, no clear rule by which to test whether it is time to press the demands of logic
or to rest in aporia, no definite criteria by which to determine the legitimacy of apparent challenges
from secular discoveries. 793 Rather what is required is a patient historical hermeneutic, governed
by a shared ethico-theoretical “imagination” 794 which flows from the encounter that “gives life a
new horizon.” Christianity is essentially historical: the content of its encounter is gradually worked
out in the Church’s contentious march through the centuries. The principle governing this process
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Hence there is such a thing a “conservative” heresy, when necessary development is resisted in the name of loyalty
to outmoded notions. cf. Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 181. In this sense, “forgetting” can
occasionally play a positive role in preserving the Church’s memory within a fundamental continuity, just human
memory often operates selectively for the sake of the whole. See Joseph Mueller, “Forgetting as a Principle of
Continuity in Tradition,” 751-81.
793
Here it is significant to observe that Newman ultimately decided to name his principles for differentiating true from
false developments “Notes” rather than “Criteria,” though he sometimes also uses the word “tests.”
794
We might label this shared ethico-theoretical imagination an “aesthetic.” Indeed, Balthasar relates his own project
of theological aesthetics to Newman’s illation. See Han Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic
Theory, Vol. II: Dramatis Personae: Man in God. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 130-36. cf. Dulles, Models
of Revelation, 162.
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is no other logos than the Logos in person, Jesus Christ, who as such is the ultimate canon of the
Church’s faith. 795
The objections of the neoscholastics to this schema correspond to their inability to
recognize the “imagination” as a genuine intellectual faculty. To Garrigou-Lagrange and those of
his school, the introduction of subjectivity inherent in this proposal necessarily implies relativism
and hence modernism. 796 If faith cannot be exclusively measured by objective and immutable
doctrines, to what else do we have to appeal beside private experience, which is inherently variable
and unstable? But matters appear quite differently to Ratzinger, for whom the principal moment
of faith’s transmission occurs in the liturgy, wherein the Christian is endowed with a new
“memoria” that functions as a “supernatural conscience” within him. 797 From this it should be
clear that the “encounter” of which he speaks can in no way be reduced to mere private experience.
Rather he refers to something held in common, something emerging through the “action of mind
upon mind,” to the “We” of faith and the collective imagination which, guaranteed by the Holy
Spirit, can indeed norm all private judgments. The ground of the Church’s dogmatic authority
stems from its claim to represent this communal conscience. 798
Faith then, while not based on vision or experience, does provide an experience and a vision
of its own, which is essential to its proper understanding. As St. Thomas says, “by the light of faith
which God bestows on him, a man assents to matters of faith and not to those which are against
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cf. Newman, Oxford University Sermons, 334: “Though the Christian mind reasons out a series of dogmatic
statements, one from another, this it has ever done, and always must do, not from those statements taken in themselves,
as logical propositions, but as being itself enlightened and (as if) inhabited by that sacred impression which is prior to
them, which acts as a regulating principle, ever present, upon the reasoning, and without which no one has any warrant
to reason at all.”
796
cf. Beaumont, “The Reception of Newman in France at the Time of the Modernist Crisis,” in Receptions of
Newman, 176: “Ultimately, in fact, both the ‘modernists’ and their neo-scholastic opponents had more in common
with each other than with Newman…[i.e., both were intellectualist]…Neither possessed the patristic culture of the
complexity and balance of Newman’s thought.”
797
Ratzinger, On Conscience, 35.
798
Ratzinger, On Conscience, 36.
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faith.” 799 To use Newmanian terms, its assent coincides with a certain illative imagination, a
personal apprehension, which enables it to perceive the divine authority and so make its
confession. 800 From the beginning, this confession is dogmatic in nature—“You are the Christ, the
Son of the living God!”-“My Lord and My God!”—yet its dogmatic form is unintelligible apart
from the encounter which illumines it. 801 Conversely, the encounter is itself always normed by its
dogmatic content. 802 Thus, there can be no question of reducing faith either to private experience
or to public dogma. It depends rather on a more nuanced conception, one in which confession
(dogma) is intimately united with encounter (liturgy), such that these are understood to mutually
interpenetrate and condition one another. 803 One aspect cannot be properly understood without the
other. Dogma abstracted from encounter ends in unintelligible notionalism. Encounter abstracted
from dogma ends in a modern subjectivism. But the two go together: the encounter is determined
by the confession, and the confession is realized in the encounter. 804 Theology, then, must always
work before the One whom it confesses. In other words, faith can only be understood in the context
of Eucharist. 805
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ST II-II, q. 2, a. 3, ad. 2.
See Newman, Grammar of Assent, 360.
801
cf. Dulles, Models of Revelation, 144: “Our concepts are molded by a real existential relationship that cannot be
conceptually thematized without the help of symbols given in revelation.”
802
Avery Dulles offers a nice articulation of the dynamic here through his discussion of the relationship between the
symbolic and the doctrinal aspects of revelation. See Dulles, Models of Revelation, 82: [citing Louis Dupre] “the
original Jesus-experience could not convey any revelation unless it were accompanied by a primary interpretation that
enjoyed equal status with the experience itself.” cf. ibid., 161: “The symbolic approach does not require a wedge to
be driven between symbol and doctrine.” cf. ibid., 144: “Because of the cognitive content implicit in the originative
symbols, revelatory symbolism is able not only to ‘give rise to thought’ but also to shape the thought it arouses…the
influence travels both directions. Doctrine enriches the meaning of symbols.” cf. ibid., 153: “Dogma…can give
stability and added power to the symbolism of primary religious discourse. The primacy of symbol does not justify
any symbolic reductionism.”
803
The real and the notional are never to be separated, but must be taken as a unity.
804
In this we are seeking to articulate a “third way” between modernist subjectivism and anti-modernist intellectualism
that consciously approaches the project of von Balthasar’s theological aesthetics. cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love
Alone is Credible, 59-60.
805
cf. Ratzinger, Milestones, 57: “I came to see the liturgy as being its [theology’s] living element, without which it
would necessarily shrivel up.”
800
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Faith only lives in this tradition. 806 It grows in a culture founded upon a primal encounter—
a real impression—apart from which it cannot properly be grasped. 807 Its objectivity, then, is only
apprehensible within the collective subjectivity of the Church, which is most fully operative in the
liturgy. From this it follows that any merely doctrinal stability will of itself be insufficient to
guarantee the preservation of the faith. Fidelity to the normative articulations of the past is
undoubtedly necessary to that preservation, but such fidelity will ring hollow if it is isolated from
the heart of the real encounter. What is required rather is the sympathy of a living cultural tradition,
which alone can enter into the confessions of the past in such a way as to effectively apply them
in the present circumstance. 808 Short of this condition, we land inevitably back in the abovementioned pitfalls of fideism and rationalism, 809 with faith’s notions and reason’s notions vying
for dominance. The two will be forever incompatible unless both are mediated by living
tradition. 810 But, as Alasdair MacIntyre has admirably shown, 811 the idea that we can know
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cf. Ratzinger, Milestones, 127: “The Church is a necessary aspect of revelation…‘tradition’ is precisely that part
of revelation that goes above and beyond Scripture and cannot be comprehended within a code of formulas.”
807
cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, Vol. I, 117-27. The form cannot be apprehended without the
splendor, nor the splendor in isolation from the form.
808
cf. Dulles, Models of Revelation, 223: “authentic tradition must of course be established by sound criteria, but the
criteria cannot be rightly used by those who do not live within the tradition.”
809
See supra, 117: “To falsely absolutize the notional aspects of theology in such situations would be to risk obscuring
their transparency to the center, such that the center’s fundamental outlines become hidden from view in a twin
temptation to fideism and rationalism: fideism insofar as stagnated theological language might force us to bracket our
understanding of faith from our natural and experiential knowledge, rendering faith’s object unrelatable and hence
unencounterable; rationalism insofar as a strict adherence to ultimately inadequate notions might force us to deny the
mysteries of faith when these notions are paradoxically outstripped.”
810
If the conclusions faith and reason are seen to be static and complete, then any tension between the two will be
insufferable, and one will have to give way to the other in confrontation (in which case both parties suffer). But if the
two are set in motion within a living historical tradition whose roots penetrate to a deeper level than explicit
articulations, then tensions become sufferable, as all things are yet on their way to full resolution, a resolution on
which faith does not depend. cf. Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 186: “A mere formula either does not
expand or is shattered in expanding. A living idea becomes many, yet remains one.”
811
Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University Press, 1988).
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anything apart from the context of tradition is, like “the fact,” but another example of modern
naïveté. 812 It flows from the dubious Cartesian attempt to ground reason upon itself. 813
Newman explodes that ill-fated project from within by his appeal to the real impression
upon the imagination as a genuinely intellectual apprehension which takes priority over the
notional aspects of ratiocination. In this he paves the way for later thinkers who, like Martin Buber,
will seek to ground reason in pre-conceptual apprehensions, and for Joseph Ratzinger, who will
seek to re-center all of Christian Theology upon the encounter with the person of Jesus Christ. This

812
As we have said, this does not deny the human capacity for truth. As Newman teaches, man, even as he recognizes
the fallibility and conditioning of his sensibilities, can still and must necessarily give his assent to truths qua true. Such
assents are after all the condition for recognizing our errors in the first place. To be conditioned and limited by a
perspective, therefore, does not and cannot entail the relativization of the moral values which I continue to apprehend
and assert as true. For I have no basis on which to critique any value except on that of the values which I still possess.
As MacIntyre puts it, the impossibility of thinking outside of a tradition does not invalidate human thinking, for we
cannot pretend to judge it externally from some supposedly neutral platform. Thus, contra Long, there is no need for
a “pure” reason that leaves history behind. Long wonders aloud how Ratzinger’s assertions in Truth and Tolerance—
that all reasoning is historically conditioned and that all projects of a “purely” rational preambula fidei are accordingly
ill-fated—can be reconciled with his later papal affirmations in the Regensburg lecture that philosophical reason is
capable of arriving at metaphysical truths that can serve as bases for dialogue. (See Long, Natura Pura, 212-22.) To
overcome the apparent tension, Long offers the solution that Ratzinger’s opinion on a matter so fundamental to his
theological vision had simply changed in the few years separating the later pontifical speech from the “early” work of
Truth and Tolerance (the book actually appears quite late in Ratzinger’s career arc). In fact, Ratzinger is able to affirm
both a) that reason can arrive at a common ground of metaphysical truth, and b) that reason is historically conditioned
and needs to be open to faith in order to fulfill its task, because he assumes a broader vision of reason than Long, who
can only envision reason in its explicit forms. Naturally, if reason is reduced to explicit apodictic proof, then things
will either be demonstrable or they will not. But if reason is understood to live in the interplay between the implicit
and the explicit dimensions within the culturally and historically shaped imagination that governs its judgments, then
“valid” demonstrations can fail to deliver real knowledge, and real apprehension can obtain without the benefit of
demonstration. In this case, explicit reason must live in connection with the existential and historical light of the
imagination in order to secure real knowledge. Since the Christian faith is the ultimate fulfillment of this “light,” any
“reason” that would explicitly cut itself off from its influence will necessarily atrophy. Such is the modern situation
as exemplified by Kant: (explicit) reason seeks its grounds within itself rather than above itself, and thereby cuts itself
off from being. Benedict’s point at Regensburg is that such a “reason” is incompatible with Christianity, just as it is
an inadequate ground for intercultural dialogue. But a reason that is open beyond itself to what it cannot explicitly
grasp, even if it is yet “on its way” to embracing the revealed Logos, is compatible both with dialogue and with faith.
“For philosophy…listening to the great experiences and insights of the religious traditions of humanity, and those of
the Christian faith in particular, is a source of knowledge, and to ignore it would be an unacceptable restriction of our
listening and responding.” There is no contradiction in Ratzinger’s vision here. He understands reason to grow in
history through historical perception, such that it is always “on the way,” and never finished, never identical with the
Logos. Because this “pilgrim” status is inherent to philosophical reason, its need for the light of faith in no way
threatens its integrity. Moreover, since faith is similarly “on the way” toward full articulation and relies on something
deeper than articulation for its life, it can tolerate philosophical questions and uncertainties that might otherwise shake
its stability.
813
cf. Newman, Sermons Preached on Various Occasions, 51: “It is certain that man is not sufficient for his own
happiness, that he is not himself, is not at home with himself, without the presence within him of the grace of Him
who, know it, has offered that grace to all freely.”
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Newmanian insight is, I would suggest, the key to understanding the difference that defines
Ratzinger’s approach to the modern crisis vis-à-vis that of Garrigou-Lagrange. Whereas GarrigouLagrange identifies an intellectual malady and so proposes ontological notions, Ratzinger
indentifies a spiritual malady and so re-proposes the person in light of whom those notions can
again become intelligible. The real apprehension is the norm that values and grounds all notional
aspects. This, finally, is what justifies the efforts of the ressourcement, whose brighter lights were
concerned above all to tie everything back to the primal Source from whom all else flows. Far
from relativism, the goal of this movement was to preserve the authentic role of truth by
rediscovering truth’s full dimensionality in Christ.
In the end, it is Jesus who is the Truth that saves us. He is the light that shines in the
darkness of our fallen minds, and scatters the shadows of ignorance and error, doubt and
uncertainty that so mark our lives as human beings, endowing us with the capacity to transcend
the painful limitations of our time and place even as we remain in historical flesh. He is the
meaning of history, the central axis in whom the story of each individual life finds its purpose and
completion, in whom our diverse and partial perceptions coalesce and all the vectors combine to
form the drama of existence. We find our shared humanity in communion with him. Above all
then, he is the meaning of life, the meaning of persons, who unveils our own impenetrable mystery
to us as he leads us to the reconciliation of all fragments in the eternal memoria that is our origin
and goal:

“Anyone who has seen me has seen the Father”
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